United States v. Robert Jackson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 23-2733
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 23-2733 ____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ROBERT JACKSON, Appellant ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 3:20-cr-00291-001) District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion ____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on May 15, 2025

Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 9, 2025)

_______________

OPINION * _______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Robert Jackson of drug offenses resulting in the death of Joseph

Sturges, and the District Court sentenced Jackson to an aggregate term of life

imprisonment. For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment.

I

In July 2020, Joseph Sturges was found dead on his family’s property. First

responders found drugs and drug paraphernalia in Sturges’s immediate vicinity, including

a used syringe, a prescription bottle containing Suboxone pills, and several empty baggies

that previously contained drugs. Ten of those empty baggies bore a stamp with the words

“Dirty Harry” and a picture of Clint Eastwood, one was stamped “Daily News,” and one

was unstamped. 1 Sturges’s pockets contained eight pills and ten full baggies of drugs

bearing the “Dirty Harry” stamp.

The police ordered testing of the pills from Sturges’s pockets and the substances in

the full “Dirty Harry” baggies. A lab determined that the pills were Xanax and that one

of the “Dirty Harry” baggies, which the lab selected at random, contained fentanyl. The

police did not send the empty baggies or the syringe for testing. (Per their safety

protocols, the police photographed and destroyed the syringe rather than keeping it in

evidence.)

1 An additional unstamped baggie, which appeared to be old, was found in an ashtray covered with ash.

2 A post-mortem toxicology analysis showed that Sturges’s blood contained

amphetamine (25 nanograms per milliliter), methamphetamine (93 nanograms per

milliliter), and fentanyl (48 nanograms per milliliter), plus metabolites of those three

drugs and of Zolpidem (a prescription drug used to treat insomnia). The forensic

pathologist who performed the autopsy, Rameen Starling-Roney, M.D., testified that this

level of methamphetamine was “not the highest level that I’ve seen, but it’s there,” and

that there was “a high level—very high level of fentanyl” in Sturges’s blood. App. 155.

Dr. Starling-Roney concluded, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that

“[w]ithout the fentanyl that is noted it would be less likely of—much less that Mr.

Sturges would have died at that particular moment.” Id.

Forensic toxicologist Michael Coyer, Ph.D., opined that Sturges’s level of

methamphetamine was sufficient to cause impairment but still “relatively low,” while the

level of fentanyl in Sturges’s blood was “on the upper range” of all overdose death cases

he had seen. App. 265. Considering the circumstances of Sturges’s death, the autopsy

report, and the toxicology analysis, Dr. Coyer concluded to a reasonable degree of

scientific certainty that “but for the use of fentanyl [Sturges] wouldn’t have died. . . .

This level of fentanyl was fatal.” App. 265. He also concluded that Sturges would have

died from a fentanyl overdose even without the methamphetamine in his system.

Investigators connected Sturges’s drug activity to Taurie and Heather Colosi—

sisters who admitted that they arranged for Sturges to buy what they thought was heroin

from their supplier “Jay” three days before Sturges’s death. The Colosis helped

authorities set up a sting for “Jay,” whom officers later identified as Jackson. When

3 Jackson arrived to deliver drugs to the Colosis, officers ordered him out of his vehicle

and arrested him. While exiting his vehicle, Jackson dropped two ten-baggie bundles of

fentanyl bearing the same “Dirty Harry” stamps as the baggies found on and near Sturges

when he overdosed. Jackson admitted to authorities that he had arrived to deliver

controlled substances to the Colosis that day, as he had done on previous occasions.

A grand jury returned an indictment charging Jackson with three counts:

(1) conspiracy to distribute fentanyl, resulting in the death of the user, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846; (2) distribution of fentanyl, resulting in the death of the user, in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) possession of fentanyl

with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The government filed an

Information of Prior Convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851, listing Jackson’s four prior

felony drug convictions.

During jury selection for Jackson’s trial, the government exercised a peremptory

strike on prospective juror 33 (“PJ-33”). Jackson objected, arguing that the strike was

discriminatory and violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), so the prosecutor

provided race-neutral reasons for the strike. The prosecutor said she struck PJ-33

because he was twenty-one years old, had no life experience, and was not showing

respect for the dignity of the Court. She added, “He didn’t answer any questions. I don’t

know if he’s smoking pot every night.” App. 125. Defense counsel asked the prosecutor

to agree that PJ-33 was “a person of color.” App. 125. The prosecutor replied that she

“didn’t look at him” and could not tell if he was a person of color, but that she “would

strike anyone who is 21 years old in a case like this.” Id.

4 The District Court denied the Batson challenge. It found that PJ-33 did not answer

any questions, was 21 years old, and was wearing a hat in the courtroom, supporting the

prosecutor’s perception of disrespect.

The jury convicted Jackson on all counts. With respect to Counts 1 and 2, it found

that Sturges’s death resulted from the use of fentanyl distributed by Jackson.

Before sentencing, Jackson moved to dismiss the Information of Prior

Convictions, arguing that his prior convictions did not trigger a mandatory sentence of

life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The District Court denied the motion,

concluding that Jackson’s prior convictions did require a mandatory life sentence on

Counts 1 and 2. It sentenced Jackson to concurrent terms of imprisonment: life on

Counts 1 and 2, and 360 months on Count 3. This timely appeal followed.

