SUMMARY ORDER
1.
Donald Parker
Donald Parker challenges his conviction after trial on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
see
21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(B)-(C), and 846. Parker argues that the district court erred in (a) failing to suppress evidence seized from his apartment, (b) admitting certain hearsay testimony and unauthenticated physical evidence, and (c) permitting him to represent himself at sentencing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
a.
Suppression of Evidence
Parker argues that the evidence seized from his residence should have been suppressed because the search warrant lacked probable cause. Because Parker’s pre-trial suppression motion was not based on any deficiencies in the warrant, but on the entry into his residence before the warrant was secured, we review the probable cause argument only for plain error,
see United States v. Verkhoglyad,
516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir.2008), which is not present here. Insofar as the warrant affidavit referenced evidence obtained during the
Terry
stop leading to Parker’s arrest, Parker waived any challenge to the lawful procurement of that evidence when he acquiesced in the district court to the denial of his motion to suppress that evidence.
As for Parker’s challenge to the veracity of the officers’ accounts of the
Terry
stop, this point warrants little discussion because the district court reasonably determined that detailed information from a confidential informant, who had proved reliable in the past, which information was corroborated in part by surveillance observations, was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal conduct would be found in Parker’s residence.
See Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 230, 241, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983);
United States v. Canfield,
212 F.3d 713, 719-20 (2d Cir.2000). We accord this finding “great deference.”
Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317;
United States v. Salameh,
152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir.1998). Further, even if probable cause were lacking — which it was not — no suppression of evidence was required as long as executing officers relied upon the warrant in “objective good faith.”
See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 920, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984);
United States v. Clark,
638 F.3d 89, 104-05 (2d Cir.2011) (holding that
Leon
good-faith
exception applied where warrant affidavit contained “entirely conclusory” allegations). Because Parker cannot show either
Gates
or
Leon
error, let alone plain error, his suppression challenge fails on the merits.
b.
Evidentiary Challenges
(1).
Hearsay
Parker argues that his Confrontation Clause right was violated when the district court permitted Officer Bellizzi to testify at trial to out-of-court statements by defendant’s girlfriend Donna Hurst and a confidential informant. Parker concedes that he failed to object at trial; accordingly, we review only for plain error.
See
Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of out-of-court statements that are “testimonial,” including statements elicited during police interrogations.
Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51-53, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004);
accord United States v. Saget,
377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that statements that a declarant reasonably expects might be used in future judicial proceedings are testimonial). This constitutional bar does not apply, however, where testimonial statements are used “for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”
Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The government argues that the challenged hearsay statements fall within this exception. We need not decide the question here because even if we were to resolve it in Parker’s favor, he would not be entitled to any relief. Any error was plainly harmless in light of the other overwhelming evidence of guilt, including possession of narcotics, drug packaging material, a weapon, and ammunition.
See United States v. McClain,
377 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir.2004) (rejecting
Crawford
error as harmless).
See also United States v. Lombardozzi,
491 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir.2007) (defendant not prejudiced where
Crawford
error was harmless).
(2).
Authentication
Parker waived any authentication challenge in the district court when, after testimony was elicited—often by his own counsel—indicating that Officer Bellizzi had not seized evidence that the government sought to introduce through him, defense counsel plainly stated that he had no objection to admission of the proffered evidence. Such a strategic decision constitutes true waiver barring review on appeal.
See United States v. Quinones,
511 F.3d 289, 321 (2d Cir.2007).
c.
Right to Counsel at Sentencing
After trial and before sentencing, the district court granted Parker’s motion to waive counsel and proceed
pro se.
Parker now argues that the decision violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the district court failed to determine that his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary under
Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Such a determination is best made by engaging the defendant in an “on-the-record discussion” to ensure his understanding of the ramifications of his decision.
Torres v. United States,
140 F.3d 392, 401 (2d Cir.1998). We have expressly declined, however, to require such a discussion to follow any formula or specified procedure.
See United States v. Fore,
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SUMMARY ORDER
1.
Donald Parker
Donald Parker challenges his conviction after trial on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
see
21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(B)-(C), and 846. Parker argues that the district court erred in (a) failing to suppress evidence seized from his apartment, (b) admitting certain hearsay testimony and unauthenticated physical evidence, and (c) permitting him to represent himself at sentencing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
a.
Suppression of Evidence
Parker argues that the evidence seized from his residence should have been suppressed because the search warrant lacked probable cause. Because Parker’s pre-trial suppression motion was not based on any deficiencies in the warrant, but on the entry into his residence before the warrant was secured, we review the probable cause argument only for plain error,
see United States v. Verkhoglyad,
516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir.2008), which is not present here. Insofar as the warrant affidavit referenced evidence obtained during the
Terry
stop leading to Parker’s arrest, Parker waived any challenge to the lawful procurement of that evidence when he acquiesced in the district court to the denial of his motion to suppress that evidence.
