United States v. Robert S. Wylie, A/K/A Bobby S. Wylie

569 F.2d 62, 186 U.S. App. D.C. 231

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: March 27, 1978
• Docket: 76-2005
• Status: Published

Opinions

McGOWAN, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of possession of a bank statement stolen from the mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. The sole issue presented is whether the District Court erred in denying a pretrial motion to suppress the bank statement and the envelope in which it was enclosed, which appellant claimed were the fruits of an unreasonable investigative “seizure” of his person. Although this is a relatively close case on its facts, as Judge Bryant’s comments in the course of the suppression hearing indicated, we are satisfied that the ruling here challenged did not contravene appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights and, accordingly, affirm his conviction.

I

The only witness at the suppression hearing was Officer Franck, a veteran of six years with the Metropolitan Police Department, throughout which time he had engaged in routine patrols of local banks as part of his official duties. In the early afternoon of February 10, 1976, having been assigned to “bank detail” for the day, Officer Franck entered a branch of the National Bank of Washington located in the 1300 block of Connecticut Avenue, Northwest. Although he had been in that particular branch “many, many times,” he was not himself a customer of the bank and did not know which of the counter slips were withdrawal slips and which were deposit slips.

According to his testimony, Officer Franck first observed appellant from about 25 feet away, as the latter was standing in line at a teller’s window, holding a blue piece of paper which, because of its size, appearance, and color, Franck assumed to be a check. The officer’s attention was drawn to appellant because “his pants were kind of shaggy”; “[h]e was dressed fairly modestly”; and, more generally, “[h]e didn’t appear to be right inside the bank.” Tr. 9-10. While Franck walked to the “bank book,” which officers on bank detail are required to sign, and after he had written in the book, the officer continued to watch appellant.

When appellant got to the teller’s window, he waved the blue piece of paper in the air and then presented it to the teller. Officer Franck observed “[t]he bank teller look[] down at the slip of paper, turn[] it around and look[] at it and read it and immediately, within a matter of a second or two, push[] it back toward” appellant. A brief conversation between appellant and the teller ensued, but the officer was able to overhear only two words, “bank official.” Appellant picked up the piece of paper, turned, and saw Officer Franck looking at him. After three to five seconds of eye contact, appellant avoided looking further at Franck and walked up to a bank official. Instead of showing the piece of paper to the official, appellant placed it inside a brown envelope he had been carrying in his hand, and put the envelope in his pocket. He spoke for “one or two seconds” to the official, Tr. 23, then turned and “started walking fast out of the bank, not [at] the same pace he had been moving,” Tr. 12.

His interest aroused, Franck followed appellant out of the bank¹ and, having caught up with him on the sidewalk immediately outside, asked appellant, “Sir, may I talk to you a moment?” Tr. 13. When appellant responded “okay,” the officer went to his scooter parked in front of the bank and took out a copy of police department form 76, used to record information about preliminary investigative inquiries.² Franck began to fill out the form, and asked appellant for his name. Appellant told the officer that his name was “William Wither-spoon,” and that he lived on Ontario Road, Northwest.

Officer Franck then asked appellant if he had any identification, but appellant responded that he did not. The officer testified that his suspicions were amplified by this development:

Right away it struck me funny. Why does a man go into a bank to cash a check without some sort of identification.

Tr. 14; see id. 36. When Franck asked whether appellant was sure he did not have any identification, appellant replied that all he had was a withdrawal slip, which he had intended to use to take money out of his savings account. The officer requested to see the slip, and appellant took the brown envelope out of his pocket and removed the blue slip of paper which the officer had previously believed to be a check. The blue slip was in fact a withdrawal slip, with the name “William Witherspoon” written on it, and accordingly the officer transcribed this name onto P.D. Form 76.

Officer Franck asked appellant for his address and phone number, but appellant said that he did not have a phone number. Franck then asked appellant why he did not have any identification when he attempted to withdraw money from his savings account, and according to Franck’s testimony appellant gave the following answer:

He said he went into [the] bank and made a mistake. He tried to get some money from his savings account, and he had the checking account number [marked on the withdrawal slip].

