United States v. Reginald Hitchcock

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: April 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-1377
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0205n.06

No. 24-1377

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Apr 17, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN REGINALD HITCHCOCK, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION

Before: GIBBONS, WHITE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. When seeking a warrant to search Reginald Hitchcock’s home,

an officer told a judge that an informant had regularly bought drugs from Hitchcock and that

Hitchcock’s girlfriend had seen drugs at the home. After the judge issued the warrant, officers

recovered fentanyl, cocaine, and ammunition. A jury convicted Hitchcock of drug and firearm

offenses. He now argues that the officer’s affidavit in support of the warrant did not allege enough

facts to establish probable cause that the police would find drugs at his home. He adds that the

district court at least should have held an evidentiary hearing over whether the affidavit misstated

facts. We agree with the district court’s decision to reject both claims. We thus affirm.

I

This case started with a drug-trafficking investigation in Detroit, Michigan. Branden

Jousma—who has been a task-force officer with the Drug Enforcement Administration since No. 24-1377, United States v. Hitchcock

2015—led the investigation. See Aff., R.26, PageID 164. Ultimately, Jousma sought a warrant to

search a home on Cloverlawn Avenue. See id. Because judges must rely only on allegations that

an officer makes under oath when deciding whether to issue a warrant, we will describe the facts

using the allegations from Jousma’s affidavit. See United States v. Davis, 970 F.3d 650, 665–66

(6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Sumlin, 956 F.3d 879, 885 (6th Cir. 2020).

On November 16, 2020, Jousma learned about a drug dealer nicknamed “Rocket” from a

confidential informant. Aff., R.26, PageID 166. Rocket had sold the informant “heroin and

powder cocaine” many times over the last month. Id. The informant suggested that these

transactions typically occurred in the same way. Id. Rocket drove a white Chevrolet Traverse to

a location on Kentucky Street north of Schoolcraft Road. Id. He and the informant then engaged

in a “window to window” exchange while sitting in their cars on Kentucky Street. Id. The

informant could even recall the Traverse’s license plate number. Id.

By putting that number into a police database, Jousma quickly identified Hitchcock as the

Traverse’s registered owner. Id. Hitchcock also had a history of drug offenses. Id., PageID 167.

Jousma showed Hitchcock’s picture to the informant. Id., PageID 166. The informant identified

Hitchcock as Rocket. Id. Jousma also located the Traverse parked at the Cloverlawn home—six

blocks from the usual location of the drug deals on Kentucky Street. Id.

Jousma and other officers started to monitor this home on the same day that Jousma spoke

to the informant. Id. They watched Hitchcock leave the home with a woman in the Traverse. Id.

Hitchcock drove into a parking lot off Schoolcraft Road. Id. He then engaged in “what appeared

to be a hand to hand drug transaction” with someone in another vehicle. Id. After this suspected

exchange, an officer with the Michigan State Police stopped Hitchcock. Id. The woman in the

Traverse (who turned out to be Hitchcock’s girlfriend) had a warrant out for her arrest for

2 No. 24-1377, United States v. Hitchcock

absconding from parole. Id. While searching this woman during her arrest, the officer found a

small amount of heroin. Id. He otherwise let Hitchcock go. Id.

That night, Jousma and two other officers interviewed Hitchcock’s girlfriend. Id. She

asserted that she had lived at the Cloverlawn home with Hitchcock for the last six months. Id. She

suggested that Hitchcock had provided her the heroin in her possession at the time of her arrest

and that he had sold heroin to the driver that he met in the parking lot. Id., PageID 167. That said,

she admitted that this meeting location had been unusual. Id. Hitchcock had instead been making

about $7,000 per day “selling heroin, cocaine and crack to people who he [met] on Kentucky

Street.” Id., PageID 166–67. Hitchcock’s girlfriend also disclosed that he had heroin, cocaine,

and cash in a “hidden compartment in the staircase” of their Cloverlawn home. Id., PageID 167.

Without Hitchcock’s knowledge, she had taken a “chunk” of the heroin earlier that morning. Id.

The next afternoon, another officer watched Hitchcock leave the Cloverlawn home, travel

to Kentucky Street, and “meet window to window” with a vehicle. Id. This officer believed that

he saw Hitchcock engage in another “hand to hand narcotic transaction” at that time. Id. Yet after

a traffic stop of the suspected buyer’s vehicle, officers uncovered no drugs. Id. Jousma opined

based on his experience that the buyer had likely “disposed of the narcotics” before the stop. Id.

Sometime later that day, Jousma used all this information to seek a warrant to search the

Cloverlawn home. A state judge issued the warrant. Officers executed it the next day. They

uncovered a substantial amount of fentanyl and cocaine as well as ammunition in the hidden

compartment that Hitchcock’s girlfriend had told them about.

The government charged Hitchcock with three counts: possession with the intent to

distribute at least 40 grams of fentanyl; possession with the intent to distribute at least 500 grams

of cocaine; and possession of ammunition as a felon. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C.

3 No. 24-1377, United States v. Hitchcock

§ 922(g)(1). Before trial, Hitchcock moved to suppress the evidence found at the home. He made

two claims. He first argued that Jousma’s affidavit did not establish probable cause to search the

home. He next argued that the affidavit included false statements entitling him to an evidentiary

hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The district court denied his motion.

Hitchcock went to trial. A jury convicted him of all counts. The district court sentenced

him to 180 months’ imprisonment.

II

Hitchcock renews his claims that Jousma’s affidavit did not establish probable cause to

search the home and that it contained inaccuracies that entitled him to a “Franks hearing.”

A. Probable Cause

Under the Fourth Amendment, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

person or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This text requires a “probable cause”

connection between the “place to be searched” and the “things to be seized.” Id.; see United States

v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2021). That is, a “fair probability” must exist that officers

will find the items they want to seize at the place they want to search. United States v. Sanders,

106 F.4th 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (citation omitted); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

238 (1983).

Drug-trafficking investigations routinely implicate this “nexus” requirement to connect

illegal drugs to a specific location. See United States v. Miller, 850 F. App’x 370, 373 (6th Cir.

2021). Our caselaw, for example, has long debated when officers have probable cause to search a

drug dealer’s home based only on evidence of the dealer’s distribution. See Reed, 993 F.3d at

447–49; see also Sanders, 106 F.4th at 464–66. But “our cases leave no doubt” that a nexus exists

4 No. 24-1377, United States v. Hitchcock

when an officer’s affidavit connects a dealer’s trafficking to a home in a more specific way. Miller,

850 F. App’x at 373. So we have held that probable cause existed when a drug dealer went to a

drug transaction from the place that the officers sought to search, thereby suggesting that the dealer

stored drugs at that location. See id. at 373–74; see also Sanders, 106 F.4th at 463; United States

v. Coleman, 923 F.3d 450, 457 (6th Cir. 2019). And we have held that probable cause existed

when a reliable informant with personal knowledge disclosed that a dealer possessed drugs at a

home. See United States v. Bell, 2022 WL 59619, at *2–3 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022); United States v.

Brown, 732 F.3d 569, 572–74 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 971–72, 976

(6th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

These standards show that Jousma had probable cause to search the Cloverlawn home.

According to his affidavit, Hitchcock’s girlfriend said that she had lived with Hitchcock at the

home for six months. See Aff., R.26, PageID 166. She said that Hitchcock regularly sold heroin

and cocaine. See id., PageID 166–67. And she said that Hitchcock stored a large amount of these

drugs at their home. See id., PageID 167. Indeed, she suggested that she had stolen some heroin

earlier that day. See id. This information from a “known” individual may well have supplied

probable cause on its own. Allen, 211 F.3d at 976. But Jousma “corroborated” the information

with a lot more details. Bell, 2022 WL 59619, at *3. Among other things, an officer had found

heroin on Hitchcock’s girlfriend when arresting her. Aff., R.26, PageID 166. A confidential

informant had told Jousma that he bought drugs from Hitchcock. Id. And Jousma had watched

Hitchcock engage in what looked like a drug transaction from his car. Id. Hitchcock also had a

prior narcotics conviction and was out on bond in a pending drug-trafficking case. Id., PageID

167; see United States v. Christian, 925 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). These collective

5 No. 24-1377, United States v. Hitchcock

facts created a “fair probability” that the home would contain illegal drugs, so they established

probable cause to search it. Sanders, 106 F.4th at 461 (citation omitted).

In response, Hitchcock challenges the confidential informant. He argues that the

informant’s claims did not tie Hitchcock’s drug dealing to the Cloverlawn home and that Jousma

did not corroborate the informant’s allegations with enough other information. But Hitchcock says

nothing about his girlfriend’s statement that he had a secret cache of drugs at the home. That

omission speaks volumes. Her statement directly connected his home to his drug dealing. And

the other information that Jousma gathered corroborated her allegations. Jousma thus established

the required nexus through means other than reliance on the informant.