As for Parker’s challenge to the veracity of the officers’ accounts of the
Terry
stop, this point warrants little discussion because the district court reasonably determined that detailed information from a confidential informant, who had proved reliable in the past, which information was corroborated in part by surveillance observations, was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal conduct would be found in Parker’s residence.
See Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 230, 241, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983);
United States v. Canfield,
212 F.3d 713, 719-20 (2d Cir.2000). We accord this finding “great deference.”
Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317;
United States v. Salameh,
152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir.1998). Further, even if probable cause were lacking — which it was not — no suppression of evidence was required as long as executing officers relied upon the warrant in “objective good faith.”
See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 920, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984);
United States v. Clark,
638 F.3d 89, 104-05 (2d Cir.2011) (holding that
Leon
good-faith
exception applied where warrant affidavit contained “entirely conclusory” allegations). Because Parker cannot show either
Gates
or
Leon
error, let alone plain error, his suppression challenge fails on the merits.
b.
Evidentiary Challenges
(1).
Hearsay
Parker argues that his Confrontation Clause right was violated when the district court permitted Officer Bellizzi to testify at trial to out-of-court statements by defendant’s girlfriend Donna Hurst and a confidential informant. Parker concedes that he failed to object at trial; accordingly, we review only for plain error.
See
Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of out-of-court statements that are “testimonial,” including statements elicited during police interrogations.
Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51-53, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004);
accord United States v. Saget,
377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that statements that a declarant reasonably expects might be used in future judicial proceedings are testimonial). This constitutional bar does not apply, however, where testimonial statements are used “for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”
Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The government argues that the challenged hearsay statements fall within this exception. We need not decide the question here because even if we were to resolve it in Parker’s favor, he would not be entitled to any relief. Any error was plainly harmless in light of the other overwhelming evidence of guilt, including possession of narcotics, drug packaging material, a weapon, and ammunition.
See United States v. McClain,
377 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir.2004) (rejecting
Crawford
error as harmless).
See also United States v. Lombardozzi,
491 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir.2007) (defendant not prejudiced where
Crawford
error was harmless).
(2).
Authentication
Parker waived any authentication challenge in the district court when, after testimony was elicited—often by his own counsel—indicating that Officer Bellizzi had not seized evidence that the government sought to introduce through him, defense counsel plainly stated that he had no objection to admission of the proffered evidence. Such a strategic decision constitutes true waiver barring review on appeal.
See United States v. Quinones,
511 F.3d 289, 321 (2d Cir.2007).
c.
Right to Counsel at Sentencing
After trial and before sentencing, the district court granted Parker’s motion to waive counsel and proceed
pro se.
Parker now argues that the decision violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the district court failed to determine that his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary under
Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Such a determination is best made by engaging the defendant in an “on-the-record discussion” to ensure his understanding of the ramifications of his decision.
Torres v. United States,
140 F.3d 392, 401 (2d Cir.1998). We have expressly declined, however, to require such a discussion to follow any formula or specified procedure.
See United States v. Fore,
169 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir.1999). Rather, identification of a knowing and voluntary waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances.
See id.
at 108. Having reviewed the record, particularly the district court’s discussions with Parker on August 9, 2010; January 25, 2011; and March 30, 2011, we conclude that it correctly determined that Parker knowingly and voluntarily waived
his right to counsel and invoked his right to represent himself at sentencing.
We have considered Parker’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
2.
Guillermo Rijo
Insofar as Guillermo Rijo seeks review of his conviction, his counsel, John Ciran-do, moves for permission to withdraw pursuant to
Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). The Government cross-moves to dismiss Rijo’s appeal as barred by an appeal waiver contained in his plea agreement.
Upon due consideration, Cirando’s
An-ders
motion is granted. The Government’s motion to dismiss is also granted as to Rijo’s appeal of his conviction and term of imprisonment, as he has not demonstrated that the waiver of his appellate rights is unenforceable under
United States v. Gomez-Perez,
215 F.3d 315 (2d Cir.2000). With respect to Rijo’s appeal of his term of supervised release and $100 special assessment, we construe the Government’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary affirmance and grant affirmance.
3.
Martin McKreith
Insofar as Martin McKreith appeals his conviction, his counsel, Michael Hasse, moves for permission to withdraw pursuant to
Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, and the Government cross-moves for summary af-firmance.
Upon due consideration, both motions are granted.
4.
Conclusion
The appeal of defendant Guillermo Rijo is dismissed in part and his judgment of conviction, as well as the judgments of conviction of Parker and McKreith, are hereby affirmed.