United States v. Ramirez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-1872
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1872 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cr-02224-LAB-1 v. MEMORANDUM* ROGELIO TORRES RAMIREZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 19, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: HIGGINSON, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.**

Defendant-Appellant Rogelio Torres Ramirez (Torres) pleaded guilty to one

count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1) and 846. At sentencing, the district court applied a sentencing

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 3C1.2 for

reckless endangerment during flight. During the proceedings, the district court also

stated that it had something “in mind” following a colloquy with the government

which revealed the fact that Torres exercised his right not to debrief. Torres

challenges the district court’s application of § 3C1.2 and alleges that the district

court’s statement violated his Fifth Amendment rights. We affirm.

1. Section 3C1.2 applies “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial

risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from

a law enforcement officer.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. We have assumed, without deciding,

that reckless endangerment for the purposes of § 3C1.2 requires that defendants

“create[] a substantial risk of [death or] bodily injury to at least one specific person.”

United States v. Brewster, 116 F.4th 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2024).

“A district court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conduct constituted

reckless endangerment during flight is a factual finding that we review for clear

error.” Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 33 F.3d 31, 32 (9th Cir. 1994)). “A

finding is clearly erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or without support in the

record.” United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010). “We review

the district court’s . . . application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of

discretion.” Brewster, 116 F.4th at 1057–58 (quoting United States v. Harris, 999

F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2021)).

2 24-1872 Torres argues that the district court made no findings about the risks posed to

any specific individual. We disagree. The undisputed facts show that Torres hit an

occupied vehicle in the parking lot while evading arrest. The district court

repeatedly emphasized the vehicle’s being occupied in finding that Torres’s actions

constituted reckless endangerment.1 It was accordingly not “illogical, implausible,

or without support in the record,” for the court to find that Torres striking an

occupied vehicle while evading police constituted reckless endangerment. Id. at

1058 (quoting United States v. Torres-Giles, 80 F.4th 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2023)). And

the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying an enhancement under

§ 3C1.2 under these circumstances.

2. Because Torres did not raise his Fifth Amendment challenge below, we

review it for plain error. See United States v. Valencia–Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103,

1108 (9th Cir. 2010). To “secure reversal under the plain error standard,” Torres

must show (1) error, that is (2) “plain,” and that (3) “affected [his] substantial rights.”

United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013). The district court

did not plainly err at sentencing in commenting that it had something “in mind.”

When the district court asked the government whether it had a debrief with

Torres, the district court explained it was trying to find out whether there were any

1 The court also noted that the collision was “followed by a chase that went so fast [estimated at 100 miles per hour] that the officers, in thinking about the safety of others, had to abandon the chase.”

3 24-1872 additional facts to consider in terms of “the premeditation and thought” that went

into the offense. Judges are afforded broad latitude to conduct such inquiries at

sentencing. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994).

After the government explained that no debrief occurred, the district court

expressed concern that the government appeared reluctant to disclose information

about the investigation. Then, the district court stated, “So, you know, I have that in

mind. I think Mr. Torres made a terrible mistake when he took off and engaged the

police and hit another automobile.” Read in context, the district court’s statement

about what it would keep “in mind” was, at most, ambiguous.2 Torres argues that

what the district court said it had “in mind” was Torres’s failure to debrief. But we

find that the more plausible interpretation of the district court’s statement is that what

it had “in mind” was either the fact that Mr. Torres acted recklessly when fleeing or

the government’s failure to disclose relevant information about the investigation—

something the district court repeatedly pressed the government on throughout the

sentencing proceedings. The record accordingly does not show plain error.

AFFIRMED.

2 To be sure, a judge’s comments at sentencing may rise to the level of plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Tapia, 665 F.3d 1059, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2011). But more is required than what happened here. That a judge’s statement could, under one of various plausible interpretations, be understood as showing error is not enough.

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