NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________
No. 24-1625 ________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RICKY SANCHEZ, a/k/a Rickie, Appellant ________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 1:21-cr-00083-003) District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson ________________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on January 31, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, PORTER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 6, 2025)
________________
OPINION * ________________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. ROTH, Circuit Judge.
Ricky Sanchez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The District Court applied a two-level minor role reduction
and sentenced Sanchez to a below-guidelines sentence of thirty-six months’
imprisonment. Sanchez appealed and argues that the court erred by denying him a four-
level minimal participant decrease. We find no error in the District Court’s judgment of
sentence. Accordingly, we will affirm it.
I. Background 1
From February to October 2019, Sanchez received six parcels at his home on
behalf of a drug-trafficking organization (DTO). Each parcel contained between one and
two kilograms of cocaine. For Sanchez’s role, the DTO paid him a total of $2400. In
2021, a grand jury indicted Sanchez and six codefendants on one count of conspiracy to
distribute controlled substances. Sanchez pleaded guilty and admitted to having received
between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine. In the plea agreement, Sanchez agreed to
a base offense level of thirty.
At sentencing, the District Court adopted the plea agreement’s recommended base
offense level of thirty and applied the following adjustments: (1) a two-level reduction
under United States Sentencing Guideline (USSG) §2D1.1(b)(18), because Sanchez met
the safety valve criteria for lower-level offenders; (2) a two-level reduction under
§3B1.2(b), because Sanchez played a minor role in the offense; and (3) a three-level
1 Because we write for the parties, we therefore recite only those facts necessary to our disposition. 2 reduction under §3E1.1, because Sanchez had accepted responsibility for his offense.
After considering Sanchez’s entire criminal record, the District Court granted Sanchez’s
motion for a downward departure and lowered his criminal history category from III to II.
In turn, the court adjusted Sanchez’s sentencing range to fifty-one to sixty-three months. 2
After analyzing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the District Court sentenced Sanchez to
thirty-six months’ imprisonment.
In sentencing Sanchez, the District Court rejected his request for a four-level
minimal participant reduction, pursuant to USSG §3B1.2(a), which would have decreased
his offense level by an additional two points. Sanchez argued that “there are a number of
the codefendants who are clearly more culpable.” 3 He singled out one codefendant with
whom the government had agreed to a minimal participant reduction, despite that
codefendant having acted as a courier and communicated with two high-ranking
members of the DTO, in addition to receiving parcels. The District Court recognized that
it was a “close call” as to whether Sanchez’s role was minimal or minor. 4 Though the
court acknowledged that Sanchez’s role relative to several of his codefendants was
“clearly minor,” 5 it concluded that his role could not be described as minimal,
2 If the District Court had granted Sanchez a four-level minimal participant reduction (with a criminal history category of II), his sentencing range would have been reduced to forty- one to fifty-one months’ imprisonment. 3 Appx 117. 4 Appx 123. 5 Id. 3 particularly due to the “enormous quantity of cocaine” he had accepted and the length of
time of his involvement. 6
II. Discussion
Sanchez contends that the District Court erred by concluding that he had played a
minor role rather than a minimal role in the conspiracy. Specifically, he argues that the
court failed to conduct the proper comparative analysis of his culpability relative to his
codefendants using the factors outlined in United States v. Brown, 7 United States v.
Headley, 8 and the commentary to USSG §3B1.2. We disagree.
“We employ a mixed standard of review when considering whether a defendant
was entitled to a base level reduction for being a minimal or minor participant in the
criminal activity.” 9 We exercise de novo review “[w]hen the district court’s denial of a
downward adjustment is based primarily on a legal interpretation of the Guidelines the
defendant claims to be erroneous.” 10 However, we review for abuse of discretion “the
District Court’s application of the Guidelines to facts” and will reverse factual findings
“only if clearly erroneous.” 11
Under §3B1.2, the sentencing court may reduce the defendant’s offense level
based on his mitigating role in the offense. Determining whether a defendant had a
6 Id. 7 250 F.3d 811 (3d Cir. 2001). 8 923 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1991). 9 United States v. Womack, 55 F.4th 219, 243 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir. 1994)). 10 Id. 11 United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2006). 4 “minor” or “minimal” role is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires the court to assess “the
totality of the evidence.” 12 The court may grant a four-level reduction if the defendant
was a “minimal participant,” that is, if he was “plainly among the least culpable of those
involved in the conduct of a group.” 13 The court may grant a two-level reduction if the
defendant was a “minor participant,” that is, if he was “less culpable than most other
participants in the criminal activity, but [his] role could not be described as minimal.” 14
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that “the [mitigating] role adjustment
should apply.” 15
In Brown, relying on our Court’s prior analysis in Headley, we explained that “a
defendant’s eligibility for [a mitigating role adjustment] turn[s] on whether the
defendant’s ‘involvement, knowledge and culpability’ were materially less than those of
