United States v. Richter

2 Ct. Cust. 167, 1911 WL 19986, 1911 CCPA LEXIS 147
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 31, 1911
DocketNo. 544
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 2 Ct. Cust. 167 (United States v. Richter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Richter, 2 Ct. Cust. 167, 1911 WL 19986, 1911 CCPA LEXIS 147 (ccpa 1911).

Opinion

Smith, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The collector of customs at the port of New York classified certain dressed sheepskins, sewed into rectangular shapes, 64 inches long by [168]*16830 inches wide, as manufactures of fur, and assessed them for duty at 35 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 439 of the tariff act of August 5, 1909, which reads as follows:

439. Furs dressed on the skin, not advanced further than dyeing, but not repaired, twenty per centum ad valorem; manufactures of furs, further advanced than dressing and dyeing, when prepared for use as material, including plates, linings, and crosses, thirty-five per centum ad valorem; articles of wearing, apparel of every description, partly or wholly manufactured, composed of or of which fur is the component material of chief value, fifty per centum ad valorem. Furs not on the skin, prepared for hatters’ use, including fur skins carroted, twenty per centum ad valorem.

The importer objected to the classification and the duty assessed and among other grounds of protest set up that the goods were dutiable at 20 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 439 either as furs dressed on the skin, not repaired, and not advanced further than dyeing or at the same rate as partly manufactured articles not provided for under paragraph 480, the part of which relevant to the case reads a’s follows:

480. That there shall be levied, collected, and paid * * ’ * on all articles manufactured, in whole or in part, not provided for in this section, a duty of twenty per centum ad valorem.

A majoi’ity of the Board of General Appraisers decided that the merchandise was unquestionably fashioned into the form of rugs and as such were manufactures of fur, but that they did not belong to the group of manufactures of furs described in that portion of the paragraph under which they were classified and assessed for duty, for the reason that they were not prepared for use as material. As there was no general provision for manufactures of fur in the tariff act of 1909, the majority of the board felt obliged to hold that the goods were dutiable at 2Q per cent ad valorem, either as furs dressed on the skin or as nonenumerated manufactured articles. The minority of the board was of opinion that the importation was one of fur skins in the form of unfinished rugs temporarily sewn together for convenience in transportation and to guard against the inclusion of undersized or defective skins in the shipment; that the ultimate use of the unfinished rugs was the manufacture of carriage robes, the outside of fur garments, and similar purposes; that the so-called rugs had not been “prepared for use as materials, inasmuch as the flanks and defective skins have to be discarded, the skins matched, and then permanently sewn to fit them for such use,” and that the goods were dutiable as furs dressed on the skin, not advanced further than dyeing, at 20 per cent ad valorem.

From the decision of the board the Government appealed.

The appraiser returned the merchandise as “pieces of dressed natural sheepskins which were sewed into rugs,” dutiable as manufactures of fur. The evidence produced by the importer on the hearing was to the effect that the wares in question were dressed pieces of [169]*169sheepskin, sewed together in China in the form of rugs for convenient shipment and to give to the rugs a definite size, and that they were known to the trade as rugs. It appears that on arrival in this country such rugs are taken apart and the poor pieces, if any, cut out. The good pieces are rematched, if necessary, joined together by resewing, and either lined and formed anew into rugs or after resewing are converted into carriage robes, overcoats, or other things of that nature. One of the witnesses for the importer testified that the articles as imported can be used as rugs after resewing.

The goods in this case are made up of furs dressed on the skin and their nature is such that if dutiable at all under the provisions of paragraph 439 of the tariff act of 1909 they must fall within one of the following classes therein specified, namely:

(1) Furs dressed on the skin, not advanced further than dyeing, hut not repaired, twenty per centum ad valorem; or
(2) Manufactures of furs, further advanced than dressing and dyeing, when prepared for use as material, including plates, linings, and crosses, thirty-five per centum ad valorem.

The importer contends, first, that thej? are not manufactures of furs; second, that they are not further advanced than dressing and dyeing; third, that they have not been prepared for use as material; and fourth, that they are not plates, linings, and crosses which are manufactures of fur.

In support of the first point counsel for appellants argue that the rugs are at best furs manufactured, and that within the principle laid down in Dejonge v. Magone (159 U. S., 562, 568) and Hartranft v. Wiegmann (121 U. S., 609, 615) they can not be regarded as manufactures of fur. The cases cited do hold that to constitute a manufacture the material must be converted into a new and different article having a name, character, or use distinct from that of the original substance subjected to manufacturing processes. It will be noted, however, that they do not go so far as. to say that for a manufacture it is necessary that the original material should pass from its condition as a material into a finished article not destined as the material for something else. To so limit the meaning of “ a manufacture” would bring about the odd result of making the language in paragraph 439, “manufactures of furs * * * when prepared for use as material” a contradiction of terms. Ordinarily a manufactured article takes a different form, or at least'subserves a purpose different from the original materials out of which it is made and. usually it takes a different name. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States (171 U. S., 210, 216). That does not mean, however, that its usefulness as a material has necessarily ended and that as a manufacture it can not serve the purpose of material for some other manufacture. Iron ore is converted into iron; iron is turned into steel; and steel into thousands of articles of indüstrial usefulness. The iron is a manu[170]*170facture of the ore, the steel a manufacture of the iron, and a watch spring a manufacture of the steel. “The finished product of one manufacture thus becomes the material of the next in rank.” Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States (171 U. S., 210, 217). The goo'ds in question are not mere pieces of dressed fur thrown together without purpose or design. The original furs dressed on the skin have been cut into pieces, not at random, but in pursuance of a definite result to be achieved. The sample shows that these pieces have been matched, that they have been fitted to place, and then sewed together into the definite form of an unlined rug. Although the basting or rough tacking of the pieces in place would have served the purpose of holding* them together for mere convenience of transportation, the pieces are something more than basted and tacked together. The pieces of the sample are very firmly joined one to the other with strong thread, and the stitching can be considered temporary only in the sense that it is removed and a more effective st3de of stitch substituted. As imported the articles have all the appearance of rugs, and as a matter of fact bear that name in the trade.

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2 Ct. Cust. 167, 1911 WL 19986, 1911 CCPA LEXIS 147, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-richter-ccpa-1911.