United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1277
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CARLOS J. REYES-ROSARIO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Thompson and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
Edgar L. Sánchez-Mercado, for appellant.
Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
June 5, 2025 BARRON, Chief Judge. Carlos Reyes-Rosario ("Reyes") was
convicted of five federal offenses in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico in connection with his role
in a drug trafficking conspiracy. He then received concurrent
sentences for those convictions. On appeal, he contends that one
of those convictions must be reversed, or at least vacated. He
also challenges his sentences for all but one of those convictions.
We affirm.
I.
In December 2017, Reyes and 43 co-conspirators were
named in a six-count indictment handed up by a District of Puerto
Rico grand jury. The indictment charged Reyes with (1) conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances,
including cocaine, cocaine base, heroin, and marijuana, among
other controlled substances, within 1,000 feet of a protected
location, under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 860 (Count One);
(2) possession with intent to distribute heroin within 1,000 feet
of a protected location, under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 860, and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (Count Two); (3) possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a protected location, under 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 860, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Three);
(4) possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet
of a protected location, under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 860, and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (Count Four); (5) possession with intent to distribute
-2- marijuana within 1,000 feet of a protected location, under 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 860, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Five); (6) and
possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime,
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Six).
Reyes proceeded to trial on all the counts. After
several weeks of trial in August and September 2022, the jury
returned a guilty verdict on Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and
Five -- the controlled substance offenses. It found Reyes not
guilty, however, as to Count Six -- the firearms offense.
In October of that year, Reyes filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29
as to his five controlled substance offense counts. Specifically,
as to Count One, Reyes argued that the government presented no
evidence of Reyes's words or actions that could establish that he
willfully joined the conspiracy charged in that count. As to
Count Two, Reyes argued that he was convicted of aiding and
abetting the possession with intent to distribute heroin within
1,000 feet of a protected location, but that the government failed
to show he had the requisite intent or knowledge to be convicted
as an accomplice. Further, he argued that the government had not
shown that any events relevant to that count of conviction occurred
within 1,000 feet of a protected location, as required by the
statute of conviction. Finally, as to Counts Three, Four, and
Five, Reyes argued that the government failed to prove that anyone
-3- committed the principal offenses and further failed to prove that
Reyes had participated as an accomplice or that the offenses took
place within 1,000 feet of a protected location.
The District Court denied Reyes's motion for judgment of
acquittal in full in December 2022. The District Court then held
a sentencing hearing in March 2023, and sentenced Reyes to 168
months for his convictions on Counts One, Two, Three, and Four,
and 120 months for his conviction on Count Five, with the sentences
to be served concurrently.
Reyes timely appealed. He challenges the denial of his
motion for judgment of acquittal only as to Count Two. He also
contends that the District Court's asserted trial errors, if
established, would warrant the vacatur of his conviction on that
same count. In addition, he challenges the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of his concurrent 168-month sentences
for his convictions on Counts One, Two, Three, and Four.
II.
We begin with Reyes's contention that his conviction on
Count Two must be reversed because the District Court erred in
denying his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal as to that
count. Reyes contends, in essence, that the District Court erred
in denying this motion because "[t]he evidence at trial did not
show that [he], []either as a principal []or as an aider and
abettor, possessed with intent to distribute heroin."
-4- The District Court ruled, however, that the evidence was
sufficient to convict Reyes of Count Two as not only an aider and
abettor but also based on his liability for the actions of his
co-conspirators under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640
(1946). The District Court explained as follows:
In the alternative, the jury was instructed that if they found [Reyes] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to the conspiracy count (Count One), "then [they] may also, but [] are not required to, find him guilty of the substantive crime charged in Counts Two (2), Three (3), Four (4), Five (5), or Six (6) . . . ." However, in order to do so, the jury must have found all of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt, even if he did not personally participate in the acts constituting the crime or did not have actual knowledge of them. Namely,
First, that someone committed the substantive crime charged in Count (1) one, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances as related to Carlos Reyes-Rosario;
Second, that the person you find actually committed the charged substantive crime was a member of the conspiracy of which you found that Carlos Reyes-Rosario was a member;
Third, that this co-conspirator committed the charged substantive crime in furtherance of the conspiracy;
Fourth, that the defendant was a member of this conspiracy at the time the charged substantive crime was committed and had not withdrawn from it; and
-5- Fifth, that the defendant could reasonably have foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement that one or more of his co-conspirators would commit the charged substantive crime.