Tr. 14-15. The officer then “started asking questions,” “but everything was funny.” Tr. 15.

At this point, Franck addressed the following question to appellant:

Mr. Witherspoon, would you mind coming back inside the bank with me, and we will talk to the manager, and if everything is okay, you can go.

Tr. 15. Appellant answered “no,” that he would not mind, which the officer apparently interpreted as consent to return to the bank. See Tr. 17.³

Once inside the bank, Officer Franck and appellant approached the bank official whom appellant had addressed very briefly on the way out of the bank. Franck asked the official, a Mr. Stewart, what appellant had said as he walked out; and Stewart replied, according to Franck, that appellant had simply stated “I will see you later.” Tr. 17. Franck then requested Stewart to confirm that a Mr. William Witherspoon had an account with the bank. When a telephone call yielded the response that there was no account in that name, Stewart asked appellant if he had a middle initial. Rather than answering immediately, appellant started snapping his fingers and “rung [sic] his head,” and “beads of perspiration came out all over his forehead.” Tr. 18, 24.

After about 15 or 20 seconds, appellant said his middle initial was “M,” and Mr. Stewart verified the existence of both a checking and savings account in the name of William M. Witherspoon. However, the address listed on the accounts was different from the one given by appellant outside the bank, and that date of birth on the bank’s records did not match the date given by appellant in response to a question from Officer Franck. When the officer asked appellant how long the accounts had been open, appellant again started snapping his fingers, and responded “one year,” but Mr. Stewart’s information indicated that the accounts had in fact been open three-and-one-half years. Observing what appeared to be a wallet in appellant’s inside coat pocket, Franck again asked appellant if he had any identification, but appellant stated that he did not.

After consulting by telephone with a detective from the Check and Fraud Section of the Metropolitan Police Department, Officer Franck placed appellant under arrest for attempted false pretenses, 22 D.C.Code §§ 103, 1301. Incident to that arrest, Franck seized the wallet and a brown envelope from appellant’s coat pocket. Inside the wallet was a birth certificate in the name of Bobby Samuel Wylie; and inside the brown envelope was a bank statement in the name of William Witherspoon, listing the account number of a checking account, and showing a balance of $412. The blue withdrawal slip which appellant had given to Officer Franck was a, savings account withdrawal slip, made out for $400, and inscribed with the checking account number displayed on Witherspoon’s bank statement.

Later investigation revealed that the bank statement had been placed in the United States mail on February 9,1976, the day before it was found in appellant’s possession, and that Witherspoon’s mail box had been broken into on February 10. On March 10, 1976, appellant was indicted for possession of stolen mail, 18 U.S.C. § 1708, and attempted false pretenses, 22 D.C.Code §§ 103, 1301. Defense counsel’s motion to suppress the bank statement and brown envelope was denied by Judge Bryant on August 4, 1976, following the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. A bench trial was held on September 9, 1976, and the bank statement and envelope were admitted into evidence over objection. Appellant was found guilty of both offenses charged, but the false pretenses count was subsequently dismissed with the consent of the Government. On October 27, 1976, the District Court sentenced appellant to six to thirty months imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II

Appellant concedes that probable cause for arrest existed following the investigation inside the bank, and that if the police conduct leading up to the formal arrest was proper, the bank statement and the brown envelope were validly seized incident to arrest. The controversy centers around the interrogation of appellant on the sidewalk outside the bank, and his return into the bank for further investigation. Appellant contends, first, that the encounter on the sidewalk was an investigative “stop” without the reasonable, articulable grounds required by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); and, second, that the re-entry into the bank constituted an arrest without probable cause, or, alternatively, an unwarranted extension of the Terry stop after the original grounds for suspicion had vanished. At the other extreme, the Government argues, inter alia, that Officer Franck had reasonable, articu-lable grounds for suspicion of appellant from the time of the initial approach on the sidewalk, justifying a forced investigative stop, and that appellant consented to go back into the bank.

As the Supreme Court noted in Terry, supra at 13, 88 S.Ct. at 1875, “[sjtreet encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity,” and consequently each case must be evaluated in light of the particular array of facts presented, see id. at 13-16, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Our examination of the record in this case causes us to reject the extreme positions advanced by both appellant and the Government. It is our view that the police conduct at issue here involved a proper progression of escalating responses to circumstances which generated a mounting degree of suspicion that a crime had occurred. More particularly, we hold that (1) the initial approach on the sidewalk constituted a mere “contact,” and not a compelled investigative stop, and therefore did not require reasonable, articulable grounds for suspecting that appellant had committed a crime; (2) the necessary basis for an investigative stop existed at least from the time Wylie produced the withdrawal slip, and nothing else, in response to Officer Franck’s request for identification; and (3) the reentry into the bank for the purpose of further investigation was justified under the Terry stop doctrine, and did not amount to an arrest without probable cause.

A

It is well-settled that the Fourth Amendment applies to “seizures” of the person which fall short of traditional arrests, and that such restraints on personal freedom may be justified on a showing of less than probable cause if, and only if, the police conduct is “reasonable.” See, e. g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-81, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 16-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; United States v. Coates, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 337, 495 F.2d 160, 163 (1974). “As with other categories of police action subject to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of such seizures depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at 878, 95 S.Ct. at 2578-79, citing, inter alia, Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. A general rule which has emerged from this balance is that “in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, supra at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at 881, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574.

But police-citizen communications which take place under circumstances in which the citizen’s “freedom to walk away” is not limited by anything other than his desire to cooperate do not amount to “seizures” of the person, and consequently may be initiated without a reasonable, articulable suspicion, much less probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 16, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Coates v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 413 F.2d 371 (1969). As the Court in Terry noted, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16:

Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves “seizures” of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a “seizure” has occurred.

And Justice White’s concurring opinion in Terry added:

There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets. Id. at 34, 88 S.Ct. at 1886 (White, J., concurring). See also id. at 32-33, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (Harlan, J., concurring); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969).

The Metropolitan Police Department’s regulations governing investigative procedures recognize this distinction between mere “contacts,” which are not subject to Fourth Amendment limitations, and investigative “stops,” which must be supported by a reasonable suspicion. Metropolitan Police Department General Order No. 304-10 (effective July 1, 1973); see note 2 supra. A “contact” is defined as “[cjonduct by an officer which places him in face-to-face communication with an individual under circumstances in which the individual is free to leave if he wishes,”⁴ whereas a “stop” is described as follows:

A “stop” is the temporary detention of a person for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to arrest that person. A stop occurs whenever an officer uses his authority to compel a person to halt, or to keep him in a certain place, or to require him to perform some act . . . . If a person is under a reasonable impression that he is not free to leave the officer’s presence, a “stop” has occurred.

As the police regulations concede, see note 4 supra, there can be no question that a “stop” has occurred where physical force has been used to detain a person against his will, or the individual has been subjected to a “frisk” for weapons. See Terry v. Ohio, supra 392 U.S. at 16-17, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The difficulty comes in distinguishing between “non-forcible stops,” i. e., stops effectuated through a show of authority without the use of force, and mere “contacts.” In such situations, the crucial consideration is the one set forth in the police definition quoted above: whether the person was “under a reasonable impression that he [was] not free to leave the officer’s presence.” We would only add that in determining whether such a reasonable impression existed, the test must be “ ‘what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the defendant’s shoes.’ ” Coates v. United States, supra 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 99, 413 F.2d at 373, quoting United States v. McKethan, 247 F.Supp. 324 (D.D.C.1965), aff’d by order, No. 20,059 (D.C.Cir.1966).

Applying these standards to the facts before us, we conclude that Officer Franck’s initial approach to appellant on the sidewalk outside the bank constituted a “contact” and not a “stop”. Clearly, no physical force or physical contact of any kind was used to restrain appellant’s freedom of movement. And, although a refined judgment is required, we believe that an innocent person in appellant’s position would not have felt compelled to respond affirmatively to the officer’s request for information. The tone of Officer Franck’s question — “Sir, may I talk to you a moment?” — strongly suggests that appellant was free to leave if he so desired, and nothing in his response indicates the contrary. It was, at least, within a reasonable range of interpretation for Judge Bryant to conclude that this was the case.

B

We need not decide whether there came a point in the sidewalk encounter, prior to the request to return to the bank, when the intensification of the questioning would have led a reasonable person to believe that he was no longer free to go. If such -a point occurred, we believe it was after Wylie had produced the withdrawal slip — and only the withdrawal slip — in response to the police officer’s request for identification; and that circumstance, together with the events observed in the bank, provided sufficient grounds for an investigative stop within the contemplation of Terry.

In determining whether the specific and articulable facts recited by the police officer added up, following the production of the withdrawal slip, to a reasonable suspicion justifying brief detention for questioning we are guided by the general principle that in judging the reasonableness of the actions of the officer the circumstances before him are not to be dissected and viewed singly; rather, they must be considered as a whole. So considered they are to be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.

United States v. Hall, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 15, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (1976), citing United States v. Davis, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 400, 458 F.2d 819 (1972).

Officer Franck was a veteran police officer with extensive experience in observing banks and banking activity. In this case, he observed the following inside the bank: 1) a purported bank customer attempted to negotiate what appeared to be a check, which was rejected on its face by the bank teller; 2) in the ensuing conversation, the man was apparently referred to a bank official but, after seeing the police officer, merely approached a bank official, uttered a few words and, instead of showing the slip of paper to the official, placed it in an envelope in his pocket; and 3) without expressing any anger or frustration at the rejection of his transaction, or pursuing a discussion with the bank official, walked very rapidly out of the bank.⁵

Although these circumstances alone could not have formed the basis for a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred, that standard was satisfied when Wylie stated on the sidewalk that the only identification he had was a withdrawal slip which he had intended to use to withdraw money from his savings account, and removed the slip from an envelope in his pocket. At that point, the transaction in the bank took on an indisputably suspicious character warranting further investigation. According to his own admission, appellant had attempted to withdraw money from a savings account without any identification or evidence that the account was his, other than his own representation in the form of a withdrawal slip. Failure to carry identification is, of course, not itself a crime nor, in most circumstances, even a ground for suspecting criminal activity; and appellant’s inability to produce identification here was not enough to show probable cause that he had committed a crime. But surely it is unusual for an individual to attempt to withdraw money from a personal savings account without being prepared to display some evidence that he owns or controls the account — a savings passbook or bank account identification card, if not additional identification as well — and, in light of what he had observed in the bank, Officer Franck could reasonably have suspected when the only identification appellant was able to produce was the disputed transaction slip itself, that he had attempted to withdraw money from someone else’s account.⁶

c

Whether or not appellant’s freedom of movement became constrained somewhat earlier, we believe that a reasonable person in his position would no longer have felt free to leave when Officer Franck “invited” him to return to the bank. Although framed as a question rather than a command — “Mr. Witherspoon, would you mind coming back inside the bank with me” — the officer’s remark continued with the observation that “we will talk to the manager, and if everything is okay, you can go.” Tr. 15 (emphasis supplied). The clear implication, inasmuch as the request followed on the heels of direct questioning about appellant’s business in the bank, was that appellant would be free to go if, but only if, further investigation inside the bank exonerated him.⁷

Notwithstanding appellant’s assertion that any original grounds for suspicion had vanished by this time, it seems clear that Officer Franck’s suspicions could only have continued to increase following appellant’s production of the withdrawal slip. When the officer asked appellant why he did not have any identification when he attempted to withdraw money from his savings account, rather than providing an innocent explanation or even a responsive answer, appellant volunteered a highly implausible explanation for why his transaction had failed — he claimed that he had “mistakenly” written his checking account number on the savings account slip.⁸ On the other hand, the Government does not argue, nor do we believe it could, that probable cause for arrest existed on the basis of this response.

