United States v. Ransom Tae-Rick Robinson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-1994
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0491n.06

No. 23-1994

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 04, 2024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF RANSOM TAE-RICK ROBINSON, ) MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION

Before: GRIFFIN, STRANCH, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Ransom Tae-Rick Robinson challenges the substantive reasonableness of

his below-Guidelines sentence for a drug offense. As set forth below, we affirm Robinson’s

sentence.

After Robinson sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant on four occasions, a

federal grand jury indicted him on four counts of distributing methamphetamine, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Robinson pleaded guilty to one of those counts in exchange

for the dismissal of the other counts.

Robinson’s presentence report set forth a Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months of

imprisonment based on a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of II. Both

parties moved for a downward variance from the Guidelines range, citing Robinson’s limited

criminal history, his longtime employment, his family responsibilities, and the nature and

circumstances of his offense. At sentencing, the district court addressed the sentencing factors

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and granted the government’s motion for a two-level downward No. 23-1994, United States v. Robinson

variance, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months of imprisonment. The district

court concluded that a sentence at the low end of that range was appropriate and reflected the

seriousness of the offense, promoted respect for the law, and provided just punishment. See

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). So the district court sentenced Robinson to 97 months of imprisonment

followed by two years of supervised release.

In this timely appeal, Robinson challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

We review the substantive reasonableness of Robinson’s sentence under a deferential abuse-of-

discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). “The essence of a

substantive-reasonableness claim is whether the length of the sentence is ‘greater than necessary’

to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Tristan-

Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2010). “Simply put, a defendant’s sentence is

substantively unreasonable if it is too long.” United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670, 676 (6th Cir.

2020). “One way to gauge the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is to ask whether ‘the

court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others’ in reaching

its sentencing decision.” United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753–54 (6th Cir. 2020)

(quoting United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 2019)). We afford a within-

Guidelines sentence a rebuttable presumption of substantive reasonableness. See United States v.

Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008). As a result, Robinson’s burden of demonstrating that

his below-Guidelines sentence “is unreasonably long is even more demanding.” Id.; see also

United States v. Greco, 734 F.3d 441, 450 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Although it is not impossible to

succeed on a substantive-reasonableness challenge to a below-guidelines sentence, defendants who

seek to do so bear a heavy burden.”).

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Robinson contends that when the district court considered the seriousness of his offense, it

placed an unreasonable amount of weight on the 20-year statutory maximum penalty, rather than

the overall statutory scheme. Robinson relies on the district court’s observation that the 20-year

statutory maximum penalty “is a clear indication” that the executive and legislative branches

“believe[] that distribution of this drug is a very serious offense.” According to Robinson, the

statutory minimum penalty is more significant than the statutory maximum penalty. Robinson

argues that probation was an available sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a). And he emphasizes

that, because other drug offenses are subject to mandatory minimum penalties and are offenses for

which probation is expressly precluded, those offenses are significantly more serious than his

offense. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B) (requiring mandatory minimum sentences and

prohibiting probation), with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (omitting any mandatory minimum

requirement and permitting probation).

In considering the seriousness of Robinson’s offense, however, the district court did not

limit its discussion to the statutory maximum penalty. The district court found that Robinson’s

offense was serious because it involved “significant quantities of distribution of

methamphetamine.” Robinson sold a total of 2.06 kilograms of methamphetamine to the

confidential informant.1 The district court went on to state that “[m]ethamphetamine regretfully

is the number one drug of abuse in the Western District of Michigan.” The record does not show

that the district court placed an inordinate amount of weight on the statutory maximum penalty in

discussing the seriousness of Robinson’s offense. Nor does the record support Robinson’s claim

that the district court misunderstood the statutory sentencing range.

1 The government points out that each count in the indictment could have carried a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) based on the quantity and purity of the methamphetamine involved in each controlled buy. -3- No. 23-1994, United States v. Robinson

Robinson has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that his below-Guidelines

sentence is substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm Robinson’s sentence.

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