United States v. Remigio Adiran Chicuate Sanchez

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedNovember 15, 2019
Docket18-15156
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Remigio Adiran Chicuate Sanchez (United States v. Remigio Adiran Chicuate Sanchez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Remigio Adiran Chicuate Sanchez, (11th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

Case: 18-15156 Date Filed: 11/15/2019 Page: 1 of 7

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________

No. 18-15156 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00229-MSS-CPT-11

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

REMIGIO ADIRAN CHICUATE SANCHEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________

(November 15, 2019)

Before JORDAN, BRANCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: Case: 18-15156 Date Filed: 11/15/2019 Page: 2 of 7

Remigio Adiran Chicuate Sanchez appeals his total 120-month sentence of

imprisonment, imposed after he pled guilty to violations of the Maritime Drug Law

Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. § 75051 et seq. Specifically, he pled

guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of

cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in

violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a) & (b), and 21 U.S.C.

§ 960(b)(1)(B)(ii) (Count 2), and possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms

or more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a), 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(B)(ii),

and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 3).

On appeal, Sanchez argues the district court erred in finding that it could not,

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)’s “safety valve” provision, sentence him below the

mandatory minimum 120-month sentence provided by his statutes of conviction.

He argues that, even though a panel of this Court held directly to the contrary in

United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2012), defendants

like him, who have been convicted under the MDLEA, are eligible for safety-valve

relief. After review, 1 we affirm.

1 “When reviewing the denial of safety-valve relief, we review for clear error a district court’s factual determinations.” United States v. Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 1301 (11th Cir. 2004). “We review de novo the court’s legal interpretation of the statutes and sentencing guidelines.” Id. 2 Case: 18-15156 Date Filed: 11/15/2019 Page: 3 of 7

“The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act grants the United States

jurisdiction over ‘a vessel registered in a foreign nation if that nation has consented

or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United

States,’ and it forbids individuals on such vessels from both ‘possess[ing] with

intent to . . . distribute . . . a controlled substance,’ and conspiring to do the same.”

United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139

S. Ct. 796 (2019) (alterations in original) (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502(c)(1)(C),

70503(a) & 70506(b)). “First-time offenders are subject to a mandatory minimum

penalty of 10 years of imprisonment for a violation that ‘involv[es] . . . [five]

kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of

[cocaine].’” Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B) & 46 U.S.C. § 70506(a)).

For defendants convicted of certain controlled substances offenses “under”

Title 21, the safety-valve provision permits a court to impose a sentence without

regard to prescribed statutory minimums if the defendant meets certain eligibility

requirements. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a) Of note, § 3553(f)

specifically mentions “offense[s] under . . . section 1010 . . . of the Controlled

Substances Import and Export Act,” which is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 960. 18

U.S.C. § 3553(f). A qualifying defendant may also receive a two-point reduction

in his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(18). The defendant has the burden to prove that he meets the eligibility

3 Case: 18-15156 Date Filed: 11/15/2019 Page: 4 of 7

requirements under § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. See United States v. Cruz,

106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997).

As noted above, Sanchez argues on appeal that he is eligible for safety-valve

relief as to his MDLEA convictions. He bases this assertion on two premises:

(1) the text of both the MDLEA and § 3553(f) indicate that his MDLEA

convictions qualify as offenses “under” 21 U.S.C. § 960; and (2) legislative

history, including the recent enactment of the First Step Act of 2018, demonstrates

that Congress has long sought to ensure parity between sentences imposed for

drug-trafficking offenses committed in domestic waters and those committed in

international waters.

Importantly, however, we have repeatedly held that defendants convicted

under the MDLEA are not eligible for “safety-valve” relief under § 3553(f).

Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d at 1329; Castillo, 899 F.3d at 1212–14; United States v.

Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 729 (11th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 13,

2019) (No. 18-9328). Moreover, our prior precedent rule provides that “a prior

panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled

or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this [C]ourt

sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).

Thus, our prior decisions, which we are bound to follow, squarely foreclose

any argument that a defendant, like Sanchez, convicted under the MDLEA is

4 Case: 18-15156 Date Filed: 11/15/2019 Page: 5 of 7

eligible for safety-valve relief. See, e.g., Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d at 1329. We

decline Sanchez’s invitation for us to depart from our prior caselaw, as those

decisions have not been overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the

Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352.

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Related

United States v. Cruz
106 F.3d 1553 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
United States v. Jerome Wayne Johnson
375 F.3d 1300 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
United States v. Archer
531 F.3d 1347 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz
679 F.3d 1327 (Eleventh Circuit, 2012)
United States v. Wuilson Estuardo Lemus Castillo
899 F.3d 1208 (Eleventh Circuit, 2018)
United States v. Alfredo Mosquera-Murillo
902 F.3d 285 (D.C. Circuit, 2018)
United States v. Henry Vazquez Valois
915 F.3d 717 (Eleventh Circuit, 2019)

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