United States v. Rashon Edwards

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: July 17, 2024
• Docket: 21-6952
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6952

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RASHON ANDRE EDWARDS,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00011-D-1)

Submitted: April 17, 2024 Decided: July 17, 2024

Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Gina M. GROH, United States District Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Groh wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee joined. Judge Wynn wrote a dissenting opinion.

ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 21-6952 Doc: 60 Filed: 07/17/2024 Pg: 2 of 12

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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GROH, District Judge:

Rashon Andre Edwards appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a

sentence reduction pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,

132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (“First Step Act”). On appeal, Edwards argues that the district court

abused its discretion by denying his motion. Because the district court considered

Edwards’s arguments and explained its decision, we affirm.

In ruling on a First Step Act motion, a district court “must first determine whether

the sentence qualifies for reduction—i.e., whether it is eligible for consideration on the

merits.” United States v. Lancaster, 997 F.3d 171, 174 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted). If the movant is eligible for a sentence reduction, the district court “then

[has] discretion to impose a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect

at the time the covered offense was committed.” Id. at 175.

“While Congress certainly gave district courts the discretion under section 404 not

to impose sentence reductions, that discretion must be reviewed in light of the First Step

Act’s remedial purpose.” United States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398, 403 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation

omitted). However, “a district court is not required to modify a sentence for any reason.”

Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 496 (2022). Accordingly, “‘[d]rawing meaning

from silence is particularly inappropriate’ in the sentencing context, ‘for Congress has

shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms.’” Id. at 497

(quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007)).

The Supreme Court also explained that “a district court is not required to be

persuaded by every argument parties make, and it may, in its discretion, dismiss arguments

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that it does not find compelling without a detailed explanation.” Id. at 501. The First Step

Act affords district courts broad discretion, and as a result, it “counsels in favor of

deferential appellate review.” Id. An appellate court steps outside the bounds of its role

when it “substitute[s] its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness

of a particular sentence.” Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983)).

The First Step Act does not require district courts “to make a point-by-point rebuttal

of the parties’ arguments”; the sentencing court must simply “demonstrate that it has

considered the arguments before it.” United States v. Rozelle, No. 21-6901, 2023 WL

6619539, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 2023) (quoting Concepcion, at 502). This Court has

acknowledged that “a district court’s discretion is broad and its burden light.” United States

v. Troy, 64 F.4th 177, 184 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 167 (2023).

In this Circuit, district courts must “consider a defendant’s arguments, give

individual consideration to the defendant’s characteristics in light of the § 3553(a) factors,

determine—following the Fair Sentencing Act—whether a given sentence remains

appropriate in light of those factors, and adequately explain that decision.” Id. at 185

(quoting United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347, 360 (4th Cir. 2021)). But the

requirement to adequately explain a decision must be squared with the Supreme Court’s

closing lines in Concepcion:

All that is required is for a district court to demonstrate that it has considered the arguments before it. The First Step Act does not require a district court to be persuaded by the nonfrivolous arguments raised by the parties before it, but it does require the court to consider them.

597 U.S. at 502.

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When Edwards was sentenced on December 17, 2008, his guideline range was 262

to 327 months. The district court sentenced him to serve 300 months in prison. The district

court found Edwards’s conviction is a covered offense under section 404(a) of the First

Step Act and calculated his new advisory guideline range to be 70 to 87 months. 1

Importantly, the district court explained that it “completely reviewed the entire record, the

parties’ arguments, the new advisory guideline range, and all relevant factors under 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a).” JA111. We may presume when a district court says it reviewed the

record, it did.

After explaining the concerning circumstances that led Edwards to be charged in

this matter, the district court stated, “Edwards is a violent recidivist” and went on to list his

numerous convictions. JA112. Next, the court not only recognized “some positive steps

while incarcerated” but also contrasted those by listing Edwards’s infractions and the dates

for each, ranging from 2009 to 2020. Id. His most recent infraction was for an assault he

committed the same year he filed the motion for a sentence reduction. JA165.

The district court’s decision not to reduce Edwards’s sentence was explicitly based

upon his “serious criminal conduct, terrible criminal record, poor performance on

1 The parties now agree that the district court incorrectly determined Edwards’s guideline range, and it is actually 188–235 months. See Response Br. 17; Reply Br. 4–5. This error, however, is harmless because “the district court denied relief even under the incorrect lower range,” and therefore “there’s no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had the court recognized its mistake.” United States v. Smith, 75 F.4th 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2023).

