United States v. Ricky Aaron

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: June 29, 2026
• Docket: 25-4290
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4290 Doc: 25 Filed: 06/29/2026 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4290

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RICKY GROVER AARON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:23-cr-00030-MOC-SCR-1)

Submitted: June 25, 2026 Decided: June 29, 2026

Before BENJAMIN and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Joshua B. Carpenter, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Ricky Grover Aaron pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession

of child sexual abuse material, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b). 1 The

district court sentenced Aaron to 120 months’ imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised

release. On appeal, Aaron’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising

as an issue for review whether the district court abused its discretion when granting Aaron’s

motion seeking authorization of funds to hire an expert in the field of psychology by

limiting the topics the expert was permitted to evaluate to competency and insanity.

Although notified of his right to do so, Aaron has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.

The Government declined to file a brief and does not seek to enforce the appeal waiver in

Aaron’s plea agreement. 2 We dismiss in part and affirm in part.

It is well established that, “when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all

nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to entry of the plea and has no

nonjurisdictional ground upon which to attack that judgment except the inadequacy of the

plea under [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11.” United States v. Glover, 8 F.4th 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2021)

1 Although 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) uses the term “child pornography,” we “refer to such content as child sexual abuse material to reflect more accurately its abusive and exploitative nature.” United States v. Castellano, 172 F.4th 295, 298 n.1 (4th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). 2 Because the Government fails to assert the waiver as a bar in whole or in part to this appeal, we may consider the issue raised by counsel and conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to Anders. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007).

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(citation modified). Because Aaron entered a valid and unconditional guilty plea, counsel’s

challenge to the district court’s grant of the motion for authorization of funds “is not

properly before us.” United States v. Fitzgerald, 820 F.3d 107, 113 (4th Cir. 2016).

Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the appeal. See id.

In accordance with Anders, we also have reviewed the record in its entirety and have

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. 3 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal to the extent

Aaron seeks to challenge the grant of his motion for authorization of funds, and we affirm

the criminal judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Aaron, in writing, of the

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Aaron

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Aaron.

3 Although not listed as an issue for review in the Anders brief, counsel concludes that Aaron may not advance a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on any failure by trial counsel to secure an evaluation for a potential insanity defense based on dissociative identity disorder or any other condition using authorized funds. (Anders Br. at 10 n.1). To the extent that this could be construed as raising for review a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, we typically will not review such a claim made on direct appeal, United States v. Maynes, 880 F.3d 110, 113 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), “[u]nless an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the record,” United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 2016). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Aaron must satisfy the two-part test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He “must show that counsel’s performance was [constitutionally] deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. After review, we conclude that ineffective assistance by trial counsel does not conclusively appear on the face of the record. This claim “should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.” Faulls, 821 F.3d at 508. We therefore decline to address this claim at this juncture.

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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART