MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HADEN, Chief Judge.
At the sentencing hearing held January 2, 1996, the Defendant objected to the presentence investigation report, contesting the lack of consideration given him under the “safety valve” provisions of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(l)-(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5)1 the lack of adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1; and the factual accuracy of the report. The Court OVERRULED Defendant’s objections and adopted the proposed findings and recommendations of the report. The Court found and concluded the Defendant’s continued denial of factual guilt and his evasiveness with law enforcement officials in debriefings precluded him from receiving credit for acceptance of responsibility or consideration under the “safety valve” provisions. This Memorandum Opinion and Order further ex[214]*214plicates and memorializes the Court’s holding. The Court reviews the evidence and makes specific findings regarding its ruling.2
The Sentencing Guidelines provide: “[i]f a defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3El.l(a) (Nov. 1992).
“In determining whether a defendant qualifies under subsection (a), appropriate considerations include, but are not limited to [the defendant] truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § IB 1.3 (Relevant Conduct) .... A defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.”
U.S.S.G., § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 1(a)). The application notes to the Guideline further explain: U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 3) (emphasis added).
“[e]ntry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined with truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which he is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) (see Application Note 1(a)), will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility for the purpose of subsection (a). However, this evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility. A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under this section as a matter of right."
A defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence he is entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. U.S. v. Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 346, 107 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir.1989). To be considered for this adjustment, a defendant must accept responsibility for all his criminal conduct. Partial acceptance is insufficient. United States v. Underwood, 970 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846, 111 S.Ct. 131, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990).
A defendant who is dishonest about prior conduct does not accept responsibility. United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715 (4th Cir.1993). In Falesbork, the defendant argued the district court erred in rejecting his request for an acceptance of responsibility reduction. 5 F.3d 715. The findings of the presentence report demonstrated the defendant did not admit the truth of the facts contained in the indictment and that he continued to deny much of his involvement. Although Falesbork expressed remorse for his crimes, at sentencing he again attempted to minimize his involvement. Our Court of Appeals concluded the district court did not err in refusing the reduction for acceptance of responsibility because Falesbork did not truthfully and forthrightly admit his prior conduct.
Similarly, a defendant who challenges certain facts surrounding his criminal conduct does not accept responsibility. United States v. Strandquist, 993 F.2d 395 (4th Cir.1993) (no reduction for acceptance of responsibility where defendant fully admits responsibility for the offense of conviction but dial-[215]*215lenges relevant findings of fact of the district court); United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1372, 131 L.Ed.2d 227 (1995), (a defendant who falsely denies or frivolously contests relevant conduct is not entitled to reduction for acceptance of responsibility).
Here, the Defendant did not take the stand or give sworn testimony. Nevertheless, the affirmative representations of his counsel made at Defendant’s urging are equivalent, in the Court’s opinion, to a direct denial of factual guilt by the Defendant. Such affirmative denials of factual guilt preclude the Defendant from receiving credit for acceptance of responsibility or consideration under the safety valve provisions.
The Defendant admitted the relevant facts comprising the offense to which he pleaded guilty. He admitted traveling to New York City and purchasing a large quantity (seventeen ounces) of cocaine base with Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00) earned from previous drug transactions. He admitted his objective was to bring the cocaine base to Charleston for distribution. He further admitted distributing controlled substances was his sole means of financial support.
Nevertheless, the Defendant did not admit he and his co-Defendant, Bandele Jones, were acting in partnership. Nor did he admit knowledge of the cocaine powder involved. Further, his admitted involvement with only seventeen ounces, or 481.95 grams, of cocaine base is far short of the total amount of controlled substances the evidence established was attributable to him.
The actions of the Defendant, Jones, White and Frank Fazio were part of an ongoing common plan3 to bring drugs from New York to distribute in Charleston. During the week of March 12, 1995 Jones and Robinson traveled from Charleston to New York City for the purpose of obtaining drugs for distribution in Charleston.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HADEN, Chief Judge.
At the sentencing hearing held January 2, 1996, the Defendant objected to the presentence investigation report, contesting the lack of consideration given him under the “safety valve” provisions of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(l)-(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5)1 the lack of adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1; and the factual accuracy of the report. The Court OVERRULED Defendant’s objections and adopted the proposed findings and recommendations of the report. The Court found and concluded the Defendant’s continued denial of factual guilt and his evasiveness with law enforcement officials in debriefings precluded him from receiving credit for acceptance of responsibility or consideration under the “safety valve” provisions. This Memorandum Opinion and Order further ex[214]*214plicates and memorializes the Court’s holding. The Court reviews the evidence and makes specific findings regarding its ruling.2
The Sentencing Guidelines provide: “[i]f a defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3El.l(a) (Nov. 1992).
“In determining whether a defendant qualifies under subsection (a), appropriate considerations include, but are not limited to [the defendant] truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § IB 1.3 (Relevant Conduct) .... A defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.”
U.S.S.G., § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 1(a)). The application notes to the Guideline further explain: U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 3) (emphasis added).
“[e]ntry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined with truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which he is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) (see Application Note 1(a)), will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility for the purpose of subsection (a). However, this evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility. A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under this section as a matter of right."
A defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence he is entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. U.S. v. Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 346, 107 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir.1989). To be considered for this adjustment, a defendant must accept responsibility for all his criminal conduct. Partial acceptance is insufficient. United States v. Underwood, 970 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846, 111 S.Ct. 131, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990).
A defendant who is dishonest about prior conduct does not accept responsibility. United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715 (4th Cir.1993). In Falesbork, the defendant argued the district court erred in rejecting his request for an acceptance of responsibility reduction. 5 F.3d 715. The findings of the presentence report demonstrated the defendant did not admit the truth of the facts contained in the indictment and that he continued to deny much of his involvement. Although Falesbork expressed remorse for his crimes, at sentencing he again attempted to minimize his involvement. Our Court of Appeals concluded the district court did not err in refusing the reduction for acceptance of responsibility because Falesbork did not truthfully and forthrightly admit his prior conduct.
Similarly, a defendant who challenges certain facts surrounding his criminal conduct does not accept responsibility. United States v. Strandquist, 993 F.2d 395 (4th Cir.1993) (no reduction for acceptance of responsibility where defendant fully admits responsibility for the offense of conviction but dial-[215]*215lenges relevant findings of fact of the district court); United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1372, 131 L.Ed.2d 227 (1995), (a defendant who falsely denies or frivolously contests relevant conduct is not entitled to reduction for acceptance of responsibility).
Here, the Defendant did not take the stand or give sworn testimony. Nevertheless, the affirmative representations of his counsel made at Defendant’s urging are equivalent, in the Court’s opinion, to a direct denial of factual guilt by the Defendant. Such affirmative denials of factual guilt preclude the Defendant from receiving credit for acceptance of responsibility or consideration under the safety valve provisions.
The Defendant admitted the relevant facts comprising the offense to which he pleaded guilty. He admitted traveling to New York City and purchasing a large quantity (seventeen ounces) of cocaine base with Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00) earned from previous drug transactions. He admitted his objective was to bring the cocaine base to Charleston for distribution. He further admitted distributing controlled substances was his sole means of financial support.
Nevertheless, the Defendant did not admit he and his co-Defendant, Bandele Jones, were acting in partnership. Nor did he admit knowledge of the cocaine powder involved. Further, his admitted involvement with only seventeen ounces, or 481.95 grams, of cocaine base is far short of the total amount of controlled substances the evidence established was attributable to him.
The actions of the Defendant, Jones, White and Frank Fazio were part of an ongoing common plan3 to bring drugs from New York to distribute in Charleston. During the week of March 12, 1995 Jones and Robinson traveled from Charleston to New York City for the purpose of obtaining drugs for distribution in Charleston. On March 18, 1995 Robinson telephoned Angelo White from New York City and encouraged him to join them. Subsequently, White and Fazio departed for New York from Yeager Airport in Charleston. The evidence established White, Jones and Robinson purchased a large quantity of cocaine base and cocaine powder while in New York. Fazio agreed to carry the drugs back to Charleston.
On March 19, 1995 Robinson, Jones and White arrived at Yeager Airport on the same flight from New York City via Pittsburgh. As the passengers exited the plane, an officer recognized Fazio. Officers advised Fazio they had reason to believe he was involved in transporting controlled substances. Fazio denied he possessed any drugs and consented to a search of his person and luggage. The search revealed 1,009 grams of cocaine base and 59.8 grams of cocaine powder attached with duet tape to Fazio’s upper body.
During the search, Robinson entered the terminal. Believing he might be Angelo White, officers approached him for identification. At the time the officers did not have any evidence linking Robinson to Fazio. Subsequently, Robinson was released.
Soon thereafter, White entered the terminal and was detained for questioning. White consented to a body search whereupon ten packets of marijuana were retrieved. White was placed under arrest. During separate debriefings, White and Fazio made statements which implicated Robinson and Jones in the scheme.
At Jones’ trial, White also testified he made at least four to five trips to New York with Robinson and Jones between January, 1994 and March, 1995. On each trip, Jones and Robinson jointly purchased sixteen to eighteen ounces of cocaine base for personal use and for distribution in Charleston. White made his purchases separately on these trips. On at least three additional occasions, White did not accompany Jones and Robinson to New York, but gave them money to purchase at least one ounce of cocaine base on his behalf. On each occasion, White received at least one ounce of cocaine base, as he had requested, for a total of three ounces.
[216]*216Based upon the foregoing, Robinson’s relevant conduct4 includes the 1,009 grams of cocaine base seized at Yeager Airport, 1,814.4 grams of cocaine base for the previous four trips to New York with Jones (16 ounces x 4 trips = 64 ounces = 1,814.4 grams), 85.05 grams (3 ounces) of cocaine base purchased by Robinson and Jones for White on three occasions in New York, and 59.8 grams of cocaine powder seized at Yeager Airport. The total weight of cocaine base attributed to the Defendant is 2,908.45 grams. The total amount of cocaine powder is 59.8 grams.5 Based on the foregoing evidence and the trial evidence and jury verdicts in co-Defendant Jones’ case, these amounts were reasonably foreseeable to Robinson. In most instances they were directly attributable to him as well.6
The Court found the testimony and evidence adduced at Jones’ trial credible. All calculations regarding quantities of controlled substances are consistent with that testimony. The Court finds the Defendant has not truthfully provided the Government or the Court with all information and evidence concerning the offense that was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme. Accordingly, the Court finds and concludes the Defendant does not qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility or for consideration under the provisions of the safety valve. Simply put, Defendant Robinson does not qualify for the reductions because he did not admit, but in fact contested, the extent of his relevant criminal conduct.
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel, the Marshal for the District and the Probation Office of this Court.