USCA4 Appeal: 23-4378 Doc: 55 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 1 of 20
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4377
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RHONDA NOTGRASS,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 23-4378
ROBERT NOTGRASS,
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (2:23-cr-00016-1; 2:23-cr-00017-1)
Argued: September 24, 2024 Decided: February 27, 2025
Before KING and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and William L. OSTEEN, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4378 Doc: 55 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 2 of 20
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Osteen joined.
ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. Alexander Allen Redmon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Emily L. Szopinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia; Natalie Atkinson, THOMAS COMBS & SPANN PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
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RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:
Rhonda and Robert Notgrass stole from American taxpayers when they fraudulently
drew benefits from the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program. Though it charged
them with felonies, the Government let the Notgrasses plead guilty to misdemeanors, and
the district court sentenced them to probation.
On appeal, the Notgrasses challenge four conditions set for their probation. But as
part of their plea deal, the Notgrasses agreed to waive their right to appeal certain aspects
of their sentence. So before tackling the merits, we face a threshold question: whether they
can bring such a challenge at all. They can. The Notgrasses’ appellate waiver covers only
any sentence of imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised relief—not conditions of
probation. So we reach the merits of their challenge.
On the merits, the Notgrasses argue that four probation conditions were both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We reject both arguments. The district court
adequately explained the conditions at sentencing in light of their objections, and the
conditions were reasonably related to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. We discern no
abuse of discretion, and so we affirm the district court’s sentence.
I. Background
The summer of 2020 was a trying time. Everyone responded differently as the
COVID pandemic swept the nation: Some turned to baking; some turned to brewing; still
others turned to crime. Robert Notgrass was a minister at the Lubeck Church of Christ in
West Virginia. Rhonda Notgrass, his wife, was a congregant at the church.
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When the pandemic hit, some churches across the nation closed or went bankrupt.
But not the Lubeck Church of Christ. Although it cancelled services for a few weeks in
the spring, the church stayed open—only it did so without Robert. The church relieved
Robert of his duties in June 2020 for reasons not directly related to COVID-19. With
unemployment looming ahead, a crushing student-debt load bearing down, and the
pandemic roiling the job market, he and his wife panicked.
Then the Notgrasses spotted a way out: rendering Caesar’s coin to themselves. See
Mark 12:17. The national COVID-19 relief effort included a program called Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance. This program provided benefits to replace wages lost “as a
direct result of the pandemic.” But since Robert was fired for reasons not directly related
to the pandemic, and Rhonda hadn’t lost her job, he and his wife were ineligible.
That didn’t stop them. In August 2020, Robert allegedly filed a fraudulent
application for pandemic benefits, falsely claiming that his unemployment was directly due
to the pandemic. Rhonda filed her own fraudulent application, falsely claiming that she
had been employed at the Lubeck Church before losing her job because of the pandemic.
And since Robert was previously minister at the church, he falsely vouched for Rhonda’s
prior employment there. The ruse worked: The government accepted their applications
and sent checks.
Their scheme, however, didn’t go unnoticed. Someone reported the fraud later that
month. The Department of Labor investigated, and federal charges were filed. Robert and
Rhonda each pleaded guilty. Their plea agreements both contained the following appeal
waiver:
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[Defendant] knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to seek appellate review of [his/her] conviction and of any sentence of imprisonment, fine or term of supervised release imposed by the District Court, or the manner in which the sentence was determined, on any ground whatsoever . . . so long as that sentence of imprisonment, fine or term of supervised release is below or within the Sentencing Guideline range corresponding to offense level 10, regardless of criminal history category.
J.A. 95; J.A. 105 (emphasis added).
The district court sentenced both Notgrasses to five-year terms of probation. Each
was required to abide by the “standard terms and conditions of probation as recommended
by the United States Sentencing Commission” as adopted by the court. They also were
required to comply with the “standard conditions of supervision adopted by the Southern
District of West Virginia and Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.3.” J.A. 161; J.A. 191.
On top of those standard conditions, the district court also imposed various “additional
probation terms” and “special conditions of supervision” regulating their conduct. Their
conditions were not identical. Instead, the district court modified them to suit Robert and
Rhonda’s individual circumstances.