The question thus becomes whether compelled reentry into the bank for a brief inquiry could be justified as part of an investigative “stop” or instead constituted an “arrest” without probable cause. Or, to put the question less metaphysically, whether returning appellant to the suspected scene of the crime, a few feet from where he and the officer were standing, for a brief investigation after which appellant would be free to go if his story checked out, could be justified on less than probable cause. We hold, on the basis of the general principles established in Terry v. Ohio, supra, that the return to the bank was a reasonable procedure for investigating the suspicious circumstances with which Officer Franck was confronted. See Cooper v. United States, 368 A.2d 554, 556-57 (D.C.Ct.App. 1977) (reaching same conclusion on substantially similar facts). See also Young v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 333, 337, 435 F.2d 405, 409 (1970).

As the Supreme Court observed in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), Terry recognizes the propriety of an “intermediate response”— between the extremes of arrest and simply walking away- — in circumstances warranting reasonable suspicion of criminal activity:

In Terry this Court recognized that “a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.

Id. at 145 — 46, 92 S.Ct. at 1923 (citations omitted). The general constraint set forth in Terry is that an investigative seizure must be “reasonably related in scope to the justification for [its] initiation.” Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884; accord, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574.⁹ And, in determining reasonableness, “the facts [must] be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure . ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?” Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

Here, the police officer was faced with circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion that appellant had unlawfully attempted to withdraw money from someone else’s bank account. By returning with appellant to the suspected scene of the crime, a few feet away, and making a brief investigation, the officer could resolve whether a crime had in fact been committed. If so, appellant would be arrested on probable cause; if not, he would be free to go. In these circumstances, we think that it was open to the District Court to conclude that the action taken by the officer was entirely appropriate.¹⁰

United States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1972), cited by appellant for the proposition that extension in time and space of an investigative stop may be unjustified, even though the police officer has legitimate grounds for a more limited stop, is distinguishable. In that case, a person suspected of owning marijuana which had been found in a nearby house, was stopped on the street and transported by car to the Sheriff’s office, where he was subjected to “prolonged” detention, id. at 114, 115, lasting 20-25 minutes, during which he was interrogated, fingerprinted, photographed, and required to fill out an arrest form. This prolonged detention at the Sheriff’s office, a distance away from the place at which the initial stop occurred, was both more intrusive and less likely to yield immediate results than the investigative procedure employed here.¹¹

Concluding, as we do, that Judge Bryant’s disposition, after a full evidentiary hearing, of the pretrial suppression motion was a permissible relation of the facts adduced to established legal principles, we think the contested evidence was admissible at trial, and the judgment of the District Court is accordingly affirmed.¹²

It is so ordered.

1 . The officer testified that he did not have time to talk with the teller of the bank official before appellant walked out of the bank. Tr. 23.

2 . Pursuant to police regulations, P.D. Form 76 may be used to report the circumstances surrounding a “contact” (defined as “[c]onduct by an officer which places him in face-to-face communication with an individual under circumstances in which the individual is free to leave if he wishes”); and must be used to record any non-forcible “stop” (defined as “temporary detention of a person for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to arrest that person”). A different form, P.D. Form 253, must be filled out in the event of a stop effectuated through force. Metropolitan Police Department General Order No. 304-10 (effective July 1, 1973).

3 . In response to defense counsel’s question as to whether appellant was free to go at this time, Franck stated:

Sir, if he turned and walked away from me then, as long as I have been a policeman, I know I couldn’t have stopped him. He could have kept right on going. And I would have had no choice but to let him walk.

Tr. 15. Evidently, this statement reflected the officer’s belief that probable cause was necessary in order to compel appellant to go back into the bank, since Franck had stated earlier: I would have had to let him go because I didn’t feel that there was probable cause at that time. I merely had a suspicion, which was being amplified as each moment passed by.

See Tr. 36.

At some point prior to re-entering the bank, Officer Franck radioed in the name “William Witherspoon” to police headquarters, to check for outstanding arrest warrants. This apparently was a normal procedure when filling out Form 76 on an individual. Franck did not wait for an answer before escorting appellant into the bank. Tr. 19-20.

4 . The section of General Order No. 304-10 dealing with “contacts” goes on to provide in relevant part:

Contacts may be initiated by an officer when he reasonably believes that investigation of a situation is justified. The standard for police-citizen contact is not “probable cause,” “reasonable suspicion,” or any other specific indication of criminal activity.

1. Initiating a Contact.

An officer may initiate a contact with a person in any place in which the officer has a right to be. It is difficult to define precisely such places. Generally, they may include: (1) areas of government-owned or possessed property normally open to members of the public; .

2. Conduct of Contacts.

Persons “contacted” may not be detained against their will or frisked. They may not be required to answer the officer’s questions or in any way respond to the officer if they choose not to do so. The officer may not use force or coercion to attempt to require citizens to stop or respond. If they refuse to cooperate, they must be permitted to go on their way; however, if it seems appropriate under the circumstances, they may be kept under surveillance. Since a contact is not a stop or an arrest and the person contacted may be innocent of wrongdoing of any kind, officers should take special care to act in as restrained and courteous manner as possible, (emphasis in original)

5 . Under these circumstances we think a purely voluntary “contact” approach by the police officer to appellant was unobjectionable, irrespective of the latter’s physical appearance; and we attach no significance to Officer Franck’s characterization of that appearance, as we are confident the district judge did not either.

6 . Whether the police officer had grounds for reasonable suspicion as of the time of appellant’s initial response — that he did not have any identification — is less clear. At that point, the officer still believed that appellant had tried to cash a check rather than withdraw money from a savings account, and it is perhaps less unusual to attempt to negotiate a check without additional identification, since possession of a check engraved with a particular account number is probably more reliable evidence of ownership of that account than a savings withdrawal slip with the account number written in by hand.

7 . The police officer’s statement that if appellant had simply walked away at this point, he would not have been stopped, is of course not dispositive of how a reasonable person in appellant’s position would have viewed the situation. And, especially in light of the fact that appellant was promised his freedom if, and impliedly only if, he returned to the bank, we cannot say that his “consent” to the return was “freely and.voluntarily given.” Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854; see id. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976).

8 . Certainly it would be unusual for the true owner of a savings account to attempt to recall his account number from memory (rather than copying it from some written record), let alone to make a mistake and recall and transcribe his checking account number instead.

9 . There is dictum in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 881-82, 95 S.Ct. at 2580, to the effect that in an investigative stop of a vehicle suspected of containing illegal aliens,

The officer may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause.

No suggestion was made in that case, however, that further detention might be reasonably related to the justification for the initial stop; and, indeed, in the context of border patrols searching for illegal aliens, it is hard to imagine a reasonable ground, absent evidence of some other form of criminal activity, for further detention without consent or probable cause. As we explain below, the circumstances of the instant case are distinguishable in that regard.

10 . It was not unreasonable for Officer Franck to take appellant bank into the bank without waiting for the results of the warrant check on “William Witherspoon,” see note 3 supra. Since the suspected crime involved impersonation of Witherspoon, Witherspoon’s arrest record would have been largely irrelevant.

11 . The recent case of United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977), reported in 45 U.S.L.W. 2520, in which three persons suspected of trafficking in narcotics were stopped by federal agents in a parking lot outside the Detroit Metropolitan Airport and taken into a small office in the airport pending further investigation, is also distinguishable. Although the Sixth Circuit held that an arrest without probable occurred when the individuals were taken to the private office and held there against their will, this investigative seizure evidently was not even supported by a reasonable suspicion. Moreover, in light of the fact that the individuals were threatened with indefinite detention pending acquisition of a warrant to search their luggage, which led to an invalid consent search in which drugs were discovered, the intrusion on their personal liberty was clearly greater than in the instant case.

12 . The dissent, in steadily escalating hyperbole, has chosen finally to characterize the result we reach as initiating a repressive rule of law requiring every person to be always in possession of identification data producible on demand by any policeman at any time and for any or no reason. In the narrow context of the evidentia-ry record before us, revealing circumstances in which identification is normally expected to be available and where its absence had a relevance for law enforcement purposes peculiar to those special circumstances, we find the dissent’s language in this regard surprising, as will also, we believe, the District Court before whom that record was made and whose decision we affirm.