Here, the jury heard testimony as to the operations of the drug points in broad daylight, and saw video evidence in support thereof. They were the triers of fact who evaluated the evidence and made determinations as to its weight and the credibility of the witnesses. As a matter of fact, the jury, exercising its duty, found [Reyes] not guilty as to Count Six of the Indictment. Therefore, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Reyes-Rosario and his coconspirators would sell the controlled substances charged in Counts Two through Five in furtherance of the drug trafficking conspiracy while he was a member of the organization.
(Alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
Reyes does not challenge this aspect of the District
Court's decision in any respect. For example, he does not argue
that the District Court inaccurately stated the law in so ruling,
that it was inappropriate for the District Court to rely on
Pinkerton liability in this manner, or that his conviction on the
conspiracy count charged in Count One was also based on
insufficient evidence. Nor does he argue that the evidence
adduced at trial was insufficient to find that he was criminally
liable for his co-conspirators' possession of heroin with intent
to distribute within 1,000 feet of a protected location. See
United States v. Salvador-Gutierrez, 128 F.4th 299, 309 (1st Cir.
-6- 2025) (en banc) ("Under Pinkerton, a defendant is 'criminally
liable for the substantive offenses committed by his co-
conspirators during the course of and in furtherance of the
conspiracy,' so long as the offenses could be 'reasonably foreseen
as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.'"
(citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Hansen, 434
F.3d 92, 103 (1st Cir. 2006); and then quoting Pinkerton, 328 U.S.
at 648)).
Indeed, Reyes fails to make any such challenge even
though: (1) the jury heard testimony that Reyes was the leader of
the drug point operation at Jardines de Cidra, a location that no
one disputes qualifies as protected under the statute underlying
Count Two; (2) saw videos of Reyes at that location, speaking with
individuals who sold heroin there; (3) saw videos of heroin sales
taking place at the Cidra drug point; and (4) heard testimony and
saw evidence that heroin was purchased from that drug point in a
recorded undercover transaction. Given Reyes's failure to develop
any argument as to why the evidence adduced at trial would not
have been sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Reyes
guilty of the substantive offense charged in Count
Two -- possession with intent to distribute heroin within 1,000
feet of a protected location -- based on the standard set forth in
Pinkerton, we must reject his contention that his conviction on
Count Two must be reversed.
-7- III.
Reyes's claims of trial error concern: (1) the admission
of a video recording of the execution of a search warrant and the
admission of drugs and items seized during the execution of that
warrant; and (2) the limitation of Reyes's cross-examination as to
the criminal histories of the police officers who executed that
search and the exclusion of evidence concerning that same subject.
We see no merit in these challenges.
A.
1.
Reyes's first challenge to the admission of evidence
concerns the District Court's decision to permit the government to
admit a video into evidence with respect to a search by Puerto
Rico police on January 14, 2016, of a house located in the Jardines
de Cidra public housing project. During the search in question,
Puerto Rico police officers recorded a video, which showed objects
that a cooperating witness, Juan Claudio-Cervera ("Claudio"),
testified were drugs, drug paraphernalia, and weapons belonging to
the conspiracy with which Reyes was allegedly involved. That
video was presented by the government at trial, alongside physical
items that Claudio testified were seized during that search.
Reyes takes issue with the District Court's decision to
allow Claudio to authenticate the video as an accurate portrayal
of the Cidra house at the time of the search, and to authenticate
-8- the items and drugs entered into evidence as those seized during
the search. In Reyes's view, Claudio could not properly
authenticate any of that evidence, because -- though he was present
at the Cidra house at the time of the search -- he "did not record
the video and was not present at all times while the video was
being recorded." Reyes goes on to contend that the video lacked
continuity and was not complete and therefore not susceptible to
authentication by Claudio, because, as he describes the video, it
"jumped in time on more than eleven occasions, showing that the
video had been altered and was thus[] not the original video."
Making matters worse in Reyes's eyes, the police officers who
recorded the video and conducted the search were themselves engaged
in "corrupt and illegal practices" during the timeframe in which
the search occurred, "depriving the video of any reliability as to
its authenticity and accura[cy]."
The proponent of a piece of evidence must "produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is." Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). That standard is
met if a district court supportably finds that the proponent has
shown "a reasonable probability" that the evidence is what it
purports to be. United States v. Luna, 649 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir.
2011) (quoting United States v. Barrow, 448 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir.
2006)).