II 2

Jackson raises three issues on appeal: his Batson challenge, an unpreserved

challenge to the death-results jury instruction, and an argument that his mandatory life

sentence is illegal. We consider each in turn.

2 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

5 A

Jackson argues that the government struck PJ-33 on the basis of racial or ethnic

animus, violating Batson.3 Apparently agreeing that the District Court properly applied

Batson’s legal framework, Jackson only argues that the District Court clearly erred when

it accepted the race-neutral reasons the prosecutor gave to explain the strike.

A district court’s factual finding that a prosecutor was not motivated by

discrimination is “accorded great deference on appeal” because the finding largely turns

on credibility. United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217, 267 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991)). “Where there are two permissible

views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

3 Jackson alleges that PJ-33 was “Latinx,” Appellant’s Br. 16, but the District Court did not make a factual finding about PJ-33’s race or ethnicity. Normally, the District Court would make that finding at the first step of Batson’s three-step inquiry. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (“First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. . . . Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” (citations omitted)). Here, however, the prosecutor explained her reasons for striking PJ-33 without prompting from the District Court, so the first step became moot. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). Jackson also alleges that there were three persons of color among the 37 potential jurors who remained after strikes for hardship and cause. But there was no fact-finding in that regard, either, and Jackson points to nothing in the record except defense counsel’s remark to the trial court that PJ-33 was “one [] person of color, probably one of three on the panel. . . . There aren’t that many out of 37 in the room right now.” (emphasis added)). App. 124. Nonetheless, we need not remand for factual findings because these facts would not alter our disposition of Jackson’s appeal.

6 Here, Jackson argues that the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons were implausible

and belied by the record. He makes five points to support this argument: (1) the

prosecutor’s comment about how PJ-33 may be smoking pot every night was motivated

by discriminatory animus, as PJ-33 gave no affirmative response when the District Court

asked whether any potential jurors had experience using or possessing illegal drugs; (2) it

was not plausible for the prosecutor to have not looked at PJ-33 but also to have stricken

him based on his demeanor; (3) PJ-33 showed no disrespect when he wore a hat he had

not been told to remove; (4) seated jurors were similar to PJ-33: one was 26 years old,

and another answered no questions during group voir dire; and (5) the case had racial

overtones.

All of Jackson’s points challenge the District Court’s choice to credit the

prosecutor’s statements that she was unaware of PJ-33’s race or ethnicity when she struck

him for cause. But the District Court made a factual finding that the prosecutor only

looked at PJ-33 enough to note his hat. App. 125 (“[T]he government indicates that

except seeing his hat they didn’t look at them. I have no reason to disbelieve their proffer

in that regard.”). It also found that PJ-33’s hat supported the prosecutor’s perception of

disrespect. App. 125 (“The government proffered that . . . he's wearing a hat in the

courtroom, which I can understand them believing that is disrespectful.”). These findings

were not clearly erroneous. Further, the District Court was in the best position to

evaluate all the circumstances bearing on the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for

striking PJ-33. Jackson now presents a different view of those circumstances, but the one

the District Court chose was not clearly erroneous.

7 B

For the first time on appeal, Jackson argues that the District Court gave erroneous

jury instructions for the death-results element of Counts 1 and 2. We review this

unpreserved claim for plain error, United States v. Stevens, 70 F.4th 653, 656–57 (3d Cir.

2023), and we discern none.

The death-results element enhances the statutory penalties for Counts 1 and 2. See

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). This sentencing enhancement applies only when the victim’s

use of the drug the defendant distributed was the but-for cause of the victim’s death.

Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 211 (2014) (explaining that an event “results

from” a cause within the meaning of § 841(b)(1)(C) where the cause “is an antecedent

but for which the result in question would not have occurred.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

The District Court instructed the jury that, to convict on Count 2, it must find that

Sturges’s use of the fentanyl Jackson distributed “was a cause without which the death of

Joseph Sturges on July 28, 2020 would not have occurred.” App. 317. Jackson contends

that this instruction permitted jurors to find the death-results element was satisfied by

something less than but-for causation. We disagree. By requiring the jury to find the

fentanyl Jackson distributed was a cause without which the victim would have lived, the

instruction required but-for causation. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211 (“[I]f poison is

administered to a man debilitated by multiple diseases, it is a but-for cause of his death

even if those diseases played a part in his demise, so long as, without the incremental

effect of the poison, he would have lived.”).

8 The District Court’s instructions for Count 1 (conspiracy) included only the

elements of the conspiracy offense—not the elements of the underlying distribution

offense. That was not erroneous, as the object of the conspiracy was separately charged

in Count 2 of the indictment and the District Court separately (and correctly) instructed

the jury on the elements of Count 2. See 3d Cir. Model Criminal Jury Instructions,

§ 6.18.371A (2021); United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 669 (3d Cir. 2011).

C

Finally, Jackson argues the District Court erred in imposing a mandatory life

sentence on Counts 1 and 2 based on a qualifying prior conviction. We review this legal

question de novo. See United States v. Henderson, 841 F.3d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 2016).

Because the jury convicted Jackson on Counts 1 and 2 and found that the

government proved the death-results element, Jackson was subject to a mandatory

sentence of life imprisonment if he had “a prior conviction for a felony drug offense.” 4

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Absent a qualifying prior conviction, he was subject to a

sentencing range of 20 years to life imprisonment. Id.

Jackson urges us not to apply the term “felony drug offense” in § 841(b)(1)(C)

(the provision governing his convictions) because that term does not appear in

4 Contrary to Jackson’s argument, a jury need not making findings concerning a defendant’s prior convictions for felony drug offenses for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added)).

9 §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B). In the First Step Act of 2018, Congress replaced

“felony drug offense” with the term “serious drug felony or serious violent felony” in

§§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B), but it did not make that revision to § 841(b)(1)(C).

See United States v. Zayas, 32 F.4th 211, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2022). Jackson contends that

the First Step Act resulted in nonuniformity that prevents us from applying the language

of § 841(b)(1)(C). But in United States v. Zayas, we applied the language of

§ 841(b)(1)(C) when that provision (rather than §§ 841(b)(1)(A) or 841(b)(1)(B))

governed the defendant’s conviction. Id. That holding in Zayas binds us here, despite

Jackson’s arguments to the contrary.

In Zayas, we held that the defendant’s convictions under two New Jersey

statutes—N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7 (governing distribution of a controlled substance

within 1,000 feet of a school) and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-10(a)(1) (governing possession

of a controlled dangerous substance)—triggered the § 841(b)(1)(C) sentencing

enhancement. Id. at 230–31. Because Jackson had prior convictions for violating those

same New Jersey statutes when he committed the offenses charged in Counts 1 and 2, the

government argues that Zayas requires us to affirm Jackson’s mandatory life sentences.

But Jackson points out that the parties to Zayas did not argue (and we did not address)

whether either of those New Jersey statutes penalizes more conduct than “a felony drug

offense” as that term is used in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). So we will assume that our

statement in Zayas is not binding precedent on the overbreadth question. See United

States v. Bennett, 100 F.3d 1105, 1110 (3d Cir. 1996).

10 Nonetheless, we conclude that Jackson has at least one prior conviction for a

“felony drug offense” that triggers the § 841(b)(1)(C) enhancement. To determine

whether his prior convictions qualify, we apply the categorical approach. United States v.

Aviles, 938 F.3d 503, 511 (3d Cir. 2019). And we will assume without deciding that two

of Jackson’s prior convictions—those for third-degree manufacture, distribution, or

possession with intent to manufacture or distribute “a controlled dangerous substance or

controlled substance analog,” in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(3) (eff.

Nov. 1, 2000, to Feb. 22, 2021) (“Section 35-5”)—were for violating indivisible statutes

that encompass controlled substance analogs. Even under this assumption, Jackson’s

Section 35-5 convictions trigger the § 841(b)(1)(C) enhancement.

Jackson contends that, because Section 35-5 proscribes conduct relating to cocaine

analogs and heroin analogs, his Section 35-5 convictions do not qualify as “felony drug

offenses.” We disagree.

“The term ‘felony drug offense’ means an offense that is punishable by

imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or

foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana,

anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) (emphasis

added). In turn, “narcotic drug” is defined to include numerous substances, including

“opiates.” Id. § 802(17)(A). And an “opiate” is defined as “any drug or other substance

having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being

capable of conversion into a drug having such addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining

liability.” Id. § 802(18).

11 The heroin analogs that qualify for Section 35-5 convictions satisfy the definition

of “opiates.” Under New Jersey law, a heroin analog is a substance “that has a chemical

structure substantially similar” to heroin and that was “specifically designed to produce

an effect substantially similar to” heroin. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-2. Thus, a heroin

analog has “an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine” or

is capable of conversion into a substance that does, so it is an “opiate.” 21 U.S.C.

§ 802(18); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1300.01(b) (referring to heroin as a “morphine-like

drug”). That means it is also a “narcotic drug” under federal law. And offenses

prohibiting conduct relating to “narcotic drugs” qualify as “felony drug offenses.”

Turning to cocaine analogs, Jackson relies on one particular analog—ioflupane—

to argue that his Section 35-5 convictions do qualify as “felony drug offenses.” Ioflupane

is “derived from cocaine via ecgonine” and was removed from the federal Controlled

Substances Act schedules in 2015. Removal of Ioflupane from Schedule II of the

Controlled Substances Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 54715-01, 2015 WL 5265212 (Sept. 11, 2015).

But ioflupane’s removal from those schedules does not affect the statutory definitions

that govern Jackson’s sentencing enhancement. The term “narcotic drug” is defined to

include “[a]ny compound, mixture, or preparation” containing “[e]cgonine, its

derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(17)(E) (emphasis

added). Therefore, as an ecgonine derivative, ioflupane is a “narcotic drug,” and

Jackson’s challenge cannot succeed.

Because Jackson has at least one prior conviction for a felony drug offense, his

mandatory life sentences are lawful.

12 * * *

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment.