Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11449 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-00027-MW-GRJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ROBERT CARL ALLBRITTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(January 17, 2019)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 2 of 6
Robert Allbritton appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Allbritton
argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence
because probable cause did not support the traffic stop that led to the discovery of
marijuana and methamphetamine. After careful review, we affirm Allbritton’s
conviction.
On September 28, 2016, Robert Dean, a Deputy with the Alachua County
Sheriff’s Office, initiated a traffic stop of a car that failed to come to a complete
stop at a stop sign shortly after exiting Interstate 75 outside of Gainesville, Florida.
After speaking with the driver, Allbritton, Dean radioed for backup and then began
to write a warning ticket. A backup officer arrived within minutes. While
speaking with the passenger, the officer smelled marijuana inside of the car. A
search of the car revealed a small amount of marijuana and approximately three
kilograms of methamphetamine.
A federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment, charging Allbritton
with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine. Allbritton filed a motion to suppress evidence,
arguing that Deputy Dean initiated the traffic stop without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. Allbritton maintained that his actions were consistent with
Florida Statute § 316.123(2)(a), which provides that, “[e]xcept when directed to
2 Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 3 of 6
proceed by a police officer or traffic control signal, every driver of a vehicle
approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop” before entering
the intersection.
At a suppression hearing, Deputy Dean testified to the circumstances
surrounding the traffic stop. On September 28, Dean was patrolling Interstate 75
in an unmarked Chevy Tahoe. He drove beside a silver Nissan Altima with
Massachusetts plates and observed suspicious movements from its driver. Dean
then followed the Altima as it exited the Interstate at Exit 374, which was the final
southbound exit in Alachua County. At the end of the off ramp, which intersected
with a county road, there was a stop sign. Dean observed the Altima slow down
but never come to a complete stop as it navigated the stop sign and turned right
onto the county road. At that point, Dean activated his patrol lights and initiated a
traffic stop. The government admitted a video of the traffic stop into evidence, and
the district court stated it had viewed the video several times before the hearing.
The district court denied the motion to suppress. Crediting Deputy Dean’s
testimony and the video of the traffic stop, the court found that Allbritton failed to
stop fully at the stop sign. The court therefore concluded that Dean had probable
cause to stop Allbritton for violating Florida Statute § 316.123(2)(a), which, in the
court’s view, required a “complete stop.” The court rejected Allbritton’s argument
that Dean “directed [him] to proceed” through the stop sign, within the meaning of
3 Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 4 of 6
the exception in § 316.123(2)(a), by “almost rear-end[ing] him” as he slowed down
to stop. The court found that Dean took no action that would constitute a direction
to proceed within the meaning of the statute. Rather, according to the court, Dean
“merely followed behind [Allbritton] at a safe distance, both vehicles slowed as
they approached the intersection,” and as Dean prepared to stop behind Allbritton
he observed Allbritton “roll through the stop sign.”
After the denial of his suppression motion, Allbritton entered a conditional
guilty plea to the conspiracy count, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
suppression motion. He was sentenced to thirty-six months of imprisonment and
three years of supervised release, and he now appeals.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed
standard, reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Jones, 377 F.3d
1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004). There is no clear error “[i]f the district court’s
account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.”
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008); U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Generally, the decision to stop and therefore “seize” a vehicle
and its occupants is reasonable where the officer has probable cause to believe that
4 Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 5 of 6
a traffic violation has occurred. United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th
Cir. 1999). “[A]n officer’s motive in making the traffic stop does not invalidate
what is otherwise objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Under Florida law, “every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection
indicated by a stop sign shall stop” before entering the intersection, “[e]xcept when
directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic control signal.” Fla. Stat.
§ 316.123(2)(a). Allbritton does not dispute that he failed to stop fully at the stop
sign, but he maintains that the statutory exception applies because he was “clearly
driving out of the way of an obviously impatient law enforcement officer.” Under
this theory, Deputy Dean’s “obvious impatience” apparently constitutes the
“direct[ion] to proceed by a police officer.” Allbritton further suggests that, even if
the statutory exception does not apply, probable cause was lacking because Dean’s
actions “caused, or at least influenced the commission of the traffic infraction.”
Here, the district court did not err in denying Allbritton’s motion to
suppress. First, the record clearly supports the court’s finding that Allbritton
committed a traffic violation by failing to stop fully at the stop sign. The video
evidence confirmed Deputy Dean’s testimony that the Altima’s wheels “never
came to a complete stop” as Allbritton traversed the stop sign. So, it was
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Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11449 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-00027-MW-GRJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ROBERT CARL ALLBRITTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(January 17, 2019)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 2 of 6
Robert Allbritton appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Allbritton
argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence
because probable cause did not support the traffic stop that led to the discovery of
marijuana and methamphetamine. After careful review, we affirm Allbritton’s
conviction.
On September 28, 2016, Robert Dean, a Deputy with the Alachua County
Sheriff’s Office, initiated a traffic stop of a car that failed to come to a complete
stop at a stop sign shortly after exiting Interstate 75 outside of Gainesville, Florida.
After speaking with the driver, Allbritton, Dean radioed for backup and then began
to write a warning ticket. A backup officer arrived within minutes. While
speaking with the passenger, the officer smelled marijuana inside of the car. A
search of the car revealed a small amount of marijuana and approximately three
kilograms of methamphetamine.
A federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment, charging Allbritton
with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine. Allbritton filed a motion to suppress evidence,
arguing that Deputy Dean initiated the traffic stop without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. Allbritton maintained that his actions were consistent with
Florida Statute § 316.123(2)(a), which provides that, “[e]xcept when directed to
2 Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 3 of 6
proceed by a police officer or traffic control signal, every driver of a vehicle
approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop” before entering
the intersection.
At a suppression hearing, Deputy Dean testified to the circumstances
surrounding the traffic stop. On September 28, Dean was patrolling Interstate 75
in an unmarked Chevy Tahoe. He drove beside a silver Nissan Altima with
Massachusetts plates and observed suspicious movements from its driver. Dean
then followed the Altima as it exited the Interstate at Exit 374, which was the final
southbound exit in Alachua County. At the end of the off ramp, which intersected
with a county road, there was a stop sign. Dean observed the Altima slow down
but never come to a complete stop as it navigated the stop sign and turned right
onto the county road. At that point, Dean activated his patrol lights and initiated a
traffic stop. The government admitted a video of the traffic stop into evidence, and
the district court stated it had viewed the video several times before the hearing.
The district court denied the motion to suppress. Crediting Deputy Dean’s
testimony and the video of the traffic stop, the court found that Allbritton failed to
stop fully at the stop sign. The court therefore concluded that Dean had probable
cause to stop Allbritton for violating Florida Statute § 316.123(2)(a), which, in the
court’s view, required a “complete stop.” The court rejected Allbritton’s argument
that Dean “directed [him] to proceed” through the stop sign, within the meaning of
3 Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 4 of 6
the exception in § 316.123(2)(a), by “almost rear-end[ing] him” as he slowed down
to stop. The court found that Dean took no action that would constitute a direction
to proceed within the meaning of the statute. Rather, according to the court, Dean
“merely followed behind [Allbritton] at a safe distance, both vehicles slowed as
they approached the intersection,” and as Dean prepared to stop behind Allbritton
he observed Allbritton “roll through the stop sign.”
After the denial of his suppression motion, Allbritton entered a conditional
guilty plea to the conspiracy count, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
suppression motion. He was sentenced to thirty-six months of imprisonment and
three years of supervised release, and he now appeals.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed
standard, reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Jones, 377 F.3d
1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004). There is no clear error “[i]f the district court’s
account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.”
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008); U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Generally, the decision to stop and therefore “seize” a vehicle
and its occupants is reasonable where the officer has probable cause to believe that
4 Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 5 of 6
a traffic violation has occurred. United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th
Cir. 1999). “[A]n officer’s motive in making the traffic stop does not invalidate
what is otherwise objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Under Florida law, “every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection
indicated by a stop sign shall stop” before entering the intersection, “[e]xcept when
directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic control signal.” Fla. Stat.
§ 316.123(2)(a). Allbritton does not dispute that he failed to stop fully at the stop
sign, but he maintains that the statutory exception applies because he was “clearly
driving out of the way of an obviously impatient law enforcement officer.” Under
this theory, Deputy Dean’s “obvious impatience” apparently constitutes the
“direct[ion] to proceed by a police officer.” Allbritton further suggests that, even if
the statutory exception does not apply, probable cause was lacking because Dean’s
actions “caused, or at least influenced the commission of the traffic infraction.”
Here, the district court did not err in denying Allbritton’s motion to
suppress. First, the record clearly supports the court’s finding that Allbritton
committed a traffic violation by failing to stop fully at the stop sign. The video
evidence confirmed Deputy Dean’s testimony that the Altima’s wheels “never
came to a complete stop” as Allbritton traversed the stop sign. So, it was
objectively reasonable for Dean to have believed that Allbritton committed a traffic
5 Case: 18-11449 Date Filed: 01/17/2019 Page: 6 of 6
violation by rolling through the stop sign. See Simmons, 172 F.3d at 778. And
because Dean had probable cause to stop Allbritton for a traffic violation, his
“motive in making the traffic stop [did] not invalidate what [was] otherwise
objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
Second, nothing in the record indicates that Deputy Dean either induced the
traffic violation or directed Allbritton to proceed through the stop sign without
stopping fully. There was no testimony that Dean made any gestures or statements
to Allbritton before activating his patrol lights. And the video evidence contradicts
Allbritton’s claim that Dean engaged in aggressive or obviously impatient driving
and almost rear-ended him. Having viewed the video of the traffic stop, we agree
with the district court that Dean “merely followed behind [Allbritton] at a safe
distance, both vehicles slowed as they approached the intersection,” and as Dean
prepared to stop behind Allbritton he observed Allbritton “roll through the stop
sign.” Because the court’s account of the evidence is plausible, there is no clear
error in the court’s finding that Dean did not cause the traffic infraction. See
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to
suppress, and we therefore affirm Allbritton’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.