United States v. Roger Thomas Eley

Fifth Circuit

United States v. Roger Thomas Eley

480 F.2d 617

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJuly 30, 1973

Docket73-1263

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 480 F.2d 617 (United States v. Roger Thomas Eley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Roger Thomas Eley, 480 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

'Appellant was indicted for bank robbery on July 7, 1971. His trial was set for July 18, 1972. He failed to appear and was then indicted for bail jumping. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3150. His conviction and this appeal therefrom followed in due course.

The district court did not err in refusing to permit appellant to establish fear as his motive for bail jumping. Cf. United States v. Miller, 4 Cir., 1971, 451 F.2d 1306. There was no proffer of facts sufficient to make out a denial of counsel within the reach of Massiah v. *618 United States, 1964, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, or otherwise. The nearest approach to a proffer is the pre-trial affidavit of counsel for appellant reciting only what appellant had stated to him but its contents do not rise above the level of claiming that the prosecutor conferred with appellant in the absence of and without notifying appellant’s court-appointed counsel. Appellant filed a post-trial affidavit to the same effect. This bare circumstance would not make out a Massiah violation. We are not told for example, that the conversations or arrangement, if any, with the law enforcement authorities were not at the volition of appellant and, at his direction, to the exclusion of his counsel.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

'Appellant was indicted for bank robbery on July 7, 1971. His trial was set for July 18, 1972. He failed to appear and was then indicted for bail jumping. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3150. His conviction and this appeal therefrom followed in due course.

The district court did not err in refusing to permit appellant to establish fear as his motive for bail jumping. Cf. United States v. Miller, 4 Cir., 1971, 451 F.2d 1306. There was no proffer of facts sufficient to make out a denial of counsel within the reach of Massiah v. *618 United States, 1964, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, or otherwise. The nearest approach to a proffer is the pre-trial affidavit of counsel for appellant reciting only what appellant had stated to him but its contents do not rise above the level of claiming that the prosecutor conferred with appellant in the absence of and without notifying appellant’s court-appointed counsel. Appellant filed a post-trial affidavit to the same effect. This bare circumstance would not make out a Massiah violation. We are not told for example, that the conversations or arrangement, if any, with the law enforcement authorities were not at the volition of appellant and, at his direction, to the exclusion of his counsel.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

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480 F.2d 617, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-roger-thomas-eley-ca5-1973.

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