The Notgrasses objected to four of the conditions. They jointly objected to two
shared standard conditions: (1) a requirement they receive their probation officer’s
permission before leaving the judicial district in which they resided; and (2) a prohibition
on possessing dangerous weapons. They also jointly objected to one of their “additional
probation terms”: (3) that they register with Workforce West Virginia, the state’s
unemployment agency, or an equivalent organization in the state where they lived. Finally,
Robert objected to one of his unique “special conditions of supervision”: (4) a requirement
that he participate in a mental-health-treatment program monitored by his probation officer.
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Against the first condition, both argued that they didn’t pose a danger to others and
so shouldn’t be required to get permission before leaving the judicial district where they
live. After hearing from counsel, the district court found the travel-permission condition
“appropriate” and overruled their objections. J.A. 147; J.A. 174.
Both challenged the weapons prohibition (the second condition) on the grounds that
they retained their constitutional right to defend themselves despite their misdemeanor
convictions. But after reviewing the Notgrasses’ presentence report, which detailed why
the weapons bans were necessary, the district court overruled these objections too, finding
that the conditions were “appropriate and not unduly restrictive of the defendant’s rights.”
J.A. 147-48; see also J.A. 175. The court did, however, allow Rhonda to continue carrying
pepper spray and mace, excepting these self-defense sprays from the general prohibition.
As for the third condition, the Notgrasses pointed out that they had moved back to
Missouri and so shouldn’t have to register with an unemployment agency in West Virginia.
In response, the court modified the condition by directing them to register with the
appropriate Missourian agency.
Last, Robert accepted the fourth condition’s requirement to seek counselling but
objected to his probation officer supervising the treatment. He argued that his care should
be directed only by his current providers. The court determined the supervision
requirement was “appropriate” despite the objection and clarified that it did not prohibit
continuing his treatment plan with his current providers. J.A. 177.
The Notgrasses appealed.
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II. Discussion
The Notgrasses gave away many of their rights when they pleaded guilty, and
among these was their statutory right to appeal certain aspects of their punishment. But
they didn’t cede the right to challenge aspects of their probation. Still, their challenge to
the conditions’ procedural and substantive reasonableness fails on the merits. The district
court adequately explained the Notgrasses’ conditions in light of their objections and
imposed a sentence that was reasonably related to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. So we
affirm.
A. The Appeal Waiver Does Not Cover Probation Conditions
We begin with the threshold question: whether the Notgrasses’ appeal is barred by
the valid appeal waiver in their plea agreement. Whether an issue falls within an appeal
waiver is a question we review de novo. See United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 223–
24 (4th Cir. 2023). If the appeal waiver covered the Notgrasses’ challenges to their
probation conditions, then we would stop here. We proceed because it does not.
A plea agreement is a contract. For this reason, we interpret it by reading the “plea
agreement’s plain language in its ordinary sense” to ensure that each party “receive[s] the
benefit of their bargain.” United States v. Tate, 845 F.3d 571, 575 (4th Cir. 2017)
(quotation omitted). Both Notgrasses agreed they would not seek appellate review “of any
sentence of imprisonment, fine or term of supervised release imposed by the District Court,
or the manner in which the sentence was determined, on any ground whatsoever . . . so
long as that sentence of imprisonment, fine or term of supervised release is below or within
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the Sentencing Guideline range corresponding to offense level 10.” J.A. 95; J.A. 105.
Although this waiver sweeps broadly, it does not cover their probationary conditions.
The waiver has three parts. The first—“any sentence of imprisonment, fine or term
of supervised release”—explains what types of sentences the waiver covers. 1 The
second—“the manner in which the sentence was determined”—clarifies that the
Notgrasses forfeit not just substantive challenges to those sentences but procedural ones
too. And the last part—“so long as that sentence of imprisonment, fine or term of
supervised release”—conditions the appellate waiver on the sentence of imprisonment not
exceeding the advisory Guidelines range.
