United States v. Richard E. Ewing

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Richard E. Ewing

446 F.2d 60, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 8691

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 2, 1971

Docket71-1652

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 446 F.2d 60 (United States v. Richard E. Ewing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Richard E. Ewing, 446 F.2d 60, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 8691 (9th Cir. 1971).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Ewing appeals from his conviction for bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)).

He contends that the line-up in which he was identified as the robber did not meet the standards of United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, because the two public defenders attending the lineup did not actively participate in those *61 proceedings. Wade does not require any such activity. There is no indication that the line-up was unfair in any respect.

He also says that the court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of a police officer concerning the substance of a tip that he had received from an anonymous informant.

If the testimony were used for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted by the informant, an assumption that is doubtful in the context in which the testimony was offered, we are nevertheless convinced that error in refusing to strike it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The informant’s oblique reference to Ewing was a repetition of earlier testimony that had been received without objection. The direct evidence of Ewing’s guilt was unusually strong. The error, if any, could not have affected the outcome of the trial.

The judgment is affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM:

Ewing appeals from his conviction for bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)).

He contends that the line-up in which he was identified as the robber did not meet the standards of United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, because the two public defenders attending the lineup did not actively participate in those *61 proceedings. Wade does not require any such activity. There is no indication that the line-up was unfair in any respect.

He also says that the court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of a police officer concerning the substance of a tip that he had received from an anonymous informant.

If the testimony were used for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted by the informant, an assumption that is doubtful in the context in which the testimony was offered, we are nevertheless convinced that error in refusing to strike it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The informant’s oblique reference to Ewing was a repetition of earlier testimony that had been received without objection. The direct evidence of Ewing’s guilt was unusually strong. The error, if any, could not have affected the outcome of the trial.

The judgment is affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

446 F.2d 60, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 8691, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-richard-e-ewing-ca9-1971.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack