USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 1 of 8
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-13655 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
ROBERTO PERALTA IBARRA, Defendant- Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20581-DPG-3 ____________________ ____________________ No. 22-13743 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 2 of 8
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13655
versus
ALBERTO PEGUERO, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20581-DPG-2 ____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellants Roberto Peralta Ibarra and Alberto Peguero ap- peal their convictions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Peguero also appeals his sentence. Appellants assert several issues on ap- peal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm Appellants’ convictions and Peguero’s sentence. I. DISCUSSION A. MDLEA Application to Exclusive Economic Zones Appellants first contend the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA as applied to their offense because they were not arrested upon the “high seas.” Rather, their offense was committed on non-territorial waters around Colombia comprising its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under international law. However, this Court recently held an EEZ is part of the “high USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 3 of 8
22-13655 Opinion of the Court 3
seas” for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Consti- tution. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 823 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025). International law does not limit the Felonies Clause. Id. at 826. Therefore, a motion to dismiss an MDLEA indictment on constitutional grounds was properly de- nied in Alfonso when several codefendants were arrested 69 nautical miles off the coast of the Dominican Republic within its EEZ be- cause this location was within the “high seas.” Id. at 819, 827. The holding that EEZs are within the “high seas” of the Fel- onies Clause is binding precedent in this case. Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 827; see also United States v. Kluge, 147 F.4th 1291, 1303 n.3 (11th Cir. 2025) (stating under our prior panel precedent rule, a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su- preme Court or us sitting en banc). Thus, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA and the MDLEA ap- plied to the Appellants arrested in the EEZ of Colombia. B. Constitutionality of MDLEA 1. Definition of Stateless Vessels Appellants next contend the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s au- thority under the Felonies Clause when it defines “stateless” vessels more broadly than international law does in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C). We review a challenge to the constitutionality of a criminal statute de novo. United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374, 1378 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2025 WL 2824488 at *1 (Oct. 6, 2025). Although a guilty plea generally USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 4 of 8
4 Opinion of the Court 22-13655
waives a defendant’s right to appeal his conviction, it does not waive the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute un- derlying the conviction. Id. International law does not limit Con- gress’s authority to define “stateless” vessels for the purposes of the MDLEA in § 70502(d)(1)(C). Id. at 1381. The Appellants’ argument is foreclosed by Canario-Vilomar. This Court has already rejected the premise that international law limits Congress’s authority to define “stateless” vessels. Id. There- fore, the district court did not err in holding § 70502(d)(1)(C) was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to define “stateless” vessels and assert jurisdiction more broadly than international law. 2. Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals Appellants contend the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s powers and violates due process because it allows the United States to as- sert jurisdiction over foreign nationals in the absence of any nexus between the offense and the United States. Appellants acknowledge this Court has rejected similar arguments. The conduct proscribed by the MDLEA need not have a nexus to the United States because universal and protective princi- ples support its extraterritorial reach. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1383 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2014)). We have thus “plainly foreclosed” due process nexus argu- ments. Id. at 1382–83. Appellants’ argument is foreclosed. Under our longstanding precedent, the MDLEA is constitutionally imposed on defendants regardless of their nexus to the United States, therefore, its USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 5 of 8
22-13655 Opinion of the Court 5
application was proper irrespective of Peguero’s and Peralta Ib- arra’s ties to the country. C. Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction Appellants contend the Government failed to prove the ves- sel they were arrested on was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C). They contend the plain text of § 70502(d)(1)(C) states it is satisfied only when a claim of registry is initially asserted, which they distinguish from their fac- tual proffers which only stated the shipmaster “made a verbal claim of Dominican nationality.” We review de novo a district court’s subject matter jurisdic- tion. United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2023). The MDLEA’s statutory jurisdictional requirement goes to the sub- ject matter jurisdiction of the courts. Id. While parties may not stipulate to jurisdiction, they may stipulate to facts that bear on our jurisdictional inquiry. Id. Our task is to determine whether the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. Id. The MDLEA treats the terms “nationality” and “registry” as interchangeable throughout § 70502. Id. at 1291. The equivalency of these two terms in the statute is evidenced by § 70502(d)(1)(C), where the rejection of a master’s claim of registry is premised on the named country’s failure to confirm nationality. Id. The Appellants’ factual proffers were sufficient to establish statutory jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(C) because claims of na- tionality and claims of registry are interchangeable in the MDLEA under this Court’s precedent. Id. Although Gruezo did not deal USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 6 of 8
6 Opinion of the Court 22-13655
with a challenge to jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(C), it neverthe- less used the subsection as an example of the principle that the MDLEA does not generally distinguish between the two concepts as a matter of law. Id.
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USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 1 of 8
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-13655 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
ROBERTO PERALTA IBARRA, Defendant- Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20581-DPG-3 ____________________ ____________________ No. 22-13743 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 2 of 8
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13655
versus
ALBERTO PEGUERO, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20581-DPG-2 ____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellants Roberto Peralta Ibarra and Alberto Peguero ap- peal their convictions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Peguero also appeals his sentence. Appellants assert several issues on ap- peal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm Appellants’ convictions and Peguero’s sentence. I. DISCUSSION A. MDLEA Application to Exclusive Economic Zones Appellants first contend the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA as applied to their offense because they were not arrested upon the “high seas.” Rather, their offense was committed on non-territorial waters around Colombia comprising its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under international law. However, this Court recently held an EEZ is part of the “high USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 3 of 8
22-13655 Opinion of the Court 3
seas” for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Consti- tution. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 823 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025). International law does not limit the Felonies Clause. Id. at 826. Therefore, a motion to dismiss an MDLEA indictment on constitutional grounds was properly de- nied in Alfonso when several codefendants were arrested 69 nautical miles off the coast of the Dominican Republic within its EEZ be- cause this location was within the “high seas.” Id. at 819, 827. The holding that EEZs are within the “high seas” of the Fel- onies Clause is binding precedent in this case. Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 827; see also United States v. Kluge, 147 F.4th 1291, 1303 n.3 (11th Cir. 2025) (stating under our prior panel precedent rule, a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su- preme Court or us sitting en banc). Thus, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA and the MDLEA ap- plied to the Appellants arrested in the EEZ of Colombia. B. Constitutionality of MDLEA 1. Definition of Stateless Vessels Appellants next contend the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s au- thority under the Felonies Clause when it defines “stateless” vessels more broadly than international law does in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C). We review a challenge to the constitutionality of a criminal statute de novo. United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374, 1378 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2025 WL 2824488 at *1 (Oct. 6, 2025). Although a guilty plea generally USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 4 of 8
4 Opinion of the Court 22-13655
waives a defendant’s right to appeal his conviction, it does not waive the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute un- derlying the conviction. Id. International law does not limit Con- gress’s authority to define “stateless” vessels for the purposes of the MDLEA in § 70502(d)(1)(C). Id. at 1381. The Appellants’ argument is foreclosed by Canario-Vilomar. This Court has already rejected the premise that international law limits Congress’s authority to define “stateless” vessels. Id. There- fore, the district court did not err in holding § 70502(d)(1)(C) was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to define “stateless” vessels and assert jurisdiction more broadly than international law. 2. Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals Appellants contend the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s powers and violates due process because it allows the United States to as- sert jurisdiction over foreign nationals in the absence of any nexus between the offense and the United States. Appellants acknowledge this Court has rejected similar arguments. The conduct proscribed by the MDLEA need not have a nexus to the United States because universal and protective princi- ples support its extraterritorial reach. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1383 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2014)). We have thus “plainly foreclosed” due process nexus argu- ments. Id. at 1382–83. Appellants’ argument is foreclosed. Under our longstanding precedent, the MDLEA is constitutionally imposed on defendants regardless of their nexus to the United States, therefore, its USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 5 of 8
22-13655 Opinion of the Court 5
application was proper irrespective of Peguero’s and Peralta Ib- arra’s ties to the country. C. Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction Appellants contend the Government failed to prove the ves- sel they were arrested on was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C). They contend the plain text of § 70502(d)(1)(C) states it is satisfied only when a claim of registry is initially asserted, which they distinguish from their fac- tual proffers which only stated the shipmaster “made a verbal claim of Dominican nationality.” We review de novo a district court’s subject matter jurisdic- tion. United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2023). The MDLEA’s statutory jurisdictional requirement goes to the sub- ject matter jurisdiction of the courts. Id. While parties may not stipulate to jurisdiction, they may stipulate to facts that bear on our jurisdictional inquiry. Id. Our task is to determine whether the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. Id. The MDLEA treats the terms “nationality” and “registry” as interchangeable throughout § 70502. Id. at 1291. The equivalency of these two terms in the statute is evidenced by § 70502(d)(1)(C), where the rejection of a master’s claim of registry is premised on the named country’s failure to confirm nationality. Id. The Appellants’ factual proffers were sufficient to establish statutory jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(C) because claims of na- tionality and claims of registry are interchangeable in the MDLEA under this Court’s precedent. Id. Although Gruezo did not deal USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 6 of 8
6 Opinion of the Court 22-13655
with a challenge to jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(C), it neverthe- less used the subsection as an example of the principle that the MDLEA does not generally distinguish between the two concepts as a matter of law. Id. (finding no error when a magistrate judge concluded that § 70502(d)(1)(B) did not require the United States Coast Guard (USCG) to ask the master to make a claim of both nationality and registry for the vessel because the terms were inter- changeable in the statute). Therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction for the Appellants’ prosecution under § 70502(d)(1)(C) when the Appellants stipulated the master of their vessel asserted a nationality that was not verified by the asserted state. D. Nominal Involvement of the United States Appellants contend the USCG’s “nominal involvement” in this “Dutch-interdiction” is insufficient to permit the application of the MDLEA. They maintain that because the Dutch “ran” the law enforcement effort, it was incumbent upon them, not the United States, to prosecute the offense. They argue allowing an American prosecution in these circumstances violates due process. The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (CAIT) was signed by the United States and subsequently ratified by the United States Senate over three decades ago. See S. Rep. No. 102-30. Article 17 of CAIT provides that parties to the convention shall “co-operate to the fullest extent possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea.” CAIT, art. 17.1. It also states that if a signatory has reasonable grounds to USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 7 of 8
22-13655 Opinion of the Court 7
suspect illicit traffic, it “may request the assistance of other Parties in suppressing its use for that purpose.” Id., art. 17.2. It states that those other parties “shall render such assistance within the means available to them.” Id. The treaty encourages the establishment of “joint teams.” Id., art. 9.1(c). Appellants do not show how the MDLEA is unconstitu- tional as applied to them because they cite no authority for the principle that the government’s ability to prosecute hinges on its degree of involvement with their arrest and detention. We find no authority, and Appellants cite none,1 supporting Appellants’ argu- ment that nominal involvement by the American government would make their prosecution unconstitutional. Further, the ex- press terms of CAIT countenance this exact arrangement between Dutch and American authorities. The district court did not err in concluding the degree of involvement of the United States author- ities in the arrest and detention of the Appellants—even if deter- mined to be “nominal”—does not render the MDLEA unconstitu- tional as applied to them as a violation of the Appellants’ due pro- cess rights. E. Safety Valve Peguero contends the district court erred in interpreting the safety valve disqualification provisions at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). Section 3553(f) of Title 18 of the United States Code lays out the
1 We note Appellants do not argue they were unreasonably seized and searched by the USCG, so the Fourth Amendment authorities cited do not support their due process argument. USCA11 Case: 22-13655 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2026 Page: 8 of 8
8 Opinion of the Court 22-13655
requirements for “safety valve” relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). If certain statutory requirements are met, a sentencing court may impose a sentence “without regard to any statutory minimum sentence.” Id. The first requirement to be eligible for this relief is the defendant not have certain disqualifying marks on his criminal history. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). The three subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) create an eli- gibility “checklist,” specifying three necessary conditions for safety valve relief: the defendant must not (1) have more than four total criminal history points, (2) have a prior three-point offense, and (3) have a prior two-point violent offense. United States v. Pulsifer, 601 U.S. 124, 141, 153 (2024). If any one of the three requirements is not met, a defendant is ineligible for the safety valve. See id. Peguero’s arguments have been foreclosed by Pulsifer. Id. The binding interpretation of “and” in § 3553(f)(1)(B) is a disjunc- tive one. Id. at 141, 153. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding Peguero ineligible for safety valve relief when it was undis- puted he had a prior three-point conviction under § 3553(f)(1)(B). II. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we affirm Appellants’ convictions and Peguero’s sentence. AFFIRMED.