USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 1 of 22
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-14
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAMES H. ROANE, JR., a/k/a J.R.,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 20-16
RICHARD TIPTON, a/k/a Whittey,
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. David J. Novak, District Judge. (3:92-cr-00068-DJN-3; 3:92-cr-00068-DJN- 1)
Argued: September 14, 2022 Decided: October 18, 2022 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 2 of 22
Before WILKINSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Rushing and Senior Judge Floyd joined.
ARGUED: Gerald Wesley King, Jr., FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina; Joanne Marie Heisey, FEDERAL COMMUNITY DEFENDER OFFICE, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellants. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey Lyn Ertel, FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM, INC., Atlanta, Georgia; Stephen Northup, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Frederick R. Gerson, DURRETTE, ARKEMA, GERSON & GILL PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant Richard Tipton, III. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Joseph Attias, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 3 of 22
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
In this consolidated case, James Roane, Jr. and Richard Tipton appeal the district
court’s denial of their motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, Pub. L. No.
115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). They argue first that their convictions under
21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) for drug-related murder are “covered offenses” pursuant to the
First Step Act, and therefore their death and life imprisonment sentences can no longer be
sustained. They also argue that their convictions for crack cocaine distribution offenses in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) are “covered,” and their sentences
associated with these convictions should be reduced. We agree with the district court that
21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) is not a covered offense under the First Step Act as its penalties
were not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 2–3, 124 Stat. 2372,
2372 (2010). We also find the district court was substantively and procedurally reasonable
in denying a sentence reduction for appellants’ drug distribution offenses. We thus affirm.
I.
A.
As repeat litigants in this court, the underlying facts of this case have been
comprehensively set forth by previous panels. United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th
Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382 (4th Cir. 2004). We reemphasize
them here. This appeal arises from Roane and Tipton’s involvement as principal “partners”
in a drug-trafficking conspiracy in the Richmond, Virginia area from 1990 to 1992. Tipton,
90 F.3d at 868. The partners “obtained wholesale quantities of powdered cocaine from
suppliers in New York City, converted it by ‘cooking’ [it] into crack cocaine, then
3 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 4 of 22
packaged it, divided it among themselves, and distributed it through a network of 30-40
street level dealers[.]” Id. Appellants both earned substantial profits from this network. Id.
Over a short period of time beginning in January 1992, appellants were involved in several
brutal murders and maimings within the Richmond area. Id. Their victims were targeted
because of “treachery or other malfeasance [within the gang], or because they were
competitors in the drug trade, or because they had personally offended one of the
‘partners.’” Id.
For example, on January 4, 1992, Tipton and Roane met with Douglas Talley, a
subordinate in their drug business who had mishandled a drug transaction. Id. Roane
grabbed him from behind while Tipton stabbed him eighty-four times in the head, neck,
and upper body, killing him. Id. Nine days later, on January 13, 1992, Tipton and Roane
went to Douglas Moody’s apartment, a “suspected rival” drug dealer. Id. Once there,
Tipton shot Moody twice in the back. Id. Moody fled, but Roane, armed with a military-
style knife, caught up to Moody and fatally stabbed him eighteen times. Id. This string of
violent homicides perpetrated by appellants and other co-conspirators continued until
February 19, 1992, leaving ten dead and several others in critical condition. Id. at 868–69.
Following this spree, Roane, Tipton, and other co-conspirators were jointly charged
in the Eastern District of Virginia on July 20, 1992, as part of a 33-count indictment for
violations of federal drug laws. See J.A.T. 36–57. 1 Roane was charged with 15 counts total,
1 As these cases were consolidated after briefing, there are two joint appendices. The appendix originally submitted by Tipton’s counsel will be referred to as J.A.T. The appendix originally submitted by Roane’s counsel will be referred to as J.A.R.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 5 of 22
including three counts of capital murder in furtherance of a Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(“CCE”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; one count of possession of
50 or more grams of cocaine base (“crack cocaine”) with intent to distribute, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (substantive provision) and (b)(1)(A) (penalty provision); and
one count of engaging in a CCE, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). J.A.R. 7–27. The jury
convicted him on all charged counts. See Tipton, 90 F.3d at 870. Following a penalty
hearing on the § 848(e)(1)(A) murder convictions, a capital jury recommended a death
sentence for Roane on one count and life imprisonment on the other two. Id. The district
court sentenced Roane in accord with this recommendation and imposed terms of
imprisonment for the non-murder convictions, including forty years for the drug
distribution offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Id.; J.A.R. 56.