Read together, these three clauses cover just the three enumerated punishments—
not probation. The first part of the waiver precludes challenges to “any sentence of
imprisonment, fine or term of supervised release.” The most natural reading of this part is
that there are three—and only three—identified categories of punishments that the
Notgrasses agreed not to challenge. In other words, the word “any” seemingly distributes
to each item in the list: “any sentence of imprisonment, [any] fine[,] or [any] term of
supervised release.” 2
1 In other words, it describes what types of things the Notgrasses cannot appeal. 2 There are other possible readings of this appellate waiver. One is that, rather than distributing the word “any” to each item in the list, the list might describe instances of “sentences.” In other words, we might read the waiver’s first element to apply to “any sentence of imprisonment,” “any sentence of . . . fine,” and “any sentence of . . . term of supervised release.” But lacking an article (e.g., “a”) the last two items in the list would become unnatural terms—we do not ordinarily use phrases like “sentence of . . . fine” or (Continued) 8 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4378 Doc: 55 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 9 of 20
But notably, the first part of the waiver does not explicitly preclude challenges to
terms of probation, a distinct punishment category separate from the three it lists. A
probationary sentence is not a “sentence of imprisonment.” Rather, probation is
axiomatically not imprisonment; it is a substitute. See U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(b), -(3) (“A
sentence of probation may not be imposed in the event . . . the defendant is sentenced at
the same time to a sentence of imprisonment for the same or a different offense.”). Nor,
quite obviously, is it a “fine.” And it is also not a “term of supervised release.” Probation
is served in lieu of prison, while supervised release occurs after prison. See U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.1 (explaining that a court “shall order a term of supervised release to follow
imprisonment” in certain situations and “may order a term of supervised release to follow
imprisonment in any other case”). 3 On its face, then, the waiver doesn’t cover probation.
The Government replies that even if substantive challenges to probation were
excluded by clause one, the remaining parts of the waiver cover other challenges to
probation. We disagree. The waiver’s second clause bars challenges “to the manner in
which the sentence was determined.” This phrase only covers probation conditions if the
terms of probation count as “the sentence” under the agreement. And they don’t. At most,
the agreement covers three types of punishment: prison, fines, and supervised release.
Although part two expands the waiver’s scope to cover procedural defects, not just
“sentence of . . . term of supervised release.” But even if this reading were correct, it would not change the outcome because “sentence of probation” is still not one of the terms. 3 Probation and supervised release should also not be confused with parole. Parole is early release from prison where a convict finishes out their term of imprisonment outside the jailhouse walls. 9 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4378 Doc: 55 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 10 of 20
substantive ones, it does not expand the waiver to more types of punishment. Its reference
to “the sentence” relates back to what the first clause enumerated, and probation is not
included. The waiver’s third clause gets the Government no further. It limits the
defendants’ ability to appeal “so long as that sentence of imprisonment, fine or term of
supervised release is below or within [Sentencing Guidelines offense level 10].” Like the
first clause, the third clause tells us what it reaches. And it uses the same list as the first
clause, and probation isn’t on it. And by reiterating clause one’s limits, it also confirms
that clause two—and thus the whole waiver—tracks those limits. So the best reading of
the waiver is that it doesn’t limit challenges to probation conditions.
Even if one could plausibly read the waiver to include probation conditions, we
would decline to do so. Our precedent instructs that we construe any ambiguity in a plea
agreement against the Government. Tate, 845 F.3d at 575 (citing United States v. Barefoot,
754 F.3d 226, 246 (4th Cir. 2014)). The Government may well have meant to cover
probation conditions when drafting the waiver. Perhaps it even thought that the waiver did
cover probation; as we explain below, probation and supervised release are often treated
very similarly. But we look at what the plea agreement said, not what the Government
meant for it to say. We will not do the Government’s work for it by reading an omitted
category into an enumerated list of meaningfully distinct terms. Although the Notgrasses
agreed not to appeal many things, probations conditions were not one of them. We
therefore proceed to the merits of the Notgrasses’ challenge.
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B. The District Court’s Sentence Was Procedurally and Substantively Reasonable
On the merits, the Notgrasses argue that four of their probation conditions are both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. On procedure, they claim that the district
court inadequately explained the reasons for the conditions at their sentencing hearings in
light of their objections. On substance, they say that the probation conditions were not
“reasonably related” to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). Both
challenges fail.
We assess the Notgrasses’ challenges to their conditions of probation under the
familiar two-pronged procedural and substantive reasonableness standard that is applied to
all sentencing appeals. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48, 51 (2007). 4 We first ensure
that the district court did not commit procedural error—for instance, by “failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. We then “consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence,” id., which, here, means that we check to see if the
discretionary conditions imposed were “reasonably related” to the purposes of punishment
4 Although Gall was a challenge to the sentence of probation generally, not to any particular condition of probation, this distinction makes no difference. A sentence includes all attached conditions. See, e.g., United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 178 (4th Cir. 2020). Indeed, Gall recognized that “[o]ffenders on probation are . . . subject to several standard conditions that substantially restrict their liberty” as well as “individual ‘special conditions’ imposed by the court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 48. In doing so, the Court referred to all of these conditions as part of the offender’s “probationary sentence[].” Id. As we just explained, probation and supervised release are meaningfully distinct from each other and from sentences of imprisonment. Yet because both are sentences, the principles governing their application and our appellate review of each apply to each other. Therefore, we draw from the post-Gall line of sentencing cases in our Circuit to evaluate the procedural and substantive reasonableness of these probation conditions. 11 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4378 Doc: 55 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 12 of 20
laid out in the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). At both steps, we review
the district court’s actions under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, declining to
“flyspeck[]” the district court’s work out of respect for the “latitude” it has in sentencing
determinations. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 218–19 (4th Cir. 2010).
1. The district court adequately explained its probation conditions, and so the sentence is procedurally reasonable
There is no one-size-fits-all assessment of a district court’s sentencing explanation.
“The adequacy of the sentencing court’s explanation depends on the complexity of each
case.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 2017). “The appropriateness of
brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon
circumstances.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). All the district court
must do is provide “enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.”
Id.
This means that the district court need not give much explanation, if any, when
imposing certain conditions of punishment. Conditions that are better understood as
conceptually inherent to the punishment itself—being housed in a cell during a term of
imprisonment, for example—require nothing beyond the general explanation for the choice
of that punishment. Relatedly, for sentences of probation, a district court also need say
nothing more about the “mandatory conditions” required by § 3563(a) to be imposed on
every offender. See United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296–97 (4th Cir. 2020). Like
conceptually inherent conditions, mandatory conditions “are, necessarily, part of any term
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of [probation] pronounced at sentencing; the district court has no discretion to omit them.”
Id. In imposing them, the district court does not exercise “his own legal decisionmaking
authority” and so needs no “reasoned basis” to do so. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356.
Some discretionary conditions, too, require little or no explicit explanation;
sometimes “the court’s reasoning, although not spelled out, [is] patently obvious.” United
States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006)). This is so when the reason for
imposing the conditions is “so self-evident and unassailable” that the discretionary
condition’s reasonable relation to the § 3553(a) factors is easily discernable. United States
v. Amin, 85 F.4th 727, 739 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Elbaz, 52 F.4th 593,
613 (4th Cir. 2022)). Otherwise put, though all discretionary conditions must rest on a
“reasoned basis,” the basis for many discretionary conditions can be straightforwardly
gleaned “by examining the rationale for the sentence as a whole.” United States v.
McMiller, 954 F.3d 670, 676 (4th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).
This is particularly likely for the “standard conditions” recommended by the
Sentencing Commission. See U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(c) (standard conditions for probation); id.
§ 5D1.3(c) (standard conditions for supervised release). The “standard conditions” are so-
named because they are sensible in almost every case where that form of sentence is
imposed. For example: Few, if any, words are needed to explain why a defendant
sentenced to probation must “report to the probation officer.” Id. § 5B1.3(c)(2); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(15) (same). Likewise, it’s easy to see why a defendant must “notify
the probation officer” of any later arrest. U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(c)(9); see also 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3563(b)(18) (same). The bases for discretionary conditions like these may self-evidently
follow from the reason why the court imposed probation in the first place.
By contrast, conditions that are “unusual” or “severe” will often require more
explanation. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
More explanation will also be required when the defendant raises “nonfrivolous
arguments” against aspects of the chosen sentence. Blue, 877 F.3d at 518. The difference
in the amount of explanation required is not because of a different standard—an
“individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case” is required for all
sentences, id. (quotation omitted)—but because atypicality and nonfrivolous opposition
could make discerning the district court’s reasoned basis more difficult. Yet even when
reviewing unusual or severe conditions, we “may infer” the conditions’ relation to the
§ 3553(a) factors “where the sentence imposed is explicitly tailored to address a
defendant’s individual characteristics.” Id. at 521. And we “may also infer that a
sentencing court gave specific attention to” the defendant’s opposing argument when the
court “engages counsel in a discussion about” it. Id.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the Notgrasses’ procedural-
unreasonableness challenge. They argue that the district court failed to adequately explain
its reasoning when presented with specific objections to four conditions: (1) that they
obtain permission from their probation officer before leaving the judicial district in which
they resided; (2) that they be prohibited from possessing dangerous weapons; and (3) that
they register with the unemployment agency or an equivalent organization in the state
where they lived. Robert alone also alleges the same procedural defect attaches to the
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condition that (4) his probation officer supervise his participation in a mental-health
treatment program. Despite these challenges, all four conditions were imposed in a
procedurally reasonable manner because the district court individually raised and
adequately responded to each objection at the sentencing hearing.
The first two conditions are, notably, standard conditions recommended by the
Sentencing Commission for all probation sentences. See U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(c)(3), -(10).
We are mindful that the standard conditions are statutorily discretionary and not imposed
automatically. See Rogers, 961 F.3d at 297–98. But a thorough explanation of these two
conditions is not always required. And though the district court’s explanation was brief, it
did enough to justify both.
On the travel-permission condition, the district court stated—in reply to a generic,
conclusory objection from the Notgrasses—that it did not find the condition particularly
severe since it would not prevent the Notgrasses from going anywhere; it just required them
to check in to let the probation officer know of their whereabouts. The reason behind this
condition is hard to miss: Probation works only if the probation officer knows where the
probationer is.
The reasoning behind the weapons restriction was similarly clear. The district
court—again, in response to a bare, unspecified objection—reiterated that the restriction
was not unduly severe. And the sensible reason was again self-evident: As the
presentencing report itself explained, weapons restrictions are necessary to ensure the
safety of probation officers. It is especially apparent that the district court considered the
specifics of the weapons restriction because it chose to narrow the restriction upon
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Rhonda’s objection to exclude self-defense items such as pepper spray and mace. The
attention dedicated to these standard conditions is “enough to satisfy” us on review that the
district court “considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis” for imposing
the conditions. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. 5
It is even easier to discern the reasoning behind the “additional” condition that both
Notgrasses register with an unemployment agency in their resident state. In general,
employment is beneficial because recidivism decreases when probationers provide for
themselves and build social ties with coworkers. See Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts.,
Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions 29 (2024). That reasoning is
particularly apt here given that the Notgrasses turned to crime because of financial
difficulties in the wake of Robert’s unemployment. This tailoring to the Notgrasses’
“individual characteristics” allows us to infer an appropriate connection to the § 3553(a)
factors. Blue, 877 F.3d at 521. What’s more, the district court again signaled that it paid
5 United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 550 (4th Cir. 2021), does not control this case. In Boyd, the court imposed a list of supervised-release conditions on every defendant, based in part on an assumption that they were “warranted in every case.” Id. at 557–58. In the Notgrasses’ case, though, the district court did not impose “special conditions . . . across broad categories of cases or defendants.” Id. (quotation omitted). Instead, the sentencing judge reviewed the Notgrass’ presentence report and imposed individually tailored conditions on their probations. That those tailored conditions happen to largely consist of the standard conditions recommended by the Sentencing Commission simply reflects the fact that the standard conditions are standard for a reason.
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specific attention to this condition by accepting the Notgrasses’ objection and modifying
the state of registration from West Virginia to Missouri, their new state of residence. 6
Finally, we are satisfied with the rationale for the “special” condition imposed on
Robert to engage in supervised mental-health counseling. Unlike the other three
conditions, this requirement is neither commonplace nor unintrusive, so we must “carefully
scrutinize” the reasoning behind it. Armel, 585 F.3d at 186 (quotation omitted). Though
we find no need to delve into detail, the record reflects that Robert would benefit from
mental-health counseling, making this special condition again tailored to his “individual
characteristics.” Blue, 877 F.3d at 521. 7 True, Robert did not object to the counseling as
a whole; he objected only to having his counseling supervised by his probation officer. But
for one facing mental-health challenges, it is obvious why oversight would aid in regular
compliance with appointments and treatment. The district court stated as much when it
clarified in light of Robert’s objection that it was “not making any comment on [Robert’s]
6 Robert objected specifically to registering with Workforce West Virginia while consenting to do so with an appropriate agency in Missouri. Rhonda generally objected to the condition because she “intend[ed] to remain residing in Missouri.” J.A. 148. So both objections were to the location of, not the fact of, registration. 7 This case is a far cry from Lewis, which reversed a district court’s decision to impose an addiction-treatment program as a condition. 958 F.3d at 244. In Lewis, “the parties did not address, nor did the district court inquire [about], whether Lewis was addicted to controlled substances . . . [and, in fact] the probation officer stated in the PSR that Lewis denied ‘ever drinking alcohol or using illicit substances.’” Id. Therefore, the “evidence suggest[ed] that” Lewis did “not need addiction treatment.” Id. But here, Robert admitted needing treatment, his PSR stated that he had a history of mental-health problems, and the district court considered the fact that he was currently undergoing mental-health treatment. 17 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4378 Doc: 55 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 18 of 20
current treatment or saying that that treatment [with his current providers] cannot continue”
but only deciding that “the involvement of the probation officer is appropriate.” J.A. 177.
We need no more detail to understand the district court’s reasons for the four
conditions. The court paid sufficient attention to each of the defendant’s objections,
modifying the conditions and providing exceptions where appropriate. So we are satisfied
that the conditions were imposed in a procedurally reasonable manner.
2. The probation conditions satisfy the § 3553(a) factors and so are substantively reasonable
Because the district court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable, we now assess
whether it was substantively reasonable. To do so, we “take into account the totality of the
circumstances” and assess whether the sentence as a whole—including any conditions—is
justified by the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We review the district
court’s determination with “due deference” and will only reverse if we find an abuse of
discretion. Id. We find no abuse of discretion here.
The Notgrasses were both nonviolent first-time offenders who accepted their
responsibility. As a result, the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, accurately reflected
in the Government’s presentence report, recommended zero to six months of imprisonment
for both and encouraged the court to consider a sentence of probation instead. See U.S.S.G.
§ 5C1.1, cmt. nn.2 & 4. Adhering to the Guidelines’ suggestion, the district court decided
to sentence both Notgrasses to 60 months of probation in lieu of imprisonment. This
sentence was the maximum within-range sentence of probation recommended by the
Guidelines for the Notgrasses’ offense levels. Id. § 5B1.2.
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We have repeatedly stated that “sentences that fall within the Guidelines range are
entitled to a presumption of substantive reasonableness.” Blue, 877 F.3d at 519–20; see
also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (permitting courts of appeals to apply such a presumption). Here,
we have a challenge to the conditions of probation, not its length. But the reasoning that
supports our presumption in favor of the Guidelines’ recommendation for the duration of
probation applies equally to the Guidelines’ recommendation for the conditions of
probation. So when the district court exercises its discretion and chooses to impose the
“standard” conditions in § 5B1.3(c) of the Guidelines, we give such conditions a
presumption of substantive reasonableness because the standard conditions are always
“recommended for probation.” We provide the same presumption for any imposition of a
“special” condition from § 5B1.3(d) when the condition is recommended and applicable
under the “circumstances described.”
The Notgrasses fail to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness that
attaches to the two standard conditions they challenge. The travel-permission condition
and the weapons restriction, recommended for all probation sentences, appear eminently
sensible and—in the case of Rhonda’s pepper spray and mace carveout—appropriately
tailored. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in imposing them.
The remaining two conditions are not precisely found in the standard or applicable
special conditions recommended in the Guidelines and so are not presumed reasonable.
But it is relevant in the totality of our consideration that both have close cousins in the
Guidelines. The condition that both Notgrasses register with a Missouri unemployment
agency is a more specific instance of the recommended standard condition that the
19 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4378 Doc: 55 Filed: 02/27/2025 Pg: 20 of 20
defendant “shall try to find full-time employment.” U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(c)(7). It, too, was
appropriately tailored to the Notgrasses’ new state of residence upon objection. And the
condition that a probation officer supervise Robert’s mental-health counselling is similar
to the special condition that recommends “that the defendant participate in a mental health
program approved by the United States Probation Office” when “the court has reason to
believe that the defendant is in need of psychological or psychiatric treatment.” Id.
§ 5B1.3(d)(5). In light of the Notgrasses’ financially driven crime and Robert’s admitted
needed for mental-health treatment, we again cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion in imposing such conditions.
Under the totality of the circumstances, all four conditions further the purposes set
forth in § 3553(a) and are no more restrictive than necessary. We therefore find the
conditions substantively reasonable under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
* * *
The Notgrasses defrauded the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program. They
were caught and pleaded guilty, waiving their rights to challenge most aspects of their
sentence—but not their conditions of probation. But the district court’s conditions were
procedurally and substantively reasonable, and we find no abuse of discretion. So the
Notgrasses’ challenges fail. The district court’s sentences are
AFFIRMED.