United States v. Romario Eliacin

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-2425

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Romario Scott Eliacin

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central

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Submitted: February 10, 2022 Filed: February 16, 2022

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Romario Eliacin received a 120-month prison sentence after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In an Anders brief, Eliacin’s counsel challenges a vulnerable-victim enhancement, see U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and a pro-se supplemental brief separately raises a host of other issues.

We conclude that there was an adequate factual basis for the district court1 to give Eliacin a two-level vulnerable-victim enhancement based on the victim’s age and the circumstances surrounding the crime. See United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133, 1146–47 (8th Cir. 2017). We also conclude that the overall sentence was substantively reasonable. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence under “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that a within-Guidelines-range sentence is presumptively reasonable). The record establishes that the district court sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of judgment. See United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2006).

Eliacin’s remaining pro-se claims fare no better. The district court had good reason to deny an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, United States v. Gaye, 902 F.3d 780, 789 (8th Cir. 2018); the supervised-release conditions it imposed were not an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Godfrey, 863 F.3d 1088, 1101 (8th Cir. 2017); and there is no evidence of judicial bias, see Bannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1996).

Finally, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court and grant counsel permission to withdraw.

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1 The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.