B. Franks Hearing

In Franks, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment allows defendants to

challenge the veracity of the affidavit an officer submits to obtain a search warrant. See 438 U.S.

at 155–56. If a false statement in the affidavit mattered to the judge’s issuance of the warrant, a

court should exclude evidence recovered based on the later search. See id. at 156. But defendants

can obtain an evidentiary hearing (or “Franks hearing”) to prove this type of Fourth Amendment

violation only if they make a “substantial preliminary showing” of three things. Id. at 155; United

States v. Crawford, 943 F.3d 297, 309 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). They must show that the

challenged affidavit contained a false statement or material omission. See Franks, 438 U.S. at

155; United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997). They must show that the officer

who signed the affidavit included the falsehood or omitted the material fact with a culpable state

of mind. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56; United States v. Bateman, 945 F.3d 997, 1008 (6th Cir.

2019). And they must show that the false statement or material omission made a difference to the

6 No. 24-1377, United States v. Hitchcock

question whether the affidavit established probable cause. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; Crawford,

943 F.3d at 309–10.

In this case, Hitchcock argues that Jousma’s affidavit contained two false statements and

made two material omissions. But the district court correctly held that Hitchcock did not make

the required “preliminary showing” to support these claims. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155.

False Statements. Hitchcock argues that the affidavit misstated two facts. He first suggests

that Jousma lied about how he obtained the Traverse’s license plate number. Jousma’s affidavit

stated that the confidential informant provided this information. According to Hitchcock, though,

Jousma later testified at the preliminary hearing that he “found” a Traverse in the general area with

this license plate number. Appellant’s Br. 21 (citation omitted). But Hitchcock’s argument

misreads the preliminary-hearing transcript. Jousma testified on direct examination that he “was

given . . . the license plate number” without identifying his source. Tr., R.26, PageID 200. On

cross examination, he initially suggested that he had testified on direct that he found the license

plate number while driving around. Id., PageID 204. But he immediately corrected himself by

noting that the informant had given him the number. Id., PageID 204–05. So his preliminary-

hearing testimony comported with his affidavit. And Hitchcock presents no “proof” that Jousma

lied about the license plate number. United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990).

Hitchcock next argues that Jousma lied in the affidavit when he said that he saw Hitchcock

engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Appellant’s Br. 22. Hitchcock reasons that Jousma

admitted at the preliminary hearing that he did not see drugs pass between the two cars. Tr., R.26,

PageID 212. This time, though, Hitchcock misreads the affidavit. It did not purport to state that

Jousma had seen the drugs. It stated only that Jousma “observed Hitchcock do what appeared to

be a hand to hand drug transaction.” Aff., R.26, PageID 166 (emphasis added). So Jousma’s

7 No. 24-1377, United States v. Hitchcock

affidavit again comports with his preliminary-hearing testimony. Besides, Jousma later

interviewed Hitchcock’s girlfriend, who told him that a transaction had indeed occurred. Id.,

PageID 167. And Hitchcock again identifies no “proof” to the contrary. Bennett, 905 F.2d at 934.

Material Omissions. Hitchcock next argues that Jousma’s affidavit omitted details about

his girlfriend. After her arrest she had a “panic attack and could not breath[e].” Rep., R.26, PageID

191. So the officer with the Michigan State Police left her at a fire station, and she traveled to the

police station for her interview with Jousma later that night in an unknown way. Id. She also told

Jousma that she had been living with Hitchcock at the Cloverlawn home, but her parole office was

in another part of Detroit. Hitchcock criticizes Jousma for omitting both his girlfriend’s panic

attack and the location of her parole office from the affidavit. Appellant’s Br. 22–23. Some of

our cases have suggested that a defendant must meet a “higher” intent element when seeking to

challenge an affidavit through these types of omissions. See United States v. Davis, 84 F.4th 672,

681–82 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). But we need not consider that question here.

Hitchcock’s claim fails because these facts (if they had been included in the affidavit) would not

have eliminated the probable cause that existed to search the home based on the affidavit’s many

other incriminating details. See Crawford, 943 F.3d at 309–10.

All told, Hitchcock did not make a “substantial preliminary showing” that Jousma included

false statements or omitted material information from the affidavit. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155. The

district court thus rightly declined his request to hold a Franks hearing.

We affirm.