United States v. Rollins

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: July 30, 2004
• Docket: 03-5006
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 United States v. Rollins No. 03-5006 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0253P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0253p.06 _________________ COUNSEL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ON BRIEF: James E. Hibbard, London, Kentucky, for FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., John Patrick Grant, _________________ ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , X SUTTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Plaintiff-Appellee, - FRIEDMAN, J., joined. MOORE, J. (pp. 10-12), delivered - - No. 03-5006 a separate dissenting opinion. v. - > _________________ , GARY BURGESS ROLLINS, - OPINION Defendant-Appellant. - _________________ N Appeal from the United States District Court SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Gary Burgess Rollins pleaded for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London. guilty to possession of less than 50 kilograms of marijuana No. 02-00089—Danny C. Reeves, District Judge. with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At sentencing, this violation translated into a base offense Submitted: March 11, 2004 level of twelve, which the district court reduced to ten in view of Rollins’ acceptance of responsibility. The district court Decided and Filed: May 3, 2004* next attributed to Rollins a criminal history category of II based on his previous state-court convictions for Before: MOORE, SUTTON, and FRIEDMAN, Circuit (1) possession of marijuana and (2) driving without insurance. Judges.** After combining the vertical requirements of Rollins’ base offense level with the horizontal requirements of his criminal history category, the district court determined that he faced a sentencing range of eight to fourteen months, then sentenced him to an eight-month prison term. On appeal, Rollins challenges the district court’s inclusion * This decision was originally issued as an “unpublished decision” of his conviction for driving without insurance—a filed on M ay 3, 2004. On June 8, 2004, the court designated the opinion misdemeanor under Kentucky law—in its calculation of his as one recommend ed for full-text publication. criminal history. His argument is unavailing. ** Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s criminal Daniel M. Friedman, Circuit Judge of the U nited S tates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. history category includes all prior misdemeanors, unless they

1 No. 03-5006 United States v. Rollins 3 4 United States v. Rollins No. 03-5006

are specifically excluded in one of two subsections. U.S.S.G. offenses with an authorized term of more than five days are § 4A1.2(c) (2002). First, misdemeanors listed in not “minor traffic infractions.” 922 F.2d at 1239. Because in § 4A1.2(c)(1) or “offenses similar to” those listed are Kingston Tennessee law authorized a 90-day prison term for excluded from the criminal history calculation unless “(A) the reckless driving, the court determined that reckless driving sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term was not a “minor traffic infraction.” Id. And in view of the of imprisonment of at least thirty days, or (B) the prior established meaning of “infraction,” the court concluded that offense was similar to an instant offense.” Misdemeanors on the authorization of a 90-day prison term under Tennessee this list include, among other offenses, careless or reckless law ended the inquiry—as the Guidelines do “not intend driving, driving without a license or with a revoked or courts to weigh the relative seriousness of traffic offenses suspended license and leaving the scene of an accident. when deciding which convictions to exclude from criminal Second, § 4A1.2(c)(2) separately excludes other prior history calculations.” Id. misdemeanors—including juvenile status offenses, loitering and “[m]inor traffic infractions (e.g., speeding)”—and These conclusions in Kingston more than suffice to respond “offenses similar to them” from a defendant’s relevant to Rollins’ first objection to his sentence. Because Kentucky criminal history. law authorizes up to a 90-day prison term for violation of the State’s car insurance requirements, see Ky. Rev. Stat. Rollins initially argues that his Kentucky-law “no § 304.99-060, not unlike the Tennessee law in Kingston, a insurance” conviction constitutes a “minor traffic infraction” conviction for “no insurance” in Kentucky does not constitute under § 4A1.2(c)(2), making it non-countable in his criminal a “minor traffic infraction” under § 4A1.2(c)(2). Accord history assignment. Although this Circuit has yet to United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1199 (10th determine whether driving without insurance is a “minor Cir. 2001) (determining that driving without proof of traffic infraction” within the meaning of § 4A1.2(c)(2), our insurance is not a minor traffic infraction under decision in United States v. Kingston, 922 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir. § 4A1.2(c)(2)). Given this unchallenged aspect of Kentucky 1990), takes us a good way toward the conclusion that it is law and given our decision in Kingston, we reject Rollins’ not. Kingston holds that “infraction” in the phrase “minor invitation to “to weigh the relative seriousness” of this traffic traffic infractions” of § 4A1.2(c)(2) represents a “term of art” offense in “deciding which convictions to exclude from derived from U.S.S.G. § 1B1.9 and 18 U.S.C. § 3559. 922 criminal history calculations.” Kingston, 922 F.2d at 1239. F.2d at 1239; see also United States v. Aichele, 912 F.2d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 1990). These provisions in turn each Nor may this offense be excluded under the other provision define an “infraction” as “any offense for which the that lists non-countable misdemeanor maximum authorized term of imprisonment is not more than offenses—§ 4A1.2(c)(1). In accordance with that provision, five days.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.9 cmt. n.1; see 18 U.S.C. recall, “driving without a license or with a revoked or § 3559(a) (“An offense . . . is classified [as an infraction] if suspended license” (or a “similar” offense) may be excluded the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is . . . five if “the sentence was a term of probation” of less than a year. days or less, or if no imprisonment is authorized.”). In this case, however, the state court imposed a two-year conditional discharge for his insurance violation—a sentence On the basis of this language, Kingston concluded that that this Court has previously determined to be the misdemeanor offenses with an authorized prison term of “not “functional equivalent of ‘unsupervised probation.’” See more than five days” are “minor traffic infractions” while United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 722 (6th Cir. 1995) No. 03-5006 United States v. Rollins 5 6 United States v. Rollins No. 03-5006

(“We thus hold that conditional discharge [under Kentucky While it is true that probation frequently will occur in the law] is the ‘functional equivalent’ of an unsupervised context of the suspension of a jail sentence, the function of probation under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d).”); Harris v. United probation (and of conditional discharge under Kentucky law) States, 204 F.3d 681, 682–83 (6th Cir. 2000) (determining is by no means restricted to that setting. The overriding that Ohio’s equivalent of a “conditional discharge” sentence objective of probation is to place court-imposed conditions on qualifies as a term of probation of at least one year under the defendant. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 533.020(1) § 4A1.2(c)(1)); see also Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 644 (“Conditions of probation shall be imposed.”); id. S.W.2d 355, 358 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that aside from § 533.020(3) (“Conditions of conditional discharge shall be supervision, “there is no difference between conditional imposed.”); see generally 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal discharge and probation”). Procedure § 26.1(d) (2004) (“[T]he traditional definition of probation . . . assumes release pursuant to one or more Rollins has offered no explanation why a term of conditions and some degree of supervision to ensure “unsupervised probation” should not be treated as a term of adherence to those conditions.”). It is these court-imposed “probation” under the provision. Nor can we think of one. restrictions on the defendant’s behavior that distinguish Other courts, it bears adding, have reached the same sentences of probation or conditional discharge from mere conclusion, holding that “conditional discharge” and fines. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 cmt. n.4 (“[A] term of “unsupervised probation” alike constitute “probation” for unsupervised probation would be included [as a criminal purposes of § 4A1.2(c)(1). See United States v. Lloyd, 43 justice sentence under § 4A1.1(d)]; but a sentence to pay a F.3d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Caputo, 978 fine, by itself, would not be included.”). And it is these F.2d 972, 977 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. McCrudden, restrictions that render the sentences serious, see 9 Leslie W. 894 F.2d 338, 339 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The guidelines make no Abramson, Kentucky Practice Series: Criminal Practice & provision for treating ‘unsupervised’ probation as less than Procedure § 31:131 (2004), and presumably what makes probation.”). them countable under this Guideline. Whether the conditions imposed on Rollins in this instance (which the record does not Lastly, this Guideline provision cannot be construed to describe) were minimal—e.g., that he merely avoid further apply only to probation sentences given in connection with a offenses during his conditional discharge—or quite onerous, suspended jail sentence, as opposed to probation sentences the fact that his sentence entailed court-mandated restrictions given in connection with a fine. By its terms, the provision on his behavior is enough to draw it within the meaning of prohibits excluding a sentence if “the sentence was a term of “probation” in the Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United probation” of a year or more. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1). States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1164–67 (10th Cir. 2002) Neither the provision nor the commentary draws any (determining that requirements of maintaining good behavior, distinction between probation involving a suspended jail refraining from violating the law, and paying a $300 fee, sentence on the one hand and probation involving a fine, constituted “probation” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d)). community service or indeed probation alone on the other. The very next clause of the provision, moreover, plainly That Rollins’ conditional discharge involved the partial covers fines, as it indicates that a misdemeanor offense is not discharge of a modest fine ($500) in exchange for two years excludable if it is “similar to an instant offense,” of court-imposed restrictions, moreover, does not warrant § 4A1.2(c)(1)(B), a rule that necessarily includes differential treatment from other sentences of conditional misdemeanors that resulted in a fine alone. discharge or probation. Although Kentucky law requires that No. 03-5006 United States v. Rollins 7 8 United States v. Rollins No. 03-5006

a sentence of a prison term or a fine (or both) be imposed It is true, as Judge Moore points out, that this interpretation before a conditional discharge is given, Commonwealth v. has one seemingly odd consequence. Had Rollins paid the Tiryung, 709 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Ky. 1986), other States allow fine, his sentence would not have been countable. But when for sentences of probation (or their equivalent) independent of most of the fine was suspended and he received a two-year any other sentence, see, e.g., 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-5-3(b); conditional discharge, the sentence became countable. It is N.Y. Penal Law § 60.01; see generally Daniel E. Feld, not clear whether the Sentencing Commission anticipated this Annotation, State Court’s Power to Place Defendant on specific development when it imposed this bright-line rule Probation Without Imposition of Sentence, 56 A.L.R.3d 932 about sentences of probation of a year or more. It is clear, (1974). Consistent with the language of the relevant however, that the Commission realized that the criminal- provisions, the federal courts (to our knowledge) have never history rules in this section could lead to criminal-history considered a stand-alone sentence of probation or conditional outcomes that fail to square with the realities of an discharge, or a sentence of probation or conditional discharge individual’s criminal record. Section 4A1.3 addresses that coupled with a fine, to be anything other than a term of problem, however, by allowing district court judges to grant “probation” under § 4A1.2(c) and § 4A1.1(d), even though downward and upward departures when an application of the the defendant does not face the threat of a suspended jail Guidelines generates an inequitable result, and it makes more sentence. See, e.g., Gorman, 312 F.3d at 1166–67 (sentence sense in our view to rely on that safety-valve provision than of unsupervised probation plus a fine is a criminal justice to disregard the unyielding terms of § 4A1.2(c)(1). See sentence under § 4A1.1(d)); United States v. Castro, 279 F.3d McCrudden, 894 F.2d at 339 (The Guidelines “resolve this 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2002) (one-year sentence of probation counts potential inequity by permitting departures from the under § 4A1.2(c)); United States v. Boyd, 146 F.3d 499, 502 prescribed sentence if a resulting history score ‘significantly (7th Cir. 1998) (one year of court supervision and a over-represents’ the seriousness of a defendant’s criminal fine—where the supervision was vacated and the full fine history.”). In this instance, Rollins did not invoke this safety- imposed—is “probation” under § 4A1.2(c)); United States v. valve provision, which indeed would have been difficult for Baker, 116 F.3d 870, 873–74 (11th Cir. 1997) (term of him to do in view of his other prior criminal conduct. probation for one year or until the fine is paid in full counts under § 4A1.2(c)); United States v. Labella-Szuba, 92 F.3d Rollins lastly argues that the inclusion of a “no insurance” 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1996) (one-year conditional discharge conviction in his sentencing calculations violates the sentence, as unsupervised probation, qualifies as a criminal Guidelines’ policy of creating “reasonable uniformity in justice sentence). sentencing” by treating violators of similar offenses in a like manner. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A (policy statement). No such Application Note 4 of § 4A1.2 does not undermine this uniformity occurred here, he urges, because the inclusion of conclusion or the above court decisions. See U.S.S.G. this conviction in his criminal history boosted his sentence § 4A1.2 cmt. n.4. (“A sentence which specifies a fine or other above the sentences of similar offenders solely because the non-incarcerative disposition as an alternative to a term of Kentucky judge who sentenced him for the “no insurance” imprisonment . . . is treated as a non-imprisonment violation conditionally discharged his fine rather than sentence.”). That a defendant’s choice between a “fine or suspending the fine or requiring him to pay it in full—in other non-incarcerative disposition” and a term of contrast to what Rollins’ lawyer asserts is common practice imprisonment is a “non-imprisonment sentence” does not say by Kentucky judges. But this characterization of the actions anything about whether a sentence constitutes “probation.” of the responsible Kentucky judge has no support in the No. 03-5006 United States v. Rollins 9 10 United States v. Rollins No. 03-5006

record and is incompatible with the provisions of Kentucky ________________ law that specifically authorize just such a sentence. DISSENT For the foregoing reasons, the district court correctly ________________ included Rollins’ conviction for driving without insurance in its calculation of his criminal history. We affirm. KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Rollins’s “no insurance” conviction does not qualify as a “minor traffic infraction” under § 4A1.2(c)(2), I disagree strongly with its conclusion that the conditional discharge of a fine is equivalent to a sentence of probation, such that the conviction should count under § 4A1.2(c)(1). The conditional discharge in this case is not “the functional equivalent of ‘unsupervised probation.’” Maj. op. at 4, quoting United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 722 (6th Cir. 1995). Both cases that the majority cites, Miller and Harris v. United States, 204 F.3d 681, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2000), dealt with the conditional discharge of a prison sentence. See Miller, 56 F.3d at 721 (“whereby he was given a sentence of thirty days imprisonment conditionally discharged for two years”); Harris, 204 F.3d at 682 (discharge at issue in case is “a condition on which a sentence of imprisonment is suspended”). Here, the conditional discharge is of a fine, and all that the Kentucky courts would have done had Rollins violated the conditions of the discharge would be to impose punishment of the balance of the fine, plus court costs. The majority responds to this key distinction by arguing that it is the conditional nature of the discharge that is important: any time, then, that a state places conditions on a misdemeanant, the sentence will count, even if the full punishment the state could impose after a violation of those conditions is well below the threshold level otherwise to trigger the provision. The total illogic of this position — that a defendant fined $1,000,000 on the spot receives no criminal history points, but one whose $100 fine is conditionally discharged receives a point, or that a defendant whose fine for a nonsufficient funds check is discharged on the condition that she not shop at a particular mall for a year receives a point — is No. 03-5006 United States v. Rollins 11 12 United States v. Rollins No. 03-5006

acknowledged by the majority, but does not lead it to this is entirely unwarranted, when the proper route is so clear. conclude that perhaps the designers of the Sentencing I respectfully dissent. Guidelines did not anticipate this result. I do not believe that the determinant of “probation” is “conditions” on a defendant, but instead I believe that “probation” is determined from the ultimate punishment that could be visited on the defendant who violates those conditions. Therefore, I would conclude that the nonsensical results that follow from the majority’s reading of the provision are ample evidence that that reading is incorrect. By transforming Rollins’s fine into a term of probation, the majority also creates an odd result when contrasted with Application Note 4 to § 4A1.2, which states: Sentences Imposed in the Alternative: A sentence which specifies a fine or other non-incarcerative disposition as an alternative to a term of imprisonment (e.g., $1,000 fine or ninety days’ imprisonment) is treated as a non- imprisonment sentence. Thus, had Rollins been sentenced to payment of his $500 fine or ninety days in prison for his infraction, a possible sentence under the Kentucky statute and surely a more severe sentence than payment of $500, conditionally discharged to $50, his conviction would not count. I believe Rollins’s actual sentence for driving without insurance, which could only have resulted in a fine, is not properly counted in his criminal history under § 4A1.2(c)(1). Finally, the majority alludes to the possibility of downward departure under § 4A1.3 in cases like the one before us. Of course, no downward departure occurred in this case, and Rollins is unable to appeal the district court’s failure to make one. By relocating this issue from the definite terms of § 4A1.2(c)(1) to the discretionary “safety valve” of § 4A1.3, the majority insulates the district court’s decision from review and further limits the ability of wrongfully sentenced defendants to appeal to this court for legal correction. I think