Tipton was charged with 29 counts, including eight counts of capital murder in
furtherance of a CCE, two counts of possession of 50 or more grams of crack cocaine with
intent to distribute, and one count of engaging in a CCE under the same statutes as Roane.
J.A.T. 36–57. The jury convicted Tipton of six of the eight capital murders, both possession
counts, and the CCE count, among other crimes. Tipton, 90 F.3d at 869. Following a
penalty hearing on the murder convictions, a capital jury recommended death sentences for
Tipton on three counts and life imprisonment on the other three. Id. at 870. The district
court sentenced Tipton in accord with this recommendation and imposed terms of
imprisonment for the non-murder convictions, including for both drug distribution
convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), forty years for one count and twenty for the other.
5 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 6 of 22
Id.; J.A.T. 19. This court substantially upheld their convictions on appeal. See Tipton, 90
F.3d at 903.
B.
Roane and Tipton have since filed numerous unsuccessful collateral attacks on their
convictions and sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382 (4th Cir. 2004);
Order, In re James Roane, Jr., No. 9-8, ECF No. 24 (4th Cir. July 13, 2010); Order, In re
James Roane, Jr., No. 16-6, ECF No. 13 (4th Cir. June 6, 2016); Order, In re James Roane,
Jr., No. 20-7, ECF No. 44 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2022); Order, In re Richard Tipton, No. 16-7,
ECF No. 13 (4th Cir. June 6, 2016); Order, In re Richard Tipton, No. 19-2, ECF No. 9 (4th
Cir. May 14, 2019); Order, In re Richard Tipton, No. 20-10, ECF No. 42 (4th Cir. Jan. 24,
2022). Most recently, they filed motions for sentence reduction pursuant to section 404(b)
of the First Step Act for their 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) murder convictions and their 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) drug distribution convictions. The district court, Judge David J. Novak,
denied both motions in their entirety. 2
In relevant part, the court held that appellants’ convictions under 21 U.S.C. §
848(e)(1)(A) for murder in furtherance of a CCE did not constitute “covered offenses”
under the First Step Act. J.A.R. 170. It explained that “the Fair Sentencing Act altered the
sentences applicable to certain offenses and the First Step Act provides the vehicle to apply
2 In denying Tipton’s First Step Act motion, see Order, United States v. Tipton, No. 3:92-cr-68-DJN-1, ECF No. 76 (E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 2020), the district court incorporated by reference its earlier decision denying Roane’s similar motion, see United States v. Roane, No. 3:92-cr-68-DJN-3, 2020 WL 6370984 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2020).
6 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 7 of 22
the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively.” J.A.R. 161. But the benefit of this retroactivity only
runs to certain “covered offense[s],” which is “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the
statutory penalties of which were modified by Section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act…that was committed before August 3, 2010.” J.A.R. 165–66 (quoting First Step Act
§ 404, 132 Stat. at 5222).
The district court stated that sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act expressly
modified the penalties associated with the following statutes: 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), 21
U.S.C. § 960(b), and 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). J.A.R. 167–68. Violations of these statutes
constituted covered offenses under the First Step Act. J.A.R. 168. The court then found
that Roane and Tipton’s offense of conviction was 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), which was
not expressly altered by the Fair Sentencing Act. J.A.R. 170. The statutory penalties in §
848(e)(1)(A) remained the same both before and after the Fair Sentencing Act– death or
life imprisonment with a statutory minimum of 20 years imprisonment. J.A.R. 177. This
precluded the court from imposing a reduced sentence “as if” the Fair Sentencing Act had
been in effect under § 404(b) of the First Step Act. J.A.R. 178. Further, “Congress’ clearly
expressed intent with respect to both § 848(e)(1)(A) and the Fair Sentencing Act” shows
that drug-related murder is not a covered offense, as the Fair Sentencing Act was meant to
apply to low-level drug dealers and not to those offenders who “murdered others in
furtherance of [their] drug dealing.” J.A.R. 176–77.
The court also rejected Roane and Tipton’s argument that their § 848(e)(1)(A)
convictions were nonetheless “covered” by the First Step Act because the statute included
a covered offense as a predicate. J.A.R. 171. The court found that § 848(e)(1)(A) creates a
7 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 8 of 22
separate crime of “killing in furtherance of any of one of three distinct predicate offenses,”
which are engaging in or working in furtherance of a CCE or engaging in conduct
punishable under either 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) or 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1). J.A.R. 171–
72. The court found that the crime appellants committed was the intentional killing of an
individual while engaging in and working in furtherance of a CCE in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(a), a crime for which they were originally convicted in 1993. J.A.R. 172–74. And
though the CCE conviction, “in turn, rested on violations of § 841(b)(1)(A),” the Fair
Sentencing Act’s modification of the statutory penalties in § 841(b)(1)(A) did not affect
the defendants’ substantive liability or statutory penalties under § 848(e)(1)(A). J.A.R.
174–75. The court found that Congress intentionally limited First Step Act coverage to
those discrete offenses whose statutory penalties the Fair Sentencing Act expressly
modified– a modification that did not include § 848(e)(1)(A). J.A.R. 175.
The court agreed with appellants that their convictions for possession with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(A) are covered offenses under the First Step Act. J.A.R. 190. However, the court
exercised its discretion pursuant to section 404(c) of the First Step Act to decline a sentence
reduction. J.A.R. 192; J.A.T. 196. It determined that the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) counseled against reducing Roane and Tipton’s terms of imprisonment for their
drug distribution convictions. J.A.R. 192–94; J.A.T. 196–99.
II.
Roane and Tipton appeal the denial of their motions for sentence reduction under
section 404(b) of the First Step Act. They argue first that their murder convictions under
8 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 9 of 22
21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) are “covered offenses” pursuant to the First Step Act, and thus
they are eligible for a reduction of their death and life imprisonment sentences for these
crimes. This is a question of “threshold eligibility for First Step Act relief, which we
consider de novo.” United States v. Goodwin, 37 F.4th 948, 952 (4th Cir. 2022); see also
United States v. Allen, 716 F.3d 98, 106 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Whether the new threshold
amount announced in the Fair Sentencing Act applie[s] to [the appellant] is a question of
law which we decide de novo.”). For the reasons that follow, we disagree with appellants
and hold that 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) is not a covered offense under the First Step Act.
We begin with the relevant statutory text and background. In 1986, concerned about
the rise of crack cocaine and its influence on violent crime, Congress passed the
comprehensive Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. See also Terry v.
United States, --- U.S. ---, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 1860 (2021). This act created mandatory-
minimum penalties for various offenses involving the possession, distribution, and sale of
drugs, with much lower trigger thresholds for crack offenses. Id. Relevant here, Congress
wrote two base penalty provisions for drug distribution offenses under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1) that depended on drug quantity. Id.; see also Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 1002, 100
Stat. 3207-2– 3207-4. Under the statute, distribution of 5 grams of crack or 500 grams of
powder cocaine triggered a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence, and distribution of 50
grams of crack or 5 kilograms of powder cocaine triggered a 10-year mandatory minimum
sentence. Terry, 141 S. Ct. at 1860 (citing 100 Stat. at 3207-2, 3207-3). These different
9 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 10 of 22
triggers produced a 100-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio for the same statutory penalty. See
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 266 (2012).
As time went on, policymakers worried that the 100-to-1 ratio was too high, in
substantial part because African Americans were disproportionately convicted of crack
offenses at the lower trigger threshold. See Terry, 141 S. Ct. at 1861 (citing United States
Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing
Policy 153-154, 192 (Feb. 1995)). Congress responded to these concerns through the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, which reduced the statutory
penalties for certain crack offenses to produce an 18-to-1 crack-to-powder drug quantity
ratio. See Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 269. Specifically, section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act raised
the drug quantity trigger for a 10-year minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)
and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1) from 50 grams to 280 grams of crack, and the 5-year minimum
trigger under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2) from 5 grams to 28
grams. § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372. Section 3 also eliminated the mandatory minimum sentence
for simple possession of crack under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). § 3, 124 Stat. at 2372.