12 Womack, 55 F.4th at 243, 246; see also USSG §3B1.2, comment. (n.3(C)).
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________
No. 24-1625 ________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RICKY SANCHEZ, a/k/a Rickie, Appellant ________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 1:21-cr-00083-003) District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson ________________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on January 31, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, PORTER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 6, 2025)
________________
OPINION * ________________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. ROTH, Circuit Judge.
Ricky Sanchez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The District Court applied a two-level minor role reduction
and sentenced Sanchez to a below-guidelines sentence of thirty-six months’
imprisonment. Sanchez appealed and argues that the court erred by denying him a four-
level minimal participant decrease. We find no error in the District Court’s judgment of
sentence. Accordingly, we will affirm it.
I. Background 1
From February to October 2019, Sanchez received six parcels at his home on
behalf of a drug-trafficking organization (DTO). Each parcel contained between one and
two kilograms of cocaine. For Sanchez’s role, the DTO paid him a total of $2400. In
2021, a grand jury indicted Sanchez and six codefendants on one count of conspiracy to
distribute controlled substances. Sanchez pleaded guilty and admitted to having received
between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine. In the plea agreement, Sanchez agreed to
a base offense level of thirty.
At sentencing, the District Court adopted the plea agreement’s recommended base
offense level of thirty and applied the following adjustments: (1) a two-level reduction
under United States Sentencing Guideline (USSG) §2D1.1(b)(18), because Sanchez met
the safety valve criteria for lower-level offenders; (2) a two-level reduction under
§3B1.2(b), because Sanchez played a minor role in the offense; and (3) a three-level
1 Because we write for the parties, we therefore recite only those facts necessary to our disposition. 2 reduction under §3E1.1, because Sanchez had accepted responsibility for his offense.
After considering Sanchez’s entire criminal record, the District Court granted Sanchez’s
motion for a downward departure and lowered his criminal history category from III to II.
In turn, the court adjusted Sanchez’s sentencing range to fifty-one to sixty-three months. 2
After analyzing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the District Court sentenced Sanchez to
thirty-six months’ imprisonment.
In sentencing Sanchez, the District Court rejected his request for a four-level
minimal participant reduction, pursuant to USSG §3B1.2(a), which would have decreased
his offense level by an additional two points. Sanchez argued that “there are a number of
the codefendants who are clearly more culpable.” 3 He singled out one codefendant with
whom the government had agreed to a minimal participant reduction, despite that
codefendant having acted as a courier and communicated with two high-ranking
members of the DTO, in addition to receiving parcels. The District Court recognized that
it was a “close call” as to whether Sanchez’s role was minimal or minor. 4 Though the
court acknowledged that Sanchez’s role relative to several of his codefendants was
“clearly minor,” 5 it concluded that his role could not be described as minimal,
2 If the District Court had granted Sanchez a four-level minimal participant reduction (with a criminal history category of II), his sentencing range would have been reduced to forty- one to fifty-one months’ imprisonment. 3 Appx 117. 4 Appx 123. 5 Id. 3 particularly due to the “enormous quantity of cocaine” he had accepted and the length of
time of his involvement. 6
II. Discussion
Sanchez contends that the District Court erred by concluding that he had played a
minor role rather than a minimal role in the conspiracy. Specifically, he argues that the
court failed to conduct the proper comparative analysis of his culpability relative to his
codefendants using the factors outlined in United States v. Brown, 7 United States v.
Headley, 8 and the commentary to USSG §3B1.2. We disagree.
“We employ a mixed standard of review when considering whether a defendant
was entitled to a base level reduction for being a minimal or minor participant in the
criminal activity.” 9 We exercise de novo review “[w]hen the district court’s denial of a
downward adjustment is based primarily on a legal interpretation of the Guidelines the
defendant claims to be erroneous.” 10 However, we review for abuse of discretion “the
District Court’s application of the Guidelines to facts” and will reverse factual findings
“only if clearly erroneous.” 11
Under §3B1.2, the sentencing court may reduce the defendant’s offense level
based on his mitigating role in the offense. Determining whether a defendant had a
6 Id. 7 250 F.3d 811 (3d Cir. 2001). 8 923 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1991). 9 United States v. Womack, 55 F.4th 219, 243 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir. 1994)). 10 Id. 11 United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2006). 4 “minor” or “minimal” role is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires the court to assess “the
totality of the evidence.” 12 The court may grant a four-level reduction if the defendant
was a “minimal participant,” that is, if he was “plainly among the least culpable of those
involved in the conduct of a group.” 13 The court may grant a two-level reduction if the
defendant was a “minor participant,” that is, if he was “less culpable than most other
participants in the criminal activity, but [his] role could not be described as minimal.” 14
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that “the [mitigating] role adjustment
should apply.” 15
In Brown, relying on our Court’s prior analysis in Headley, we explained that “a
defendant’s eligibility for [a mitigating role adjustment] turn[s] on whether the
defendant’s ‘involvement, knowledge and culpability’ were materially less than those of
12 Womack, 55 F.4th at 243, 246; see also USSG §3B1.2, comment. (n.3(C)). Application Note 3(C) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to consider: (i) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and structure of the criminal activity; (ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning or organizing the criminal activity; (iii) the degree to which the defendant exercised decision-making authority or influenced the exercise of decision-making authority; (iv) the nature and extent of the defendant’s participation in the commission of the criminal activity, including the acts the defendant performed and the responsibility and discretion the defendant had in performing those acts; (v) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the criminal activity. 13 Id. at 243–44 (quoting §3B1.2(a) & comment. (n.4)). 14 USSG §3B1.2(b) & comment. (n.5). 15 United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 735 (3d Cir. 1994)). Sanchez has not argued that his case falls between §§3B1.2(a) and (b), which would have entitled him to a three-level reduction. See USSG §3B1.2. 5 other participants.” 16 Brown and Headley require the court to consider “(1) the
defendant’s awareness of the nature and scope of the criminal enterprise; (2) the nature of
the defendant’s relationship to the other participants; and (3) the importance of the
defendant’s actions to the success of the venture.” 17 The court should assess “each of
these factors in relation to the other participants in the conspiracy.” 18
We find no clear error in the District Court’s determination that Sanchez played a
minor, rather than minimal, role in the conspiracy. “While there may well be two
permissible views as to whether the evidence supports a mitigating role adjustment, ‘the
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’” 19 The record reflects
that the District Court focused primarily on the duration of Sanchez’s involvement in the
conspiracy (nine months), the number of parcels (six) he had received and delivered to
another coconspirator, the vast quantity of cocaine he had admittedly received (between
five and fifteen kilograms), and the fact that the DTO paid him for his actions, which all
speak to “the importance of [his] actions to the success of the venture.” 20 The District
Court also considered Sanchez’s culpability in comparison to his codefendants, noting
that “relative to the roles played by several of the co-defendants, Mr. Sanchez’s role was
clearly minor.” 21 Although the District Court did not recite the Brown/Headley factors in
16 Brown, 250 F.3d at 819 (quoting Headley, 923 F.2d at 1084). 17 Id. 18 Id. (citing Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d at 239). 19 United States v. Self, 681 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). 20 See Brown, 250 F.3d at 819 (citing Headley, 923 F.2d at 1084). 21 Appx 123. 6 its analysis, we will uphold the sentence where, as here, “the record amply supports the
district court’s conclusion” that the defendant was not a minimal participant in the
offense. 22 Sanchez contends that he had no knowledge of the enterprise’s scope and had
direct contact with only one other codefendant. However, Sanchez’s coconspirators had
“trusted [him] to handle the distribution of wholesale quantities of drugs,” 23 in particular,
between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine, valued at approximately $29,000 to
$32,000 per kilogram. Ultimately, we agree with the District Court that this case is a
“close call.” 24 That is the very reason that the court did not clearly err in finding that
Sanchez had played a minor, rather than minimal, role.
III. Conclusion
We conclude that Sanchez has failed to establish that the District Court abused its
discretion in granting a two-level minor role reduction rather than a four-level minimal
role reduction. 25 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.
22 See Carr, 25 F.3d at 1208. 23 See Self, 681 F.3d at 201 (citing Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d at 241). 24 Appx 123. 25 To the extent Sanchez suggests that the least culpable member of any given conspiracy is entitled to a “minimal participant” reduction as a matter of law, we disagree. Cf. Brown, 250 F.3d at 819 (“[T]he mere fact that a defendant was less culpable than his co- defendants does not entitle the defendant to ‘minor participant’ status as a matter of law. If this were the case, then the least culpable member of any conspiracy would be a minor participant, regardless of the extent of that member’s participation.” (citation omitted)). 7