United States v. R.M. Packer Co.

355 F. Supp. 3d 66
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedDecember 14, 2018
DocketCivil Action No. 1:16-10767-DJC; Civil Action No. 1:16-10769-DJC
StatusPublished

This text of 355 F. Supp. 3d 66 (United States v. R.M. Packer Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. R.M. Packer Co., 355 F. Supp. 3d 66 (D.D.C. 2018).

Opinion

CASPER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff United States of America ("USA") seeks partial summary judgment on claims pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), against Defendants *70Tisbury Towing and Transportation ("Tisbury Towing"), D. 41 in 16-10769, and R.M. Packer Co., Inc., ("R.M. Packer"), D. 44 in 16-10767, (collectively, "Defendants")1 and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), against R.M. Packer. For the following reasons, the Court ALLOWS the USA's motion for partial summary judgment against Tisbury Towing, D. 41, and ALLOWS the USA's motion for partial summary judgment against R.M. Packer, D. 44.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the undisputed facts establish that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law." Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Sánchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996) ). A genuine dispute of material fact occurs when the factual evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party carries the burden of establishing the "absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000). If the movant satisfies this burden, the non-moving party may not merely refer to allegations or denials in its pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Instead, it "must, with respect to each issue on which [it] would bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve that issue in her favor." Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). "As a general rule, this requires the production of evidence that is 'significant[ly] probative.' " Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ) (alteration in original). The Court must "view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in his favor." Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009).

III. Factual Background

A. Tisbury Towing

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Tisbury Towing is a marine transportation company and is regulated by the Massachusetts State Implementation Plan ("SIP").2 310 C.M.R. § 7.00 ; D. 41-2 ¶¶ 4-5; D. 44-3 ¶¶ 4-5. For at least twenty-five years, Tisbury Towing has owned a single hull barge called the Rando 200. D. 41-2 ¶ 6; D. 44-3 ¶ 6; D. 44-3 at n.1. Under the SIP, the Rando 200 qualifies as a "marine tank vessel," D. 41-2 ¶ 6; D. 44-3 ¶ 6, defined as "any marine vessel [ ] capable of carrying liquid bulk cargo in tanks," 310 C.M.R. § 7.00. Until December 31, 2015, the Rando 200 was used to transport gasoline from the Tisbury Towing pier in New Bedford to Martha's Vineyard. D. 41-2 ¶ 7; D. 44-3 ¶ 7. Because the Rando 200 transported "organic liquids," Tisbury Towing was subjected *71to the "Marine Volatile Organic Liquid Transfer" regulation, pursuant to the SIP, commencing from its 2000 approval until December 2015, when its' operation ceased. D. 41-2 ¶ 8; see 310 C.M.R. § 7.24(8)(a). Under this regulation, no person may load a marine tank vessel unless it is "vapor tight" or is loaded at less than atmospheric pressure. 310 C.M.R. § 7.24(8)(e)(1). Here, the transfer at issue could not be done at less than atmospheric pressure3 so Tisbury Towing's compliance with the regulation turns upon whether the "vapor tight" condition was met.

On November 8, 2011, gasoline was transferred from a tanker trunk into the Rando 200. D. 41-2 ¶ 9; D. 44-3 ¶ 9. Tisbury Towing asserts that this transfer was a "planned test of the barge, Rando 200, for the purpose of complying with all the applicable regulations." D. 44-3 ¶ 9. Daniel Gavin ("Inspector Gavin") and Steven Risi ("Inspector Risi") from the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection "(MassDEP"), William Osbahr ("Inspector Osbahr") and Michael Looney from the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), Raymond Colicci ("Colicci") and Nate Pierce from the United States Coast Guard ("Coast Guard") and Captain Paul Bangs ("Captain Bangs"), captain of the Rando 200 at Tisbury Towing observed this loading event. D. 41-2 ¶ 9; D. 44-3 ¶ 9. This loading event revealed that the Rando 200 was not "vapor tight through any of the three available methods set forth in the SIP." D. 41-2 ¶ 10; D. 44-3 ¶ 10; 310 C.M.R.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Borges Ex Rel. SMBW v. Serrano-Isern
605 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2010)
Carmona v. Toledo
215 F.3d 124 (First Circuit, 2000)
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.
217 F.3d 46 (First Circuit, 2000)
Noonan v. Staples, Inc.
556 F.3d 20 (First Circuit, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
355 F. Supp. 3d 66, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-rm-packer-co-dcd-2018.