-9- Moreover, "[t]his requirement may be met with various
forms of evidence, including 'testimony that an item is what it is
claimed to be' or evidence of 'the appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the
item, taken together with all the circumstances.'" United States
v. Vázquez-Soto, 939 F.3d 365, 373 (1st Cir. 2019) (cleaned up)
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1), (4)). And the standard set
forth in Rule 901 also "does 'not require the proponent of the
evidence to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with
authenticity.'" United States v. Blanchard, 867 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 168
(1st Cir. 1994)).
We afford deference to a district court's determination
that evidence has been properly authenticated. See id. (quoting
United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1994)).
Applying that deference here, Reyes has not shown that the District
Court abused its discretion in finding Claudio's testimony
provided sufficient grounds to conclude there was a reasonable
probability that the video accurately depicted the search of the
Cidra house. See id. at 5 ("Evidence of authenticity may consist
of 'direct testimony of . . . a percipient witness.'" (quoting
Paulino, 13 F.3d at 23)).
At trial, Claudio testified to having extensive personal
knowledge of the conspiracy and its operations. He also testified
-10- to having worked in the Cidra house five or six days a week for
two years. Further, Claudio testified that he was present at the
Cidra house on the day of the search and was shown a search warrant
by police. He was also identified as being present in many frames
of the search video. Claudio then repeatedly testified based on
that experience that the video accurately portrayed the state of
the Cidra house on the day of the search and the officers' actions
that day.
True, Claudio did not take the video. But the evidence
supportably shows that Claudio was present when many parts of the
video were filmed. Cf. Holmquist, 36 F.3d at 169 ("A photograph's
contents, buttressed by indirect or circumstantial evidence, can
form a sufficient basis for authentication even without the
testimony of the photographer or some other person who was present
at the time it was taken."); id. (citing cases from the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits establishing the same). And while the video jumped
in time, that fact does not suffice to undermine Claudio's ability
to confirm that its contents accurately depicted the Cidra house
on the day of the search. See Blanchard, 867 F.3d at 6 (noting
that Rule 901 does not require the proponent to rule out all
possibility of doubt as to an item's authenticity).
2.
Reyes also challenges the District Court's decision to
permit the government to admit into evidence items seized during
-11- that search at issue. He argues that the District Court erred in
doing so because Claudio was unable to properly authenticate them
for the same reasons described above. He also argues that the
government could have instead had the officers who conducted the
search testify as to the video and the seized items' authenticity
but declined to do so for strategic reasons. Finally, Reyes argues
that Claudio could not authenticate those items due to "a chain of
custody issue," given that he "had no personal knowledge that the
items being presented were in fact the same items depicted in the
video."1
Reyes's first ground of challenge fails for the reasons
set forth above, given the detailed nature of Claudio's testimony.
His second ground fails as well. As we explained, the District
Court only needed evidence sufficient to supportably conclude that
the video and items were reasonably likely to be what the
government said they were. See Luna, 649 F.3d at 103. So long
as Claudio's testimony provided that supportable basis -- which,
1Insofar as Reyes contends that the admission itself of the video and items seized from the Cidra house violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, he does not appear to raise that contention until his reply brief, and in any event, fails to develop any argument on that score. We thus deem this argument waived. See Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp., 788 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2014) ("Our precedent is clear: we do not consider arguments for reversing a decision of a district court when the argument is not raised in a party's opening brief."); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.").
-12- again for the reasons set forth above, it did -- we see no reason
that the government should have been required to instead call the
officers involved with the search as authentication witnesses.
Cf. Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37, 51
(1st Cir. 1999) ("[T]here is no general rule that proof of a fact
will be excluded unless its proponent furnishes the best evidence
in his power." (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swann, 27 F.3d 1539,
1543 (11th Cir.1994))).
We move on, therefore, to address Reyes's contention
that the items seized from the house, including the drug evidence,
were of the sort that would require testimonial tracing of the
chain of custody under United States v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 66,
80-81 (1st Cir. 2006), to "render it improbable that the original
item either has been exchanged with another or has been tampered
with or contaminated," United States v. Abreu, 952 F.2d 1458, 1467
(1st Cir. 1992). We are not persuaded.
It is true that while evidence "is properly admitted if
it is readily identifiable by a unique feature or other identifying
mark[,] . . . . if the offered evidence is of the type that is not
readily identifiable or is susceptible to alteration, a
testimonial tracing of the chain of custody is necessary." Id.
But we required such tracing of the chain of custody for the drug
evidence in Anderson because "the drugs that the government sought
to admit were not readily identifiable in any way." 452 F.3d at
-13- 80. Here, by contrast, Claudio testified to his extensive
knowledge of how drugs distributed by the conspiracy were prepared
and packaged and that those drugs were present in the Cidra house
on the day of the search packaged in the conspiracy's typical
manner. He further testified to being physically present while
officers seized and placed into plastic evidence bags drugs
packaged in this manner during the search of the Cidra house. He
identified the packaging on the drugs presented at trial as
matching the packaging on those drugs seized at the Cidra house.
And he identified specific details about the stage of production
that some of the drugs presented at trial were in when the Cidra
house was searched, including how the relevant stage of production
bore on the appearance of those items. Indeed, Claudio testified
to having himself handled the proffered drugs on the day of the
search and explained that the color of the packaging on the drugs
presented at trial confirmed that they were packaged on the day in
question. Thus, given Claudio's testimony about the identifying
characteristics of the drug evidence, we cannot say the District
Court abused its discretion in deeming that evidence properly
authenticated.
Claudio's testimony also provided specific identifying
information of the type missing in Anderson as to the other items
seized from the Cidra house. For example, he identified the brand,
weapon type, and a particular modification to confirm that one of
-14- the weapons offered into evidence was a gun that belonged to his
co-conspirator and was seized during the Cidra search. The
District Court then admitted that weapon as properly
authenticated, while rejecting two other weapons that were offered
but for which Claudio could not provide specific identifying
information. And as for other drug paraphernalia, including
notebooks, scales, packaging, and other production materials,
Claudio repeatedly identified those items as being present in the
Cidra house on the day of the search, including with reference to
many of the items' location in the house, distinctive marks, or
significance to the operations of the conspiracy. We thus also
do not see how the District Court could be said to have abused its
discretion in determining that those items would not require
chain-of-custody tracing as a prerequisite to admissibility.
B.
The first of Reyes's challenges concerning limitations
on his ability to cross-examine witnesses relates to the District
Court's limitation of his ability to cross-examine Claudio about
his personal knowledge of the criminal histories of the police
officers involved in the search. That contention is without
merit. 2 Reyes also appears to challenge the District Court's
2 Insofar as Reyes means to suggest that the jury should have been entitled to review other evidence regarding the criminal histories of these officers, he does not identify what that evidence would be. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17.
-15- limitation on his ability to cross-examine the police officers
themselves.
"Confrontation [C]lause challenges are reviewed de novo
to determine whether defense counsel was afforded a reasonable
opportunity to impeach adverse witnesses; once that threshold is
reached, the trial court's restrictions on the extent and manner
of cross-examination are reviewed only for abuse of discretion."
United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2000)
(quoting United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 87 (1st Cir. 2000)).
The reasonable opportunity that defense counsel must be afforded
is "sufficient leeway to establish a reasonably complete picture
of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation." Id. (quoting
United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1996)).
We conclude that neither of Reyes's Confrontation Clause
challenges has merit.
Reyes contends that the District Court's limitation on
his ability to cross-examine Claudio "preclud[ed] [him] from
presenting evidence about [the police officers' criminal
histories]." In his view, the limitation precluded him from
introducing evidence calling into question the reliability of the
government's theory connecting the heroin seized during the search
of the Cidra house -- which the government alleged belonged to the
conspiracy of which Reyes was a part -- and heroin seized during
-16- a traffic stop of Reyes and another individual. As a result, he
asserts his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against
him was violated because the District Court "foreclos[ed] the
introduction of any testimony that supported his theory of
defense."
Claudio was the witness whose credibility Reyes had a
right to explore. Reyes was allowed the opportunity to
cross-examine Claudio extensively about topics relevant to the
basis for his personal knowledge, including about the events that
occurred on the day of the Cidra search.
True, Reyes was not allowed to cross-examine Claudio
about the criminal histories of the officers who conducted the
Cidra search. But any information about the corruption of the
officers who searched the Cidra house would not cast doubt on
Claudio's central claims as to his personal knowledge of the
operations of the conspiracy, the state of the Cidra house on the
day of the search, or his basis for thinking that the evidence
presented at trial was the same evidence seized during the search.
Thus, we do not see how this limitation on the scope of
the cross-examination of Claudio amounted to a Sixth Amendment
violation. And, notwithstanding Reyes's contention to the
contrary, our holding in Gonzalez-Vazquez comports with this
conclusion. There, we held that a district court's limitation on
a defendant's ability to cross-examine a police officer about the
-17- corruption of other officers "did not prevent the jury from
obtaining 'a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity,
bias, and motivation" because "any testimony tending to show that
these other officers were dishonest would not implicate [the
witness's]" credibility. Id. (quoting Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d at
28).