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supervision, serious misconduct while incarcerated, the need to promote respect for the

law, the need to deter others, the need to protect society, and the need to incapacitate

Edwards[.]” Id. The district court again noted that it had reached this decision after

considering “the entire record, Edwards’s arguments, and the section 3553(a) factors.” Id.

It is worth noting that the same judge who sentenced Edwards in 2008 considered

and denied this First Step Act motion. District courts are burdened with the unenviable but

necessary task of regularly sentencing individuals who have been convicted of crimes in

federal court. Judges spend hours preparing for and presiding over each sentencing hearing.

This includes reviewing lengthy presentence investigation reports, the parties’ objections,

sentencing memoranda, motions for variance or departure, statements by the defendant,

victim(s), family members, and experts, as well as the arguments of counsel. Having

considered all of this, the court must then determine a sentence, also bearing in mind the

law, purposes of sentencing, advisory guidelines, and person standing before the court.

Only a few yards separate the judge from that person as their sentence is pronounced. Under

the First Step Act’s discretionary framework, the sentencing judge is best situated to

determine whether a reduction is warranted.

When, as here, the district court has explicitly stated that it reviewed and considered

the entire record and every argument presented, provided an explanation for its decision

not to reduce the sentence, and even supported that explanation with facts from the record,

it has clearly satisfied the First Step Act’s requirements. The court need not “be persuaded

by the nonfrivolous arguments” before it, but it is required “to consider them.” Concepcion,

597 U.S. at 502. That is precisely what the district court did in this case.

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In his dissent, Judge Wynn contends United States v. Swain requires us to provide

Edwards the shorter sentence he seeks. 49 F.4th 398 (4th Cir. 2022). In Swain, the district

court’s order denying a sentence reduction was held to be substantively unreasonable

because it did not adequately explain its decision. Id. at 403–04.

After Swain, Chief Judge Diaz authored the opinion in United States v. Smith,

75 F.4th 459 (4th Cir. 2023). The Smith court affirmed the denial of a motion for reduced

sentence, finding the district court considered “remedial aims, as well as all other

nonfrivolous arguments, before exercising its broad discretion to deny sentencing relief.”

Id. at 469. The appellant in Smith understandably relied heavily upon Swain. Smith argued

that the district court made the same errors in his case that the Swain court relied upon: not

explicitly mentioning that the sentence was a significant upward variance under the new

guideline range and not discussing the remedial aims of the FSA. Id. at 467.

Just as the Smith Court did, “we decline to read Swain as requiring district courts to

robotically tick through these effects of the First Step Act in sentencing. To do so would

impose conditions beyond our modest ‘requirement that [the district court] adequately

explain its sentencing decision.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347,

358 (4th Cir. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Concepcion, 597 U.S. 481). This

court’s decision in Smith is not only binding and good law, but also it was decided after

Swain, providing clarification and more recent direction for cases like the one before us.

All three of these cases, like many others, share numerous commonalities.

Regardless of the similarities we could draw, the question before us—as indicated by Swain

and Smith—is whether the district court’s decision was substantively reasonable and

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adequately explained. Based upon the facts before us in this case, we find no reason to

reverse the district court’s decision. We therefore conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion and affirm its order.

AFFIRMED

WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

This case should be an open-and-shut application of our binding decision in United

States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398 (4th Cir. 2022). Swain held that a nearly identical order

denying a motion for resentencing was substantively unreasonable. Because Swain remains

good law and there is no meaningful basis on which to distinguish that case from this one,

we should reach the same result here.

When a district court denies a motion for a sentencing reduction pursuant to § 404

of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5222, we may not

substitute our own “judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of

a particular sentence.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 501 (2022) (quoting

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983)).

But our review is not toothless. Rather, we must ensure that the district court’s

“decision to retain or reduce a sentence under the First Step Act” is neither procedurally

nor substantively unreasonable. United States v. Troy, 64 F.4th 177, 184 (4th Cir. 2023);

see also United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 820 (4th Cir. 2023); Swain, 49 F.4th at 401–

02.

“A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it is longer than necessary to serve the

purposes of sentencing.” Swain, 49 F.4th at 402 (quoting United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d

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663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020)). In Swain—this Court’s first published opinion applying the

Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v. United States—we determined that a district

court’s denial of a § 404 motion on facts like those present here was substantively

unreasonable. The movant in that case, Mitchell Swain, was originally sentenced to a

within-guidelines 324 months’ imprisonment for drug offenses but later sought

resentencing because retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act reduced his

guidelines range to 210 to 262 months. Id. at 400. So, Swain’s original sentence was 62

months higher than the top end of his updated guidelines range.

The district court judge—who presided over both Swain and this case—recognized

the reduced guidelines range but still denied relief. Id. In doing so, he explained that he

based his decision on “Swain’s terrible criminal conduct, serious criminal record, poor

performance on supervision, misconduct while incarcerated, the need to promote respect

for the law, the need to deter others, and the need to incapacitate Swain[.]” United States

v. Swain, No. 4:07-CR-62-D, 2021 WL 298189, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2021).

We held the decision to deny relief was substantively unreasonable because “the

district court [had] relied on largely the same factual basis to deny [Swain’s] motion for a

reduced sentence as it did to impose” his original sentence “despite the fact that [Swain’s]

amended Guidelines range decreased by five to ten years,” and because the district court

had “placed too little weight on the remedial aims of the First Step Act.” Swain, 49 F.4th

at 403.

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The facts here are materially identical to those in Swain and should therefore lead

to the same result. Like Swain, Edwards was convicted of drug offenses for which the First

Step Act retroactively reduced the sentencing guidelines range.

Also like Swain, Edwards’s sentence far exceeds the top end of his updated

guidelines range. Edwards was originally sentenced to a within-guidelines 300 months in

prison, and the First Step Act retroactively reduced both the top and bottom of his

guidelines sentencing range by more than six years. His updated guidelines sentencing

range is 188–235 months, so his current sentence is 65 months above the top end of his

updated guidelines range—strikingly similar to Swain’s 62-month difference.

Further, the district court used nearly identical language in its order denying relief

in both this case and Swain. Here, the district court denied § 404 relief “[i]n light of

Edwards’s serious criminal conduct, terrible criminal record, poor performance on

supervision, serious misconduct while incarcerated, the need to promote respect for the

law, the need to deter others, the need to protect society, and the need to incapacitate

Edwards.” United States v. Edwards, No. 5:08-CR-11-D, 2021 WL 2403442, at *3

(E.D.N.C. June 11, 2021). In Swain, the district court listed the same justifications nearly

verbatim. See Swain, 2021 WL 298189, at *2.

Given the similarities in their underlying offenses, the gaps between their sentences

and updated guidelines ranges, and district court’s justifications for denying relief, I see no

basis for treating this case differently than Swain. If anything, the denial of relief in this

case is more unreasonable than the denial in Swain because Edwards is now beset by a

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litany of medical problems, including sarcoidosis and heart failure, that counsel in favor of

a shorter sentence.

The majority opinion claims that it can disregard Swain because it is following this

Court’s decision in United States v. Smith, 75 F.4th 459 (4th Cir. 2023). But Smith did

not—and could not—abrogate Swain, and the majority opinion provides no reason why

this case is more analogous to Smith than to Swain.

Swain, Smith, and this case share most of their basic facts. Similarly to Swain and

Edwards, Smith was convicted of a drug offense, sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment,

and moved for § 404 relief once the guidelines range for his offense was updated to a range

of 130 to 162 months—topping out at 78 months less than Smith’s sentence. See Smith, 75

F.4th at 463–64. And as in this case and Swain, the district court in Smith denied § 404

relief. See id. at 464. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s decision in Smith. Id. at

469.

The majority opinion suggests that we can therefore ignore Swain because Smith

“was decided after Swain, providing clarification and more recent direction for cases like

the one before us.” Maj. Op. at 7. But it is a “basic rule that one panel cannot overrule

another[.]” McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). So, if

the majority perceives a conflict between Smith and Swain, it is not free to follow the more

recent opinion—quite the opposite. If a panel perceives two earlier panel decisions as

conflicting, the panel must “follow the earlier of the conflicting opinions.” Id. We may

therefore only follow Smith instead of Swain if there is a distinguishing feature in this case

that aligns it with Smith rather than Swain.

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So, some effort should be made by the majority opinion to explain why factual

distinctions between this case and Swain support its departure from that binding precedent.

Because no such effort is made, and further, there is no meaningful basis on which to

distinguish Swain from this case, I must respectfully dissent.