United States v. Reinsch

50 F. Supp. 971, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2536
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJune 23, 1943
DocketNo. 496
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 50 F. Supp. 971 (United States v. Reinsch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Reinsch, 50 F. Supp. 971, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2536 (W.D. Wash. 1943).

Opinion

BLACK, District Judge.

In this proceeding I am confronted with a practical problem in psychology. It is my task to determine from the evidence what the defendant in 1912 actually thought of this country and of Germany; where his real allegiance lay; whether the oath he took thirty-one years ago was a sham or from the heart.

The government seeks to cancel the naturalization of the defendant in 1912 by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado upon the grounds that the defendant then falsely swore that he intended to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to Germany and then falsely swore that he would bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America.

The proceeding is brought under Section 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S. C.A. § 738.

The fact that thirty-one years has elapsed since the defendant was admitted to citizenship does not bar this proceeding to denaturalize him. If the defendant did in truth in April, 1912, intend to retain allegiance to Germany and did not then intend that his sole allegiance should be to the United States, and if such was suffi[972]*972ciently established by the evidence at this trial then a decree vacating his citizenship should enter in spite of the many years intervening between the entry of the order of naturalization and the trial. That the lapse of time .does not bar the government in this type of proceeding has been established by a number of cases. See United States v. Wursterbarth, D.C.N.J., 249 F. 908; United States v. Darmer, D.C.Wash., 249 F. 989; Schurmann v. United States, 9 Cir., 264 F. 917, 18 A.L.R. 1182; United States v. Herberger, D.C.Wash., 272 F. 278.

Therefore, the issue before the court is one of fact.

Plaintiff presented about twenty-six witnesses at the trial, which number included the defendant, who was examined in open court at such time as well as previously thereto by deposition, which deposition was admitted in evidence. With the exception of the defendant’s testimony practically all of the witneáses presented by the government, to a greater or less degree, related statements by the defendant and circumstances supporting the government’s contention. The defendant, however, submitted the testimony of approximately the same number of witnesses in support of his position. In fact, a substantial number of the defendant’s witnesses stated that during their acquaintance with the defendant they had never heard him say anything or observed him do anything which caused thetn to believe that he was other than a loyal American citizen. The government offered a number of exhibits, a portion of which were admitted at the trial, some being rejected and ruling being reserved as to the balance. The defendant offered a very much larger quantity of exhibits, regardless ' of the number, of which many were admitted at the trial, and ruling was reserved as to the admission of the rest.

Under all the circumstances in this case I am satisfied that such exhibits, offered by defendant, concerning which there was a reservation of ruling, should each be, and the same are hereby, admitted in evidence, and also am satisfied that Exhibits 6, 10, 12 and 13 offered by plaintiff with ruling reserved, should be, and same are, admitted. The other exhibits, offered by plaintiff not heretofore admitted are rejected.

At first blush there may appear to be a hopeless contradiction in the great mass of evidence presented to the court in this extended trial. But to my mind an analysis of the testimony of every witness and of each exhibit introduced makes certain the correct decision. I am completely convinced by the evidence that the defendant at the time in 1907 when he declared his intention to become an American citizen, in April, 1912 when he took the oath of allegiance, at the time of the institution of the action, at the time of the trial, and at all intervening periods, was disloyal to the United States and was loyal to Germany. It follows necessarily that I shall hold that the defendant was guilty of fraud against this government and the court which granted him citizenship and that his naturalization should be cancelled and revoked.

The testimony as a whole demonstrates that the defendant’s allegiance was to Germany and not to the United States during the First World War, and during this one, as well as during the periods preceding each such war.

My decision against the defendant does not mean that I disagree with the honesty of all of the witnesses presented by the defendant. Outside of the testimony of the defendant and his wife I feel that almost every witness presented by the defendant was sincere and gave his honest recollection and opinion.

The defendant, as demonstrated by his very substantial income, is a man of outstanding ability especially as a log and lumber buyer. And he is a man of exceeding industry and thrift as well as loyalty to his family and his work. But he has not been loyal to the country which gave him much opportunity and increasing recompense for his skill and energy. It is true he worked long hours and efficiently for his company after it became engaged in filling only war orders. But as accompany officer in effect testified, if he had not been efficient his services would have terminated. Undoubtedly defendant was determined, whether Germany won or lost,- to have an important post with that plant.

It just so happens that the defendant was two individuals: one of such individuals was the real defendant, who was loyal to Germany and disloyal to the United States and who only disclosed his real feelings to certain individuals. . The other individual was the defendant as he posed and pretended to be when he deemed such pose and pretense advantageous to himself.

[973]*973The defendant has been ably represented by learned and experienced counsel who have brought to his defense much preparation as well as skill and vigor.

But defendant, in his deposition and during the course of his trial, felt compelled to admit under oath a great many things which, even if there was no other evidence in the case, would make it extremely difficult for me to consider him disloyal to Germany or attached to the United States. Practically none of his witnesses, other than his family, knew these facts. In other words, almost all of defendant’s witnesses mistakenly thought he was an entirely different individual than he, under oath, admitted himself to be.

It is appropriate to here relate some of such admissions. The defendant admitted that last fall he told the two agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation interviewing him that he would not insult the German Gestapo by comparing them with the F. B. I.; he also admitted that he probably told them that up to Pearl Harbor he considered Germany right, and that he probably told them “You bet,” lie wanted Germany to win, but he denied he told the F. B. I. agents that after Pearl Harbor he still considered Germany right and that he still wanted Germany to win, and contended that he instead evaded and parried the question of whether he wished Germany to win after Pearl Harbor; the defendant, at the trial or in his deposition, further admitted that he had purchased no American Defense Bonds or War Bonds at all during the present war or in the period leading up to it; that except for a little loose change that he claims he may have given in 1942, that neither in 1941, 1942 nor 1943 did he make any contribution to the Red Cross; that from 1938 or 1939 he was a member of

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Related

Costello v. United States
365 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1961)
United States v. Costello
171 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. New York, 1959)
Reinsch v. United States
156 F.2d 678 (Ninth Circuit, 1945)
United States v. Bregler
55 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. New York, 1944)

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Bluebook (online)
50 F. Supp. 971, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2536, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-reinsch-wawd-1943.