United States v. Robert Smith

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 25-5758
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0120n.06

No. 25-5758

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Mar 10, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY ROBERT M. SMITH, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )

Before: BOGGS, SILER, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Robert Smith pled guilty to federal gun and drug charges.

He now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in his

residence. We reject his arguments and affirm.

In February 2024, Kentucky State Police Trooper Matthew Day stopped a car with an

expired license plate. The driver allowed Day to search the car, where the trooper found fentanyl.

Day read the driver and passenger their Miranda rights, and they agreed to speak with him. They

told him they had bought the fentanyl from Robert “Pumpkin” Smith at his house three days earlier.

While there, they had seen Smith with 10 ounces of fentanyl, $12,000 in cash, and multiple guns.

They also said that they had purchased drugs from Smith three or four times a week for the past

18 months, and that they had driven Smith on a drug run to Lexington, Kentucky. Besides fentanyl,

Smith sold methamphetamine, cocaine, ecstasy, and prescription medications; he stored these

drugs in a purse that he carried with him; and he always conducted drug deals in his kitchen. No. 25-5758, United States v. Smith

During past drug deals, the informants had seen Smith with up to $75,000 in cash. They said that

he stored the money he received in a safe-deposit box at a local bank or in a safe in his bedroom.

The informants also told Day that Smith lived in a wooden house with a concrete porch on

Mill Creek Road; that a concrete bridge led to the house; and that Smith kept a single-wide trailer

and approximately 12 vehicles, including a Ford F-150, in the yard. They also shared a photo of

Smith, and gave Day his phone number.

Based on this information, as recited by Day in an affidavit, a state judge issued a search

warrant for Smith’s house. The search revealed fentanyl, methamphetamine, hydrocodone pills, a

digital scale, $30,000 in cash, 12 guns, and ammunition. A federal grand jury thereafter charged

Smith with multiple gun and drug offenses. Smith moved to suppress the evidence from the search,

but the district court denied the motion without a hearing.

Smith then pled guilty to possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute and to possession

of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A). His plea agreement preserved his ability to appeal “whether the District Court

erred when it found that the warrant to search his residence was supported by probable cause and,

alternatively, that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.” Plea Agmt. 4. The

court sentenced Smith to 120 months in prison, followed by four years of supervised release. This

appeal followed.

Smith challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We review the

district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision. See United States v. Collazo,

818 F.3d 247, 253 (6th Cir. 2016).

-2- No. 25-5758, United States v. Smith

Smith argues the police lacked probable cause to search his house. Probable cause means

“a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). When probable cause is based on information a police

informant provides in an affidavit, courts “must consider the veracity, reliability, and the basis of

knowledge for that information.” United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 893 (6th Cir. 2006). An

informant’s eyewitness account can provide “substantial evidence” that illegal drugs will be

present in a defendant’s house. United States v. Pelham, 801 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir. 1986).

Here, two informants with first-hand knowledge of Smith’s drug-dealing provided Day

with the information in the warrant affidavit. The informants said they had repeatedly purchased

fentanyl from Smith at his house—including within the prior three days—and recounted in

substantial detail the particulars of Smith’s drug-dealing operation. They also described Smith’s

house, his driveway, and the vehicles he kept on his property. And they gave the police Smith’s

photo and cellphone number. These detailed, first-hand accounts gave the state judge reasonable

grounds to determine that the informants were telling the truth. See United States v. Dyer, 580

F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miller, 314 F.3d 265, 270–71 (6th Cir. 2002).

The informants’ statements were credible for two other reasons. For one, statements of

informants “known to the police” are entitled to greater weight than “those of an anonymous

source,” because lying to the police exposes an informant to criminal liability. United States v.

May, 399 F.3d 817, 824–25 (6th Cir. 2005). And here Day undisputedly knew the informants’

identities after stopping their vehicle. Moreover, the informants made statements against penal

interest, which enhanced their credibility. See United States v. Kinison, 710 F.3d 678, 683 (6th

Cir. 2013). They admitted to repeatedly purchasing fentanyl and even disclosed that they had

taken Smith on a drug run to Lexington, making them potential accomplices. The informants’

-3- No. 25-5758, United States v. Smith

accounts therefore gave the judge a substantial basis to conclude that a search of Smith’s home

would turn up illegal drugs. See id.; Dyer, 580 F.3d at 391–92.

Smith’s arguments to the contrary are mistaken. He contends that the information in the

affidavit was unreliable because Day did not name the informants. But “there is no requirement

that an informant be named either in the affidavit or the search warrant.” United States v. Jackson,

470 F.3d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 2006). Smith also says that, to establish probable cause, Day needed

to corroborate the informants’ statements. True, corroboration often strengthens a warrant

application; but corroboration is typically required only when the officer otherwise lacks “any

indicia of the informants’ reliability.” Coffee, 434 F.3d at 893 (cleaned up). Here, Day found

fentanyl in the informants’ car, which partially corroborated their story. The informants’ detailed

accounts also included several indicia of reliability, so further corroboration was unnecessary. See

Dyer, 580 F.3d at 392.

Finally, Smith asserts that United States v. Higgins—where we held that an affidavit lacked

probable cause—controls the outcome here. 557 F.3d 381, 390 (6th Cir. 2009), overruled on other

grounds by DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 79 (2011). But in Higgins, the informant had

never seen drugs or evidence of other crimes in the defendant’s apartment. Id. at 390. Here, the

warrant had a much more substantial basis.

Separately, Smith argues that the district court erred by denying him a Franks hearing. But

Smith did not preserve a right to appeal that (pre-plea) ruling in his plea agreement, so he has

waived that issue. See United States v. Riccardi, 989 F.3d 476, 489 (6th Cir. 2021).

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

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