United States v. Rodney Hesson

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedAugust 15, 2018
Docket17-30627
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Rodney Hesson (United States v. Rodney Hesson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Rodney Hesson, (5th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

Case: 17-30627 Document: 00514601965 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/15/2018

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED No. 17-30627 August 15, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

RODNEY HESSON, also known as Psy.D.; GERTRUDE PARKER,

Defendants - Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:15-CR-152-1

Before CLEMENT, HIGGINSON, and HO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Defendants Rodney Hesson and Gertrude Parker were charged with conspiracy to perpetrate a Medicare fraud scheme as CEOs of two companies— Nursing Home Psychological Services (“NHPS”) and Psychological Care Services (“PCS”). Under their leadership, the companies implemented policies directing psychologists to overbill Medicare for the services they provided. After a six-day jury trial, they were each found guilty of conspiracy to commit

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 17-30627 Document: 00514601965 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/15/2018

No. 17-30627

health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and conspiracy to make false statements related to health care claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Hesson and Parker raise numerous issues on appeal, but none persuades. Accordingly, we affirm. I Hesson was the owner and CEO of NHPS, which he purchased in 2008. The company partnered with nursing homes and sent psychologists to administer psychological exams and consultations to their residents. NHPS employees known as “clinical coordinators” worked with nursing homes to identify the residents in need of the company’s services. NHPS maximized the number of residents using its services by, for example, setting a low bar to qualify a resident for testing, paying coordinators per referral, and proactively scheduling subsequent evaluations at the earliest date allowed by Medicare. NHPS’s service was streamlined. Clinical coordinators, who had no psychological degrees, would put together a small file on each patient and then administer the same three basic tests, which required no specialized training and lasted no more than 10–15 minutes each. After the test was administered, the patient would briefly speak with a psychologist, who would review the test results and ask additional questions. The conversation would culminate in a treatment recommendation and short-form write-up. An assistant would then convert the psychologist’s notes into a longer report, a process which usually took 30–35 minutes. The psychologist would review the report, editing as necessary, and then fill out a billing form to be submitted to Medicare. There is significant evidence in the record that the company’s policies and culture were focused on its financial interests, not quality of care. Patients with Medicaid coverage would not receive the tests and could expect only a brief consultation because NHPS did not receive reimbursement. By contrast,

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Medicare recipients—for whose service NHPS would receive reimbursement— were seen as often as permitted, regardless of the helpfulness of the repeated visits. Many patients, for example, had mental disabilities so severe they could not complete the exams, yet were seen on a quarterly basis. Indeed, the tests themselves were not particularly probing for those who could complete them. NHPS’s billing statements to Medicare did not reflect its economized system. The billing forms used the Medicare code 96101, reimbursing “[p]sychological testing per hour of the psychologist’s or physician’s time, both face-to-face time administering tests to the patient and time interpreting these test results and preparing the report.” Despite the fact that psychologists spent little time with patients (one estimated as little as 30 minutes) or preparing their reports, they consistently reported five to eight hours per patient. As a result, the doctors would report “impossible hours”—i.e., more hours of work than physically possible in a given day. NHPS also included the work done only by assistants. Medicare paid NHPS $6.49 million on claims between 2009 and 2012. Hesson, himself a practicing psychologist at the time, was at the center of NHPS’s policy. Hesson’s company-wide target was for physicians to complete 10 to 15 patient evaluations during a single workday. He also discouraged psychologists from spending time engaging in substantial edits to the assistants’ reports. Under his leadership, psychologists were paid flat fees per patient seen, incentivizing them to spend as little time as possible with patients. He also encouraged psychologists to provide treatment recommendations that were the least burdensome to the homes. Hesson also enforced the company-wide billing policy. He emphasized the importance of billing at least four hours of work per patient to maintain the company’s financial health. Internal reviews on this issue were

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undertaken, and Hesson would reach out to doctors charging less to “encourage” them to charge more time. Those who continued to report lower hours risked having pay withheld or contracts terminated. And he practiced what he preached. Indeed, at one point, Hesson was seeking reimbursement for 78–90 hours of work per day. In June 2011, Hesson was charged with 11 counts of Medicaid fraud in connection with his private practice (not NHPS). This precipitated certain policy changes at NHPS. For example, psychologists were required to complete the tests, and he capped the number of evaluations a doctor could give per day (albeit still at a high number). The indictment also led to his decision to sell the company to Parker, his mother, who purchased NHPS for $500,000. Hesson pleaded guilty twelve days later [and lost his license. NHPS’s name changed to PCS, but Parker ran the company exactly as Hesson had. She kept the same model and practices in effect, and improved on the system’s profitability—by, for example, seeking to expand the business, imposing a ten-referral-per-visit minimum on nursing homes, and researching the residents with Medicare in advance. PCS received $7.3 million in Medicare reimbursements between 2012 and 2015. Parker made financial and management decisions for PCS and ran the day-to-day operations. She also maintained pressure on the psychologists to bill the appropriate number of hours, and confronted those who did not. Despite his fraud conviction, Hesson was an active figure in the new company. Upper management meetings were held at his house during the transition, at which he would voice opinions on administrative matters. And he remained a constant advisor on PCS billing policies and other important decisions. On October 22, 2015, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Hesson, Parker, and two high-ranking employees in NHPS/PCS—

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Beverly Stubblefield and John Teal—with conspiracy to commit health care fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349) and conspiracy to make false statements related to health care matters (18 U.S.C. § 371).

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United States v. Rodney Hesson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-rodney-hesson-ca5-2018.