United States v. Ronald Dunbar

Fifth Circuit

United States v. Ronald Dunbar

714 F. App'x 463

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMarch 14, 2018

Docket17-10901 Summary Calendar

StatusUnpublished

This text of 714 F. App'x 463 (United States v. Ronald Dunbar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Ronald Dunbar, 714 F. App'x 463 (5th Cir. 2018).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Ronald Dunbar appeals the 57-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He argues that the district court reversibly erred in assessing a base offense level of 24 because his prior Texas convictions for aggravated assault do not qualify as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) and 4B1.2. Dunbar urges that the Texas aggravated assault statute does not have the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force as an element of the offense and does not satisfy the generic definition of aggravated assault.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, correctly asserting that the issue raised on appeal is foreclosed. See United States v. Guillen-Alvarez, 489 F.3d 197, 200-01 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a Texas aggravated assault conviction under Texas Penal Code Ann. § 22.02 is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2); see also United States v. Shepherd, 848 F.3d 425, 427-28 (5th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming the continued validity of Guillen-Alvarez after Mathis v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), and specifically holding that a Texas aggravated assault conviction is a crime of violence under §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) and 4B1.2).

Dunbar concedes that the sole issue raised on appeal is foreclosed by Guillen-Alvarez, but he seeks to preserve it for further review. Accordingly, summary af-firmance is appropriate. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969), The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is therefore GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4,

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PER CURIAM: *

Ronald Dunbar appeals the 57-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He argues that the district court reversibly erred in assessing a base offense level of 24 because his prior Texas convictions for aggravated assault do not qualify as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) and 4B1.2. Dunbar urges that the Texas aggravated assault statute does not have the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force as an element of the offense and does not satisfy the generic definition of aggravated assault.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, correctly asserting that the issue raised on appeal is foreclosed. See United States v. Guillen-Alvarez, 489 F.3d 197, 200-01 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a Texas aggravated assault conviction under Texas Penal Code Ann. § 22.02 is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2); see also United States v. Shepherd, 848 F.3d 425, 427-28 (5th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming the continued validity of Guillen-Alvarez after Mathis v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), and specifically holding that a Texas aggravated assault conviction is a crime of violence under §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) and 4B1.2).

Dunbar concedes that the sole issue raised on appeal is foreclosed by Guillen-Alvarez, but he seeks to preserve it for further review. Accordingly, summary af-firmance is appropriate. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969), The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is therefore GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4,

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