United States v. Ramirez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 18, 2026
• Docket: 24-6930
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6930 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 8:21-cr-00180-JLS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* ISRAEL ARMANDO CABRERA RAMIREZ, AKA Israel Armando Cabrera,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 2, 2026 Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge.**

Israel Armando Cabrera Ramirez (“Cabrera”) entered a conditional guilty

plea to unlawful reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(1). He appeals the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the criminal information under 18

U.S.C. § 1326(d). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing the

district court’s order de novo and its factual findings for clear error, United States

v. Camacho-Lopez, 450 F.3d 928, 929 (9th Cir. 2006), we affirm.

Cabrera raises a collateral attack to his 2018 order of removal pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1326(d). To succeed on this challenge, a defendant must show that “(1)

[he] exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek

relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was

issued improperly deprived [him] of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the

entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). “[E]ach of the

statutory requirements of § 1326(d) is mandatory.” United States v. Palomar-

Santiago, 593 U.S. 321, 329 (2021).

The district court did not err by concluding that Cabrera failed to

demonstrate that his 2018 removal order was “fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(d)(3). “An underlying removal order is ‘fundamentally unfair’ if: (1) [a

defendant’s] due process rights were violated by defects in his underlying

deportation proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of the defects.”

United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, because Cabrera asserts his

underlying removal order was fundamentally unfair due to his immigration

2 24-6930 counsel’s ineffectiveness, Cabrera “must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

694 (1984).

Assuming that Cabrera’s counsel in immigration proceedings was

constitutionally ineffective, Cabrera has failed to demonstrate that such

ineffectiveness prejudiced him. As part of his 2018 removal proceedings, Cabrera

applied for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents under 8

U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Even though Cabrera met all the statutory requirements for

cancellation of removal, he failed to “establish that relief [wa]s warranted as a

matter of discretion.” Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 920 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

In re C–V–T–, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10 (B.I.A. 1998)). “In exercising discretion, the

[Immigration Judge (“IJ”)] must consider ‘the record as a whole,’ and ‘balance the

adverse factors evidencing the alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with

the social and humane considerations presented [on] his (or her) behalf.’” Id.

(quoting In re C–V–T–, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11)). “Negative considerations include .

. . ‘the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, and

seriousness.’” Id. at 920 n.5 (quoting In re C–V–T–, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11). At the

time of his immigration removal hearing, Cabrera had an extensive criminal

history, including seven misdemeanor convictions, one felony conviction, and

3 24-6930 several other arrests. Moreover, there was little evidence of rehabilitation.

Cabrera testified that he had used methamphetamine for the past 19 years and that

he had never previously gone to treatment; indeed, he was arrested and convicted

for possessing methamphetamine shortly before he was placed in removal

proceedings. Accordingly, Cabrera has not demonstrated a reasonable probability

that the IJ would have granted him discretionary relief absent any of his counsel’s

errors.

AFFIRMED.

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