Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-12558 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:18-cr-00032-RH-MJF-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAVI BABU KOLLA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(June 30, 2020)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 2 of 6
Ravi Kolla appeals his 84-month sentence for conspiracy to commit
marriage fraud to defraud the United States and conspiracy to commit money
laundering. On appeal, he asserts that his above-guideline sentence was
substantively unreasonable because the district court (1) considered improper
factors, (2) placed undue weight on his false testimony, and (3) ignored mitigating
factors. After careful review, we affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007). A defendant who challenges his sentence bears the burden of showing that
it is unreasonable considering the record and the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). A
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider relevant factors that
were due significant weight, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant
factors, or commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors
unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). The district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the
need “to reflect the seriousness of the” crime, “promote respect for the law,”
“provide just punishment,” and “protect the public from” the defendant’s future
criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C); see also Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196.
2 Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 3 of 6
The district court must also consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
We have emphasized that we must give due deference to the district court’s
consideration and weighing of the proper sentencing factors. Shabazz, 887 F.3d
at 1224. Though the district court must consider all the § 3553(a) factors, it does
not have to address each factor explicitly at the sentencing hearing. United States
v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court is not
required to weigh the factors equally, and it has discretion to attach greater weight
to one factor than another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254
(11th Cir. 2015). In addition to the § 3553(a) factors, the district court should
consider the particularized facts of the case and the guideline range. Id. at 1258–
60. But the district court retains discretion to give greater weight to any of the
§ 3553(a) factors, or combination of factors, than to the guideline range. Id. at
1259.
The district court also “has wide discretion to decide whether the [§] 3553(a)
factors justify a variance” outside the guideline range. United States v. Rodriguez,
628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Although sentences outside the Sentencing
Guidelines are not presumed to be unreasonable, we may take the degree of any
variance into account. United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566, 573 (11th Cir. 2010).
“[A] major variance . . . require[s] a more significant justification than a minor
3 Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 4 of 6
one,” and “the justification [must] be sufficiently compelling to support the degree
of the variance.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196 (quotation omitted). But we must give
“deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors . . . justify the
extent of the variance.” Turner, 626 F.3d at 574 (quotation omitted). In imposing
an upward variance, the district court can rely on factors that it had previously
considered in imposing an enhancement. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1264. Moreover,
a finding that the defendant lacked remorse and testified falsely is a valid basis for
an upward variance. See United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1253, 1264
(11th Cir. 2019) (affirming a 100-month sentence as substantively reasonable,
despite a guideline range of 46 to 57 months, where the defendant lacked remorse
and committed perjury); see also United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350, 1367–68
(11th Cir. 2010) (affirming a major upward variance as substantively reasonable
based, in part, on the defendant’s lack of remorse and false testimony at trial).
In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we will not
reverse a sentence solely because we reasonably could conclude that a different
sentence was more appropriate. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Rather, we will vacate a
sentence “if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotation omitted). And
4 Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 5 of 6
importantly, we have upheld upward variances matching the statutory maximum as
reasonable when necessary to achieve the purposes set out in § 3553(a). See
United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282, 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016)
(affirming an upward variance to the statutory maximum sentence as necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by varying upward
51 months from the high end of the guideline range and imposing an 84-month
sentence. First, the court properly relied on the number of fraudulent marriages
and Kolla’s profit from the scheme as grounds for varying upward. While the
Sentencing Guidelines generally account for the number of fraudulent marriages
and assume that the defendant engaged in the fraud for profit, the district court was
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Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-12558 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:18-cr-00032-RH-MJF-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAVI BABU KOLLA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(June 30, 2020)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 2 of 6
Ravi Kolla appeals his 84-month sentence for conspiracy to commit
marriage fraud to defraud the United States and conspiracy to commit money
laundering. On appeal, he asserts that his above-guideline sentence was
substantively unreasonable because the district court (1) considered improper
factors, (2) placed undue weight on his false testimony, and (3) ignored mitigating
factors. After careful review, we affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007). A defendant who challenges his sentence bears the burden of showing that
it is unreasonable considering the record and the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). A
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider relevant factors that
were due significant weight, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant
factors, or commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors
unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). The district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the
need “to reflect the seriousness of the” crime, “promote respect for the law,”
“provide just punishment,” and “protect the public from” the defendant’s future
criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C); see also Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196.
2 Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 3 of 6
The district court must also consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
We have emphasized that we must give due deference to the district court’s
consideration and weighing of the proper sentencing factors. Shabazz, 887 F.3d
at 1224. Though the district court must consider all the § 3553(a) factors, it does
not have to address each factor explicitly at the sentencing hearing. United States
v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court is not
required to weigh the factors equally, and it has discretion to attach greater weight
to one factor than another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254
(11th Cir. 2015). In addition to the § 3553(a) factors, the district court should
consider the particularized facts of the case and the guideline range. Id. at 1258–
60. But the district court retains discretion to give greater weight to any of the
§ 3553(a) factors, or combination of factors, than to the guideline range. Id. at
1259.
The district court also “has wide discretion to decide whether the [§] 3553(a)
factors justify a variance” outside the guideline range. United States v. Rodriguez,
628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Although sentences outside the Sentencing
Guidelines are not presumed to be unreasonable, we may take the degree of any
variance into account. United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566, 573 (11th Cir. 2010).
“[A] major variance . . . require[s] a more significant justification than a minor
3 Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 4 of 6
one,” and “the justification [must] be sufficiently compelling to support the degree
of the variance.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196 (quotation omitted). But we must give
“deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors . . . justify the
extent of the variance.” Turner, 626 F.3d at 574 (quotation omitted). In imposing
an upward variance, the district court can rely on factors that it had previously
considered in imposing an enhancement. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1264. Moreover,
a finding that the defendant lacked remorse and testified falsely is a valid basis for
an upward variance. See United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1253, 1264
(11th Cir. 2019) (affirming a 100-month sentence as substantively reasonable,
despite a guideline range of 46 to 57 months, where the defendant lacked remorse
and committed perjury); see also United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350, 1367–68
(11th Cir. 2010) (affirming a major upward variance as substantively reasonable
based, in part, on the defendant’s lack of remorse and false testimony at trial).
In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we will not
reverse a sentence solely because we reasonably could conclude that a different
sentence was more appropriate. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Rather, we will vacate a
sentence “if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotation omitted). And
4 Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 5 of 6
importantly, we have upheld upward variances matching the statutory maximum as
reasonable when necessary to achieve the purposes set out in § 3553(a). See
United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282, 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016)
(affirming an upward variance to the statutory maximum sentence as necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by varying upward
51 months from the high end of the guideline range and imposing an 84-month
sentence. First, the court properly relied on the number of fraudulent marriages
and Kolla’s profit from the scheme as grounds for varying upward. While the
Sentencing Guidelines generally account for the number of fraudulent marriages
and assume that the defendant engaged in the fraud for profit, the district court was
permitted to vary upward by relying on factors already accounted for in the
guideline range. See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1264. The court correctly considered
the particularized facts of the case and acted within its discretion to emphasize “the
nature and circumstances of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); see also
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1259–60.
Second, as to Kolla’s argument that the court improperly relied solely on his
false testimony in imposing the variance, the district court was entitled to rely on
Kolla’s lack of candor in varying upward. See Feldman, 931 F.3d at 1264.
Moreover, and in any event, the court did not rely solely on this factor in deciding
5 Case: 19-12558 Date Filed: 06/30/2020 Page: 6 of 6
to vary upward. Rather, the court explained that the variance was based on Kolla’s
lack of candor and remorse, the nature and circumstances of the offense,
deterrence, promoting respect for the law, and the seriousness of the crime, in
addition to his willfully false testimony.
Finally, contrary to Kolla’s assertion, the district court recognized mitigating
factors, including Kolla’s lack of criminal history and letters written in support of
him, but nevertheless concluded that a sentence within the guideline range would
not sufficiently achieve the purposes that underlie § 3553(a).
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an upward
variance, as it appropriately considered all the applicable § 3553(a) factors, did not
give inordinate weight to certain factors or ignore others, and properly concluded
that an upward variance was appropriate given the nature and circumstances of
Kolla’s offenses, his lack of candor, lack of remorse, and willful false testimony.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.