While raising the drug quantity ratio, Congress increased financial penalties for
major drug traffickers and sentencing enhancements for defendants who committed crimes
of violence in carrying out these drug offenses. §§ 4–5, 124 Stat. at 2372–73. As an original
sponsor of the bill said, the new sentencing structure aimed to “ensure that limited Federal
resources are directed toward the largest drug traffickers and the most violent offenders,
not just those guilty of simple possession and a first offense.” 155 Cong. Rec. S10488-01,
S10491 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2009) (statement of Senator Durbin).
10 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 11 of 22
However, the Fair Sentencing Act was not retroactive, and the new drug quantity
thresholds did not “apply to a defendant sentenced before the Act’s effective date.” United
States v. Black, 737 F.3d 280, 282 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, the same “disparities between
sentences for crack cocaine offenses and powder cocaine offenses remained for defendants
sentenced before August 3, 2010[.]” United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 260 (4th Cir.
2020). As a response, Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018, which allowed district
courts to apply the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively to sentences for certain crimes
committed prior to its enactment. Pub. L. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222; see also
Gravatt, 953 F.3d at 260. The First Step Act’s sponsors believed that retroactivity “give[s]
a chance to thousands of people…still serving sentences for nonviolent offenses involving
crack cocaine under the old 100-to-1 rul[e] to petition individually” for a sentencing
reduction. 164 Cong. Rec. S7020-02, S7021 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2018) (statement of
Senator Durbin).
Section 404 of the First Step Act governs this appeal, the text of which we present
in full:
(a) DEFINITION OF COVERED OFFENSE– In this section, the term ‘‘covered offense’’ means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 …, that was committed before August 3, 2010.
(b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY SENTENCED– A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, … impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 … were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.
(c) LIMITATIONS.—No court shall entertain a motion made under this section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing
11 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 12 of 22
Act of 2010 . . . or if a previous motion made under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the date of enactment of this Act, denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.
First Step Act § 404, 132 Stat. at 5222 (citations omitted). Whether appellants are eligible
for a sentence reduction thus turns on whether their capital murder convictions under 21
U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) are “covered offenses” under section 404 of the First Step Act. See
United States v. Thomas, 32 F.4th 420, 423 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Gravatt, 953 F.3d at
262.
As an initial matter, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), the offense of which appellants were
convicted, is nowhere mentioned in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. If a “covered
offense” is “a violation of a Federal criminal statute” whose statutory penalties were
“modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act,” see First Step Act § 404(a), 132
Stat. at 5222, then only five “offenses” are explicitly contemplated by the text. Section 2
of the Fair Sentencing Act modified the penalties associated with 21 U.S.C. §§
841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), 960(b)(1)(C), and 960(b)(2)(C) by increasing the drug
quantity thresholds for crack cocaine to trigger each statute’s mandatory minimum
sentence. § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372. Section 3 modified the penalties associated with 21 U.S.C.
§ 844(a) by eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for simple possession of crack. §
3, 124 Stat. at 2372. Congress carefully enumerated specific statutes whose penalties it
modified in the Fair Sentencing Act– we have no authority to add additional ones. “[W]here
a law expressly describes a particular situation to which it shall apply, what was omitted
12 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 13 of 22
or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.” Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass’n,
250 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2001).
Notably, each of the offenses modified by the Fair Sentencing Act involves the
possession, production, or distribution of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), on the
other hand, covers the intentional killing of another individual by “any person engaging in
or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in an
offense punishable under [21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)] or [21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)].” As the
district court correctly stated, § 848(e)(1)(A) creates “a separate crime” of “killing in
furtherance of any one of three predicate offenses” by “defin[ing] the conduct it
prohibits…and the statutory penalties for engaging in the prohibited conduct.” J.A.R. 170;
see also United States v. NJB, 104 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that an earlier
version of § 848(e)(1) is a “separate offense, not merely a penalty enhancement” for
substantive CCE offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 848). Prior to August 3, 2010, the statutory
penalty range associated with this offense was 20 years to life in prison with death
eligibility. After August 3, 2010, and through today, that penalty remains the same.
Congress in no way modified the elements or penalties of § 848(e)(1)(A) via the Fair
Sentencing Act. The text of the First Step Act therefore suggests it is not a covered offense.
The reason for § 848(e)(1)(A)’s absence from the Fair Sentencing Act is obvious in
context: prior to that Act, the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that the 100-to-1 ratio
produced sentencing disparities which ran contrary to the “goal of punishing major drug
traffickers more severely than low-level dealers.” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.
85, 98 (2007); see also Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 269 (noting the 100-to-1 ratio failed to “achieve
13 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 14 of 22
the ‘proportionality’ goal” of treating low-level dealers and major traffickers differently).
Congress accepted these findings and incorporated proportionality objectives into the Fair
Sentencing Act. See Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 269. While increasing the drug quantity thresholds
for mandatory minimums, Congress both increased the financial penalties for major drug
traffickers and added additional sentencing enhancements for defendants who used
violence during a drug trafficking offense. See Fair Sentencing Act §§ 4–5, 124 Stat. at
2372–73. And the First Step Act carried this proportionality rationale forward by
authorizing “courts to provide a remedy for certain defendants who bore the brunt of a
racially disparate sentencing scheme,” low-level crack dealers. United States v. Chambers,
956 F.3d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 2020).
On the other hand, 21 U.S.C. § 848, which covers continuing criminal enterprises,
“is designed to reach the ‘top brass’ in the drug rings, not the lieutenants and foot soldiers.”
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985). Section 848(e) in particular is “aimed
at special and serious crimes,” including “killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal
enterprise, large-scale drug distribution, or large-scale drug importation.” NJB, 104 F.3d at
634. We find it hard to believe that Congress would authorize courts to reduce sentences
imposed under § 848(e)(1)(A), especially jury-imposed death sentences, without so much
as a word. Appellants attempt to baldly rewrite the statutory scheme in arguing that
Congress wanted a sentence reduction to apply to their nine capital murder convictions.
We cannot allow such a circumvention of congressional intent and the clearly expressed
statutory means of implementing that intent.
14 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 15 of 22
C.
Nevertheless, Roane and Tipton argue that “[b]ecause conviction of an offense
punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) is incorporated as an element of 21 U.S.C. §
848(e)(1)(A), § 848(e)(1)(A) has been modified by the Fair Sentencing Act and is therefore
covered under the First Step Act.” See Appellant Roane’s Opening Br. at 19. The gist of
this argument is that appellants’ convictions for possession with intent to distribute 50
grams or more of crack cocaine under §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) served as the
predicate offense to their § 848(e)(1)(A) murder convictions. Pursuant to the Fair
Sentencing Act, § 841(b)(1)(A) now requires a threshold drug quantity of 280 grams or
more of crack cocaine to trigger its statutory penalties. After the Fair Sentencing Act,
appellants argue, the threshold drug quantity required for a § 848(e)(1)(A) capital murder
offense with a drug distribution predicate is 280 grams. Appellants’ convicted drug weight
of 50 grams can no longer sustain a conviction under § 848(e)(1)(A), and therefore,
appellants contend, its penalties are modified.
This argument, however, runs headlong into the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Terry v. United States, ---- U.S. ----, 141 S. Ct. 1858 (2021). In Terry, the Court clarified
that the relevant question district courts must ask when conducting the covered offense
inquiry is “whether the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for petitioner’s
offense.” Id. at 1862. (emphasis added). It reasoned that in section 404(a) of the First Step
Act, “‘statutory penalties’ references the entire, integrated phrase ‘a violation of a Federal
criminal statute,’” which means “offense.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d
1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2020); Black’s Law Dictionary 1300 (11th ed. 2019)).
15 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 16 of 22
We believe that Terry compels the answer in this case. Terry requires us to look to
the “statutory penalties for [appellants’] offense, not the statute or statutory scheme.” Id. at
1863. The relevant offense here is 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), which is completely different
from the 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) drug distribution predicate. The Fifth Circuit recently
noted that “[e]very court of appeals to consider the question has concluded that §
848(e)(1)(A) sets forth separate offenses– offenses for which the defendant may be
prosecuted, convicted, and punished in addition to the underlying predicate drug-
trafficking offenses.” United States v. Vasquez, 899 F.3d 363, 383 (5th Cir. 2018)
(emphasis in original); see also United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1104–05 (10th
Cir. 1996) (concluding the same for the continuing criminal enterprise predicate).
Most crucially for the Terry analysis, and most fatally to appellants’ argument, the
statutory penalties associated with their § 848(e)(1)(A) convictions remain the same both
before and after the Fair Sentencing Act– a 20-year minimum sentence up to life
imprisonment or death for drug-related murder. Thus, the penalties could not possibly have
been modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, the essential requirement for First Step Act
coverage. Moreover, in urging us to focus on the drug distribution predicate of §
841(b)(1)(A), appellants completely ignore Terry’s instruction that we look at the actual
offense for which they were convicted, § 848(e)(1)(A), not some secondary and subsidiary
part. The penalties associated with this offense are established completely independently
of the predicate offenses even while incorporating some of the substantive conduct. See
United States v. Fletcher, 997 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2021). Thus, § 848(e)(1)(A) is not a
“covered offense” eligible for sentence reduction under the First Step Act.
16 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 17 of 22
D.
Roane and Tipton resist this straightforward reasoning by pointing to our recent
decision in United States v. Thomas, 32 F.4th 420 (4th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). Thomas,
however, is no help to them. First, Thomas was a case about whether 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(a)
and 848(c) were covered offenses under the First Step Act. Whether § 848(e)(1)(A) is a
covered offense was not even before the court, nor were we presented with the stark textual
and congressional intent arguments advanced in the instant case. “[U]nder our adversarial
system of justice, an unchallenged and untested assumption is simply not a holding that
binds future courts.” United States v. Norman, 935 F.3d 232, 241 (4th Cir. 2019). This is
even more salient in a case as consequential as this one, with jury-imposed death penalties
hanging in the balance. We cannot take two clauses in a long opinion as our license to
ignore the statutory text, overrule congressional intent, and buck the Supreme Court’s
guidance in Terry.
Second, Thomas actually compels us to hold against appellants in this case. Thomas
held that a CCE conviction under §§ 848(a) and (c) was not a “covered offense” under the
First Step Act. Thomas, 32 F.4th at 423. All evidence in this case suggests that the predicate
for Roane and Tipton’s murder convictions was their engagement and work in furtherance
of a CCE, and not for their drug distribution convictions under § 841(b)(1)(A). In the
indictment, all relevant § 848(e)(1)(A) charges were for intentional killings “while engaged
in and working in furtherance of a Continuing Criminal Enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a).”
See J.A.T. 36–57 (Counts 3, 5, 8, 11, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25). Roane and Tipton were both
convicted of a substantive CCE offense under 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). See J.A.T. 40–41 (Count
17 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 18 of 22
2). The jury instructions identified the CCE conviction as one of the elements of the murder
charges, requiring the jury to find “that the defendant was engaged in furtherance of the
continuing enterprise charged in Count Two of the indictment.” J.A.R. 42. Finally, on
direct appeal, this court agreed that the § 848(e)(1)(A) murder convictions were predicated
on the substantive CCE offense. Tipton, 90 F.3d at 887. Roane and Tipton’s argument as
to Thomas illustrates the flawed equation running throughout their appeal. They seek to
somehow equate a drug distribution offense with the infinitely more serious matter of a
killing in furtherance of a CCE. In short, they attempt to compare things that are not at all
comparable.
E.
Last, but certainly not least, holding in favor of appellants would create a stark
circuit split. The two circuits to decide the question presented by this appeal have both
emphatically held that 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) is not a covered offense under the First
Step Act. See United States v. Snow, 967 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v.
Fletcher, 997 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2020). Although both cases preceded Terry, our sister
circuits identified 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) as the relevant offense for their First Step Act
determination. See Fletcher, 997 F.3d at 97; Snow, 967 F.3d at 564. They rightly decided
that the First Step Act cannot be massaged to support the proposition that criminal liability
under § 848(e)(1)(A) is altogether eliminated because some former predicate drug weight
might no longer sustain a conviction. We agree with that view for the reasons set forth
above, and we thus decline to create a gratuitous circuit split.
18 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 19 of 22
III.
We turn now to appellants’ request for a reduction in the sentences imposed for their
crack cocaine distribution offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). These offenses are
covered by the First Step Act, as their statutory penalties were explicitly modified by the
text of the Fair Sentencing Act. See Pub. L. 111–20, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010);
see also Terry, 141 S. Ct. at 1864.
We recently held that all proceedings under section 404 of the First Step Act beget
procedural and substantive reasonableness review. United States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398,
402 (4th Cir. 2022). This “requires us to consider the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the
sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)].” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). The totality of the circumstances inquiry, in turn, “require[s] courts to
consider a defendant’s arguments, give individual consideration to the defendant’s
characteristics in light of the § 3553(a) factors, determine– following the Fair Sentencing
Act– whether a given sentence remains appropriate in light of those factors, and adequately
explain that decision.” United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347, 360 (4th Cir. 2021).
We conclude that the district court satisfied its burden under this standard. As an
initial matter, section 404(c) of the First Step Act makes any sentence reduction
discretionary for covered offenses. See 132 Stat. 5222. “Congress left the decision as to
whether to grant a sentence reduction to the district court’s discretion.” United States v.
Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2019). Even so, the district court carefully explained
and weighed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for both defendants.
19 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 20 of 22
The district court began by examining the 40-year sentence associated with Roane’s
conviction for possession of 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). J.A.R. 190–91. It found this sentence to be within the new post-Fair
Sentencing Act statutory penalty range: a conviction of 50 grams now triggers the
mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(B), which mandates a sentence of imprisonment
of five to forty years. J.A.R. 191. The court then considered the rest of the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors to determine whether this sentence remained appropriate. It began with
“the nature and circumstances of the defendant.” J.A.R. 192. It noted that Roane “murdered
multiple people on different occasions in cold blood in furtherance of his drug trafficking,”
committed several violent and drug-related crimes, and had a criminal history of category
V, all of which weighed against a sentencing reduction. J.A.R. 192. The court then
proceeded to consider Roane’s good conduct and rehabilitative efforts in prison along with
the mitigating evidence and actual innocence claims presented in Roane’s sentence
reduction motion. J.A.R. 192–193, 193 n. 13. However, this “laudable” mitigating evidence
was outweighed, as the court ultimately “believe[d] that reducing [Roane’s] sentence
would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote just punishment for the offense,
provide respect for the law or afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” J.A.R. 193.
It looked to the fact that Roane was a leader in his drug trafficking ring and was himself
heavily involved in several murders, one of which resulted in a jury sentencing him to
death. Id. Lastly, the court found no applicable policy statement from the Sentencing
Commission in favor of a sentence reduction, and it noted that reducing his sentence could
lead to unwarranted sentence disparities. J.A.R. 194.
20 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 21 of 22
The district court also thoroughly weighed the sentencing factors as applied to
Tipton. Tipton’s two § 841(b)(1)(A) convictions resulted in one forty-year sentence and
one twenty-year sentence. J.A.T. 196. The court stated that “under the current statutory
penalties, [it] may impose a sentence up to forty years’ imprisonment for each count,” thus
Tipton’s sentences “remain within the statutory penalties today.” J.A.T. 196–97. It then
proceeded to evaluate each § 3553(a) factor in light of Tipton’s motion. The court noted
the mitigating evidence Tipton presented but found that “the nature and circumstances of
the offense and [Tipton’s] history and characteristics” weighed heavily against him. J.A.T.
198. The court found telling the fact that Tipton “did not limit his violence to others
engaged in drug trafficking,” but instead “innocent bystanders fell victim…simply as a
result of finding themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time.” Id. The court then found
that “reducing the sentence of a lethal drug dealer would undermine” sentencing goals,
since Tipton “has proven himself as the ultimate danger to the community” through his
leadership role in an incredibly violent drug trafficking ring. Id. As in Roane’s case, the
district judge thought the fact that Tipton was sentenced to death for his crime weighed
against a sentence reduction and noted that his “lengthy disciplinary record [in prison]
…does not demonstrate a respect for the law.” Id. It further found that Tipton had already
received an in-guideline sentence for these drug distribution crimes, and that there was “no
policy statement from the Sentencing Commission [which] weighs in favor of reducing”
Tipton’s sentence. J.A.T. 199. Lastly, the district court worried that a sentence reduction
could lead to unwarranted disparities, noting that Tipton “received the same sentences as
his co-conspirators” for the drug distribution convictions. Id.
21 USCA4 Appeal: 20-16 Doc: 61 Filed: 10/18/2022 Pg: 22 of 22
The district court carefully considered appellants’ arguments and made a well-
supported determination that the ends of justice would be disserved by any sentencing
reductions for their drug distribution crimes. The proceeding did not run afoul of the First
Step Act, nor did it evidence any procedural or substantive flaw. For the foregoing reasons,
the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED