United States v. Ramsay

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Arkansas

United States v. Ramsay

27 F. Cas. 694

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Arkansas

DecidedApril 15, 1847

StatusPublished

This text of 27 F. Cas. 694 (United States v. Ramsay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Ramsay, 27 F. Cas. 694 (circtdar 1847).

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Opinion

JOHNSON, District Judge.

It is true, as urged by the district attorney, that he who advises or counsels the commission of a murder, is, in point of morals, as guilty as the principal, and should, doubtless, be punished accordingly. In legal language, however, he is not guilty of murder, but is only accessory to it; and this distinction is preserved in all the books on criminal jurisprudence. It is said that the act of congress punishing murder necessarily embraces an accessory before the fact, and subjects him to the punishment of death. I cannot assent to the correctness of this position; but, on the contrary, applying the known rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly, I entertain no doubt that the point made by the prisoner’s counsel is well taken and must be sustained. Certainly, to commit the crime of wilful murder, and to be accessory to it, are different of-fences; and in the trial of Burr [Cases Nos. 14,692-14,694a],’ for treason, Chief Justice Marshall very clearly lays down that proposition. That an accessory before the fact ought to be punished will not be questioned by any one, for he is, indeed, frequently involved in deeper guilt than the principal. This is a question, however, for the consideration of the legislative department, and this court is only authorized to try and punish such crimes as congress expressly or by necessary implication have visited with known and certain penalties, and the court has no common law jurisdiction in that respect. The defects in the Criminal Code of the United States, have been severely felt, but it is for congress, not this court, to interpose and apply the corrective; and as I should not feel warranted in pronouncing sentence of death on the prisoner in case of conviction, I shall sustain the motion to quash the indictment, and direct him to be discharged, regretting, at the same time, that there is no law to reach his ease.

Prisoner discharged accordingly.

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JOHNSON, District Judge.

It is true, as urged by the district attorney, that he who advises or counsels the commission of a murder, is, in point of morals, as guilty as the principal, and should, doubtless, be punished accordingly. In legal language, however, he is not guilty of murder, but is only accessory to it; and this distinction is preserved in all the books on criminal jurisprudence. It is said that the act of congress punishing murder necessarily embraces an accessory before the fact, and subjects him to the punishment of death. I cannot assent to the correctness of this position; but, on the contrary, applying the known rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly, I entertain no doubt that the point made by the prisoner’s counsel is well taken and must be sustained. Certainly, to commit the crime of wilful murder, and to be accessory to it, are different of-fences; and in the trial of Burr [Cases Nos. 14,692-14,694a],’ for treason, Chief Justice Marshall very clearly lays down that proposition. That an accessory before the fact ought to be punished will not be questioned by any one, for he is, indeed, frequently involved in deeper guilt than the principal. This is a question, however, for the consideration of the legislative department, and this court is only authorized to try and punish such crimes as congress expressly or by necessary implication have visited with known and certain penalties, and the court has no common law jurisdiction in that respect. The defects in the Criminal Code of the United States, have been severely felt, but it is for congress, not this court, to interpose and apply the corrective; and as I should not feel warranted in pronouncing sentence of death on the prisoner in case of conviction, I shall sustain the motion to quash the indictment, and direct him to be discharged, regretting, at the same time, that there is no law to reach his ease.

Prisoner discharged accordingly.

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Bluebook (online)

27 F. Cas. 694, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-ramsay-circtdar-1847.