United States v. Randy Self

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4050 Doc: 36 Filed: 07/31/2025 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4050

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RANDY E. SELF,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:95-cr-00315-JFA-1)

Submitted: July 29, 2025 Decided: July 31, 2025

Before KING, WYNN, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, ELIZABETH FRANKLIN-BEST, P.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, W. Cole Shannon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4050 Doc: 36 Filed: 07/31/2025 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Randy E. Self appeals the sentence imposed following the revocation of his

supervised release. While serving his term of supervised release, Self violated the

condition prohibiting him from engaging in criminal conduct—specifically, by committing

murder. The district court revoked Self’s federal term of supervised release and sentenced

him to 24 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the 30-year sentence

imposed by the South Carolina court for the murder conviction. On appeal, Self contends

that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the revocation sentence to run

consecutive to the state sentence. We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will

affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly

unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a

revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is

unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). Only

if we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable must we decide whether

it is “plainly” so. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006).

Self requested that the district court order his revocation sentence to be served

concurrently with his state sentencing, asserting that he would be 94 years old when he

completed his 30-year state sentence, his age and health issues would significantly reduce

the risk of recidivism, and he “overserved” his underlying prison sentence in light of

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (holding that the residual clause of Armed

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Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b), is unconstitutionally vague). ∗ The court

considered Self’s arguments but concluded that a consecutive sentence was appropriate.

The court emphasized that, in connection with his original offense, Self and a codefendant

broke into the home of two elderly women and brutally beat and robbed them, and then,

while on supervised release, he committed another heinous crime—murder—by stabbing

someone to death. Additionally, the court noted Self received a significant sentence

reduction following Johnson. Although the court acknowledged that Self would be very

old by the time he completed his state sentence, the court observed that Self was in his 60’s

when he violated the conditions of supervised release by committing murder.

We conclude that the sentence imposed was reasonable and the district court did not

abuse its discretion in ordering the revocation sentence to run consecutively to the state

sentence. The district court appropriately considered the applicable 24-month policy

statement sentencing range and considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors relevant to

revocation proceedings, including Self’s history and characteristics, the need to provide

adequate deterrence, and the need to protect the public from Self’s further crimes. See 18

U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).

∗ The district court originally sentenced Self as an armed career criminal to 405 months’ imprisonment. Following Johnson, the district court reduced Self’s prison term on the conviction to time served.

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED