United States v. Robert Coley

Fourth Circuit

United States v. Robert Coley

615 F. App'x 166

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 9, 2015

Docket15-4087

StatusUnpublished

This text of 615 F. App'x 166 (United States v. Robert Coley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Robert Coley, 615 F. App'x 166 (4th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Robert L. Coley appeals his jury conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). Coley challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm,

Coley’s motion to suppress challenged the protective weapons frisk that preceded his arrest. We review factual findings underlying a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir.2015). A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a “[police] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains [an individual’s] freedom of movement.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f the officer has a ‘reasonable fear for his own and others’ safety’ based on an articulable suspicion that the suspect may be ‘armed and presently dangerous,’ the officer may 'conduct a protective search of, i.e., frisk, the outer layers of the suspect’s clothing for weapons.” United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.2004) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

*167 Our de novo review of the record confirms that the district court did not err in finding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Coley might be armed and dangerous at the time they frisked him for weapons. See United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir.2013) (“[M]ultiple factors may be taken together to create a reasonable suspicion even where each factor, taken alone, would be insufficient.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1530, 188 L.Ed.2d 462 (2014). We therefore conclude that the district court correctly denied Coley’s motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

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Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Robert L. Coley appeals his jury conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). Coley challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm,

Coley’s motion to suppress challenged the protective weapons frisk that preceded his arrest. We review factual findings underlying a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir.2015). A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a “[police] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains [an individual’s] freedom of movement.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f the officer has a ‘reasonable fear for his own and others’ safety’ based on an articulable suspicion that the suspect may be ‘armed and presently dangerous,’ the officer may 'conduct a protective search of, i.e., frisk, the outer layers of the suspect’s clothing for weapons.” United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.2004) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

*167 Our de novo review of the record confirms that the district court did not err in finding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Coley might be armed and dangerous at the time they frisked him for weapons. See United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir.2013) (“[M]ultiple factors may be taken together to create a reasonable suspicion even where each factor, taken alone, would be insufficient.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1530, 188 L.Ed.2d 462 (2014). We therefore conclude that the district court correctly denied Coley’s motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

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615 F. App'x 166, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-robert-coley-ca4-2015.

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