United States v. R.M. Packer Company, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedDecember 14, 2018
Docket1:16-cv-10767
StatusUnknown

This text of United States v. R.M. Packer Company, Inc. (United States v. R.M. Packer Company, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. R.M. Packer Company, Inc., (D. Mass. 2018).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS __________________________________________ ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:16-10767-DJC ) R.M. PACKER COMPANY, INC., ) ) ) ) Defendant. ) ) ) __________________________________________) ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:16-10769-DJC ) ) TISBURY TOWING and ) TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., ) ) ) ) Defendant. ) ) ) __________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CASPER, J. December 14, 2018

I. Introduction Plaintiff United States of America (“USA”) seeks partial summary judgment on claims pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), against Defendants Tisbury Towing and Transportation (“Tisbury Towing”), D. 41 in 16-10769, and R.M. Packer Co., Inc., (“R.M. Packer”), D. 44 in 16-10767, (collectively, “Defendants”)1 and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), against R.M. Packer. For the following reasons, the Court ALLOWS the USA’s motion for partial summary judgment against Tisbury Towing, D. 41, and ALLOWS the USA’s motion

for partial summary judgment against R.M. Packer, D. 44. II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the undisputed facts establish that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Sánchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996)). A genuine dispute of material fact occurs when the factual evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party carries the burden of establishing the “absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000). If the movant satisfies this burden, the non-moving party may not merely refer to allegations or denials in its pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Instead, it “must, with respect to each issue on which [it] would bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve that issue in her favor.” Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano– Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). “As a general rule, this requires the production of evidence

1 Given that the claims against Tisbury Towing are brought in Docket No. 16-10769 and against R.M. Packer in Docket No. 16-10767, the references as to the facts are to each docket respectively unless otherwise noted. that is ‘significant[ly] probative.’” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249) (alteration in original). The Court must “view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.” Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009). III. Factual Background

A. Tisbury Towing The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Tisbury Towing is a marine transportation company and is regulated by the Massachusetts State Implementation Plan (“SIP”).2 310 C.M.R. § 7.00; D. 41-2 ¶¶ 4-5; D. 44-3 ¶¶ 4-5. For at least twenty-five years, Tisbury Towing has owned a single hull barge called the Rando 200. D. 41-2 ¶ 6; D. 44-3 ¶ 6; D. 44-3 at n.1. Under the SIP, the Rando 200 qualifies as a “marine tank vessel,” D. 41-2 ¶ 6; D. 44-3 ¶ 6, defined as “any marine vessel [] capable of carrying liquid bulk cargo in tanks,” 310 C.M.R. § 7.00. Until December 31, 2015, the Rando 200 was used to transport gasoline from the Tisbury Towing pier in New Bedford to Martha’s Vineyard. D. 41-2 ¶ 7; D. 44-3 ¶ 7. Because the Rando 200 transported “organic liquids,” Tisbury Towing was subjected to the “Marine Volatile Organic Liquid Transfer” regulation, pursuant to the SIP, commencing from its 2000 approval until

December 2015, when its’ operation ceased. D. 41-2 ¶ 8; see 310 C.M.R. § 7.24(8)(a). Under this regulation, no person may load a marine tank vessel unless it is “vapor tight” or is loaded at less than atmospheric pressure. 310 C.M.R. § 7.24(8)(e)(1). Here, the transfer at issue could not be

2 A SIP is a plan for the implementation, maintenance and enforcement of the Clean Air Act within a particular jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). Once such SIP is approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), as the Commonwealth’s SIP has been, it is enforceable as a matter of federal law. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(a)(1), (b). done at less than atmospheric pressure3 so Tisbury Towing’s compliance with the regulation turns upon whether the “vapor tight” condition was met. On November 8, 2011, gasoline was transferred from a tanker trunk into the Rando 200. D. 41-2 ¶ 9; D. 44-3 ¶ 9. Tisbury Towing asserts that this transfer was a “planned test of the barge, Rando 200, for the purpose of complying with all the applicable regulations.” D. 44-3 ¶ 9. Daniel

Gavin (“Inspector Gavin”) and Steven Risi (“Inspector Risi”) from the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection “(MassDEP”), William Osbahr (“Inspector Osbahr”) and Michael Looney from the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), Raymond Colicci (“Colicci”) and Nate Pierce from the United States Coast Guard (“Coast Guard”) and Captain Paul Bangs (“Captain Bangs”), captain of the Rando 200 at Tisbury Towing observed this loading event. D. 41-2 ¶ 9; D. 44-3 ¶ 9. This loading event revealed that the Rando 200 was not “vapor tight through any of the three available methods set forth in the SIP.” D. 41-2 ¶ 10; D. 44-3 ¶ 10; 310 C.M.R. § 7.24(8)(e)(2).4 That is, Tisbury Towing neither provided documentation of a vapor-tightness pressure test or vapor-tightness leak test conducted in the 12 months prior to the loading event nor

conducted a vapor-tightness leak test during the event. D. 44-3 ¶ 10. Moreover, during the loading event, “EPA inspector [] Osbahr and MassDEP inspector [] Gavin (“Inspector Gavin”) heard an audible hiss, indicating the presence of a leak, from a pressure vacuum valve.” D. 41-2 ¶ 15; D. 44-3 ¶ 15. Both Captain Bangs and Inspector Obahr smelled gasoline, indicative of a vapor leak.

3 The Rando 200 was equipped with a vapor balance recovery system which operates at, not less than, atmospheric pressure. D. 44-3 ¶¶ 12-13. 4 The options for showing that a vessel is vapor tight are presenting documentation of a vapor tight pressure test prior to loading that was conducted within the last 12 months; presenting documentation prior to loading of a vapor tightness leak test within the last 12 months; or performing a leak test during the loading event in accordance with the method specified in the regulation. 310 C.M.R. § 7.24(8)(e)(2). D. 41-2 ¶ 16; D.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Borges Ex Rel. SMBW v. Serrano-Isern
605 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2010)
Carmona v. Toledo
215 F.3d 124 (First Circuit, 2000)
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.
217 F.3d 46 (First Circuit, 2000)
Noonan v. Staples, Inc.
556 F.3d 20 (First Circuit, 2009)

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Bluebook (online)
United States v. R.M. Packer Company, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-rm-packer-company-inc-mad-2018.