Insofar as Reyes can be read also to contend that his
Confrontation Clause right was violated because he was denied the
opportunity to confront the officers who conducted the search of
the Cidra house, we agree with the government that his arguments
fail at the threshold. He never contends that the officers who
conducted the search were witnesses against him, either in
testifying at his trial, or in having their own statements
introduced as hearsay. See Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635,
644 (2023) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause applies only to witnesses
'against the accused.'" (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 50 (2004))).3
Because we find that no error -- of either constitutional 3
or merely evidentiary significance -- occurred, we need not address the parties' arguments as to the prejudice Reyes contends he suffered due to the admission of the search video and related evidence and what he identifies as limitations on his ability to present his defense. We thus also need not address the parties' dispute over the proper standard of review that should apply to any such determination of prejudice.
-18- IV.
There remains to address Reyes's challenges to the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of his 168- and
120-month concurrent sentences.
"Claims challenging the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence are subject to a bifurcated inquiry:
'we first determine whether the sentence imposed is procedurally
reasonable' and if we conclude that it is, we 'then determine
whether it is substantively reasonable.'" United States v. Pupo,
995 F.3d 23, 28 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v.
Flores-Quiñones, 985 F.3d 128, 133 (1st Cir. 2021)). "A sentence
is procedurally unreasonable when the district court commits a
procedural error such as 'failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range.'" Id. at 28-29 (quoting
United States v. Díaz-Rivera, 957 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2020)).
"A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
'sentencing court has provided a "plausible sentencing rationale"
and reached a "defensible result."'" Id. at 29 (quoting
Flores-Quiñones, 985 F.3d at 133). We review preserved claims of
procedural and substantive unreasonableness for abuse of
-19- discretion. United States v. Arsenault, 833 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.
2016) ("[W]hen assessing procedural reasonableness, this Court
engages in a multifaceted abuse-of-discretion standard whereby 'we
afford de novo review to the sentencing court's interpretation and
application of the sentencing guidelines, assay the court's
factfinding for clear error, and evaluate its judgment calls for
abuse of discretion.'" (quoting United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792
F.3d 223, 226 (1st. Cir. 2015)); United States v. Flores-Nater, 62
F.4th 652, 655 (1st Cir. 2023). Unpreserved claims of sentencing
error, however, are reviewed under the plain error standard.
United States v. McCullock, 991 F.3d 313, 318 (1st Cir. 2021).
Reyes first contends that his sentence was procedurally
unreasonable. In his view, this is so because the District Court
failed to adequately explain its decision to impose the 14-year
sentence that Reyes received. As he sees it, the District Court
failed to give specific and individualized reasons pertaining to
Reyes's role in the offenses for which he was convicted for
imposing the sentence that it did and instead "merely limited
itself to provid[ing] a boilerplate statement that it had
considered the sentencing factors, as well as the elements of the
offense and Reyes'[s] participation in it."
The government correctly points out, however, that Reyes
did not raise his failure-to-explain objection below. Yet, Reyes
-20- does not address any of the final three prongs of the four-prong
plain error standard of review that applies to this unpreserved
challenge, beyond a single, conclusory sentence in his reply brief.
See McCullock, 991 F.3d at 318; United States v. Takesian, 945
F.3d 553, 563 (1st Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the challenge fails.
See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990);
McCullock, 991 F.3d at 318.
Reyes contends that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable, because the District Court imposed it based on
"illegally obtained and admitted evidence about Reyes'[s]
participation . . . in connection to heroin possession [and]
distribution." Thus, in his view, the District Court "sentenced
Reyes based on circumstances and conduct of codefendants, in
situations where he was not even present, and [based] on conduct
of a third party."
Reyes does not identify, though, the evidence on which
he contends that the District Court improperly relied. Insofar
as he is referring to the trial evidence to which he objects on
appeal, we have already explained that the District Court committed
no error in allowing that evidence before a jury, and Reyes
presents no separate argument as to why it would have been improper
for the District Court to consider the same evidence at sentencing.
Insofar as Reyes means to point to any other evidence, any such
-21- argument is waived for lack of development. See Zannino, 895 F.2d
at 17.
Further, Reyes does not develop any argument as to why
the District Court's decision to sentence him based on conduct of
co-conspirators or third parties was substantively unreasonable in
light of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provisions
allowing conduct of others to be attributed to the defendant for
sentencing purposes. See U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3
(U.S. Sent'g Comm'n) ("Relevant Conduct"). He thus has not
demonstrated that the District Court erred in imposing the sentence
that it did.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District
Court's decisions below.
-22-