United States v. Rami Mhana

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: May 12, 2026
• Docket: 24-4533
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4533 Doc: 62 Filed: 05/12/2026 Pg: 1 of 25

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4488

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RAMI MAHMOD MHANA,

Defendant – Appellant.

No. 24-4533

Plaintiff – Appellant,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:22-cr-00078-MOC-SCR-1)

Argued: October 24, 2025 Decided: May 12, 2026 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4533 Doc: 62 Filed: 05/12/2026 Pg: 2 of 25

Before KING, RUSHING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Benjamin joined.

ARGUED: Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ON BRIEF: Russ Ferguson, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

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RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

Rami Mhana appeals his convictions for money laundering, conspiracy, and

transportation of stolen goods. His appeal exclusively challenges the district court’s trial

rulings admitting certain documents into evidence. The Government cross-appeals from

the district court’s denial of its request for forfeiture. We affirm Mhana’s convictions,

reverse the district court’s forfeiture ruling, and remand for entry of a forfeiture judgment.

I.

Operating a business initially called Wireless City Fashion and later renamed

Protocol, Mhana paid in cash and below market value for fraudulently obtained latest-

generation Apple iPhones and other personal electronics, which he then shipped in bulk to

buyers overseas. His suppliers included individuals who used stolen personal-identifying

information to purchase electronics from big-box stores and wireless carriers. Mhana did

not require identification from his suppliers, ask how their electronics were obtained, or

issue receipts. But he did check whether the phones they sold were “unlocked” and

therefore available to be used on any cellular network, or “locked” and restricted to a single

network. Although wireless carriers unlock customers’ phones for free after their financial

obligations are satisfied, Mhana paid third-party services to unlock phones that he

purchased. The Government began investigating Mhana after one of his overseas

shipments of fraudulently obtained electronics ruptured during transit. Ultimately, the

Government uncovered thousands of transactions in fraudulently obtained electronics.

A federal grand jury charged Mhana with four counts of transporting stolen goods

in interstate and foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 2314; one count of conspiring to do the

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same, 18 U.S.C. § 371; and two counts of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).

After a six-day trial, a jury found Mhana guilty on all counts.

The indictment also contained a forfeiture notice, and the jury returned a special

verdict finding that a nexus existed between certain of Mhana’s property and his criminal

offenses. After the verdict, the district court granted the Government’s motion for a

preliminary order of forfeiture, finding Mhana liable for a $3,649,033 money judgment,

among other things. At sentencing almost a year later, however, the court ordered Mhana

to pay restitution but refused to enter a forfeiture judgment.

The district court entered its final judgment on September 4, 2024. Mhana appealed

the same day, and the Government subsequently filed a timely cross-appeal.

II.

Mhana asserts only evidentiary arguments on appeal. He contends the district court

erred by admitting certain documents into evidence under the business records exception

to the rule against hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), and admitting other documents into

evidence as summaries of voluminous records, see Fed. R. Evid. 1006. We review

evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when “an evidentiary decision

is guided by erroneous legal principles or rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding,”

or the decision is otherwise “arbitrary and irrational.” United States v. Nsahlai, 121 F.4th

1052, 1060 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]ven in the event of an

error,” however, “we will not reverse if the error was harmless.” Id.; see Fed. R. Crim. P.

52(a). An error is harmless if we can “say with fair assurance, after pondering all that

happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not

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substantially swayed by the error.” Nsahlai, 121 F.4th at 1060 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

A.

To begin, Mhana contends that the district court abused its discretion when it

admitted spreadsheets produced by wireless carriers—exhibits 14A, 27A, 27B, 27C, and

28—under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. Under Federal Rule

of Evidence 803(6), “[a] record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis” is

excepted from the rule against hearsay if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and

(E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Mhana raises three arguments, which we address in turn.

1.

First, Mhana argues that the wireless carrier spreadsheets did not comply with Rule

803(6) because they were created for the purpose of litigation. In the context of

electronically-stored data, however, “‘the business record is the datum itself, not the format

in which it is printed’” or displayed. United States v. May, 131 F.4th 633, 641 (8th Cir.

2025) (quoting United States v. Keck, 643 F.3d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 2011)); see Gen. Ins.

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Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 886 F.3d 346, 359 (4th Cir. 2018) (“That the loss runs

were printed out from [the company’s] database for purposes of this litigation does not

impact the admissibility of the loss runs because ‘evidence that has been compiled from a

computer database is also admissible as a business record, provided it meets the criteria of

Rule 803(6).’” (quoting U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 576 F.3d 1040,

1043 (9th Cir. 2009))).

The wireless carriers created these spreadsheets in response to Government

subpoenas requesting information regarding approximately 10,020 personal electronic

devices by reference to their International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers.

Crucially, as explained below, representatives from each wireless carrier testified that the

data in the spreadsheets were entered at or near the time of the event by someone with

knowledge, regularly maintained in the course of business, and existed in the spreadsheets

exactly as they existed in the carriers’ databases.

The Verizon representative testified that exhibit 14A was generated from a

spreadsheet template that pulled data from Verizon business records for the IMEIs the

Government provided. Specifically, exhibit 14A “is the transactional and account

information associated to those [IMEIs].” J.A. 483. He testified that the spreadsheet

template was created “more than eight years ago” and “ever since” it was created, “on

every investigation we’ve done, we pull the same exact data,” “[w]e don’t manipulate the

data,” and “[w]e give the data in full, as it is, to whoever requests it.” J.A. 503. He further

testified that—except for columns BS and BT—the information in exhibit 14A was kept in

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the ordinary course of Verizon’s business as a wireless provider, was maintained in

Verizon’s business records exactly as it existed in the spreadsheet, was entered at or near

the time when the transactions on the sheet were noted by a person with knowledge or who

had responsibility to make those entries, and was used by Verizon for billing, marketing,

and investigations. See J.A. 506 (“Q: If you take each line of this data, . . . it exists in your

system like that? A: Yes.”).

Columns BS and BT reflect information that was not admissible as Verizon’s

business records, and the district court accordingly required the Government to redact those

columns from exhibit 14A. Mhana’s passing assertion that the existence of these redacted

columns somehow “disqualified the entire exhibit” is unconvincing. Opening Br. 50.

There is no indication that any of the spreadsheet’s visible data incorporated, or was

otherwise affected by, the information in columns BS or BT. The district court therefore

correctly ruled that, with these columns redacted, exhibit 14A satisfied Rule 803(6).

b.

The AT&T representative similarly testified that the data in exhibits 27A, 27B, and

27C were “pulled directly out of data warehouses and then input in [spreadsheet] format”

with a template that AT&T had been using for “at least seven years.” J.A. 776.

Specifically, the representative testified that AT&T queried its billing and transit databases

with each IMEI the Government supplied and then produced its data about those IMEIs in

the spreadsheet template. He further testified that the information in exhibits 27A, 27B,

and 27C was recorded in the regular course of AT&T’s business activity as a wireless

carrier, that it was AT&T’s regular practice to make the entries that appeared in the

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spreadsheets, and that the entries were made or transmitted by a person with knowledge of

those transactions at or near the time of the denoted events.

Mhana complains that exhibit 27C mentions carriers other than AT&T, which he

surmises cannot reflect AT&T’s own business records. But the AT&T representative

testified that AT&T maintained, in its own database, information about some IMEIs that

other carriers had placed on the blacklist, or blocklist, which is a database used to identify

electronic devices that wireless carriers have determined were lost, stolen, or obtained

through fraud. He explained that AT&T possessed “some information on other carriers”

because in the regular course of business it would “check to see if . . . devices have been

blacklisted or blocklisted” “before the devices c[ould] be used on our network.” J.A. 791.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that exhibits 27A, 27B, and

27C satisfied Rule 803(6).

c.

The representative from Sprint, now T-Mobile, likewise testified that to create

exhibit 28, he and his team “bulk-uploaded [the IMEIs that the Government provided] into

our system,” retrieved the information “already in our system” about the IMEIs that

belonged to Sprint, and produced that information in the spreadsheet “in the same condition

as it was” in Sprint’s recordkeeping system. 1 J.A. 916–918. He further confirmed that the

information in exhibit 28 “was collected . . . from the point of sale, throughout the

transaction,” was added to Sprint’s database by a person with knowledge of those events

T-Mobile acquired Sprint in 2020. The witness previously worked for Sprint and 1

now works for T-Mobile. 8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4533 Doc: 62 Filed: 05/12/2026 Pg: 9 of 25

and reason to do so in accordance with Sprint’s regular practice, was kept in the ordinary

course of Sprint’s business as a wireless provider, and was produced from Sprint’s system

without change. J.A. 916–918.

Mhana alleges that exhibit 28 was “collaboratively prepared by the Government”

because the Government limited the exhibit “to only 10 rows of data that specifically

relate[d] to its next two trial witnesses.” Opening Br. 51. But Mhana offers no reason to

think that exhibit 28, even as limited to ten IMEIs, contained anything other than Sprint’s

business records regarding those ten devices. The district court did not abuse its discretion

in finding that exhibit 28 satisfied Rule 803(6).

2.

Second, Mhana asserts that the spreadsheets included inadmissible data:

specifically, the wireless carriers’ conclusions that certain IMEIs were associated with

fraud. The basis for Mhana’s objection is unclear—he mentions “layers of hearsay” and

having no opportunity to examine the method by which these fraud determinations were

made, see Opening Br. 51–52, 66–68, and also calls the fraud determinations “reversibly

prejudicial,” Reply Br. 26 n.2. We are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its

discretion.

Regarding hearsay, the fraud determinations were business records of the wireless

carriers, as explained above. Each wireless carrier witness testified that the fraud

determinations were made by employees with authority to make such determinations, were

made upon investigation and with personal knowledge, and were made in the regular

course of the carrier’s business. To the extent that any of those determinations were based

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on information supplied by customers, that information was verified by the carriers. Cf.

United States v. Pendergrass, 47 F.3d 1116 (Table), 1995 WL 56673, at *5 (4th Cir. 1995)

(holding that forms with information supplied by customers were business records of a

company, where the company took steps to verify the information contained therein).

As for prejudicial effect, the district court delivered a limiting instruction for each

wireless carrier spreadsheet exhibit, cautioning the jury that the carriers’ fraud

determinations did not “decide[] any issue” in the case and “should have nothing to do with

[the jury’s] findings,” which must be based on the law as provided by the court and applied

to Mhana. J.A. 539, 786–787, 919. On appeal, Mhana expresses no qualm with this

instruction, which forbade any improper use of the carriers’ fraud determinations. 2

3.

Third, Mhana contends that admitting the wireless carrier spreadsheets into

evidence violated the Confrontation Clause because the witnesses who presented the

exhibits “did not determine, code, or prepare all the relevant data entries contained therein.”

Opening Br. 54–55. “‘To implicate the Confrontation Clause, a statement must be hearsay

(“for the truth”) and it must be testimonial—and those two issues are separate from each

other.’” United States v. Seward, 135 F.4th 161, 169 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Smith v.

Arizona, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 1801 (2024)). “The latter, [the Supreme Court] has stated,

focuses on the ‘primary purpose’ of the statement, and in particular on how it relates to a

2 Mhana also asserts that the wireless carrier spreadsheets were incomplete because they “should have included the date that the blacklisted phones detailed therein were added to the blacklist.” Reply Br. 25. But he has not demonstrated that the carriers possessed that information in their records. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4533 Doc: 62 Filed: 05/12/2026 Pg: 11 of 25

future criminal proceeding.” Smith, 144 S. Ct. at 1801. “[B]usiness records are generally

not testimonial if they are ‘created for the administration of an entity’s affairs’ rather than

for ‘proving some fact at trial.’” United States v. Keita, 742 F.3d 184, 190 (4th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009)).

Mhana’s Confrontation Clause challenge fails because the business records are the

data themselves, not the format in which the data are presented. See Gen. Ins. Co. of Am.,

886 F.3d at 359; May, 131 F.4th at 641. As we have explained, the data in the spreadsheets

were “created for the administration of [the wireless carriers’] affairs” and not for the

purpose of “proving some fact at trial.” Keita, 742 F.3d at 190 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also May, 131 F.4th at 641. Accordingly, the data are non-testimonial and

do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.

We next consider the documents that Mhana contends were erroneously admitted

into evidence as business records of Wireless City Fashion or Protocol. Those documents

can be grouped into three categories.

First, exhibits 201–219 are invoices reflecting sales of electronics and related

accessories to Mhana or his business. Mhana produced these invoices to the Government

in response to a grand-jury subpoena for his business records. When Mhana produced

these invoices, he expressly certified, consistent with Rule 902(11), that they met the

requirements of Rule 803(6)(A), (B), and (C).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these exhibits under Rule

803(6) because Mhana certified that the invoices contained in these exhibits met the

requirements of that rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(D) (requiring that “these conditions

[be] shown by” testimony “or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or

with a statute permitting certification”). Mhana observes that the invoices were created by

third parties, but “Rule 803(6) does not ‘require[] that the records be created by the business

having custody of them.’” Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 886 F.3d at 358 (quoting United States v.

Wein, 521 Fed. App. 138, 140 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d

981, 986 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that insurance companies’ records compiled from hospital

records qualified as business records of the insurance companies))). The district court

properly accepted Mhana’s certification that these invoices were business records of his

company.

Exhibits 220–255 are also invoices for electronics sold to Mhana or his business

from the same resellers as exhibits 201–219, in the same format, and around the same time.

Unlike exhibits 201–219, however, Mhana did not produce the invoices in exhibits 220–

255 with a Rule 902(11) certification. Rather, the Government seized these invoices during

a search of Protocol’s computer. On appeal, Mhana argues that the invoices were

inadmissible because no custodian or other qualified witness testified that these documents

met the conditions of Rule 803(6)(A), (B), and (C).

We need not resolve this objection because, even assuming exhibits 220–255 were

admitted in error, any error was harmless. Neither exhibits 220–255 nor the IMEIs

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identified therein directly supported any of Mhana’s convictions, and the jury otherwise

heard overwhelming evidence of Mhana’s guilt. 3 Moreover, exhibits 220–255 were so

similar to exhibits 201–219 that they did not add anything of significance to evidence that

Mhana agreed was admissible pursuant to Rule 902(11).

Third, we consider exhibits 303, 304, 320, 322, and 325. These exhibits are emails

to Mhana’s business email account sent from third-party companies, Blowfish Unlocks and

SwiftUnlocks, advertising phone unlocking services. Mhana testified that he received

these advertisements during the time he was doing business with those companies. On

appeal, Mhana argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting these emails

into evidence as business records of Protocol and Wireless City Fashion.

The Government does not defend the district court’s business records ruling but

instead responds that the Government offered these advertising emails not for the truth of

their content but for their effect on Mhana, a permissible non-hearsay purpose. See Fed.

R. Evid. 801(c)(2). At trial, however, the Government did not establish that Mhana had

seen these particular emails. Without having established that Mhana read the emails, the

Government could not have used them to prove an effect on Mhana. Further, the

Government’s line of questioning suggests that it offered the emails for the truth of the

3 The Government used IMEIs from these exhibits, among many others, to create the list of approximately 10,020 IMEIs that it sent to wireless carriers, which they then used to create the spreadsheets previously discussed (exhibits 14A, 27A, 27B, 27C, and 28). Mhana does not suggest that exhibits 220–255 needed to be in evidence for this purpose. 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4533 Doc: 62 Filed: 05/12/2026 Pg: 14 of 25

matter asserted—i.e., that the companies provided the services advertised at the prices

stated therein.

Even assuming the district court abused its discretion by admitting these emails into

evidence, however, any error was harmless. See United States v. Cone, 714 F.3d 197, 220

(4th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that “it would be insufficient to survive a hearsay challenge

simply to say that since a business keeps and receives e-mails, then ergo all those e-mails

are business records falling within the ambit of Rule 803(6)(B),” but finding the error

harmless in that case). Testimony and other admissible evidence firmly established that

Mhana knowingly paid for third-party unlocking services in bulk. For example, Mhana

confirmed at trial that he knew “Blowfish to be a third-party unlocker,” J.A. 1508, and that

he paid Blowfish to unlock phones “all the time,” J.A. 1510. The Government introduced

into evidence text messages extracted from Mhana’s phone, in which Mhana says to a

Blowfish representative, for instance, “If you can’t unlock it by Monday, please refund my

money, thank you” and “I have $11,156.55 on hold for the unlock. I cannot wait for a long

time. Please try to unlock it ASAP.” J.A. 1510. The Government also introduced text

messages Mhana sent to his brother containing screenshots of emails he received from

SwiftUnlocks and Blowfish, including a Blowfish advertisement much like the ones at

issue here advertising, among other things, its “service for cleaning . . . bad IMEI devices.”

J.A. 1086. Exhibits 303, 304, 320, 322, and 325 were “cumulative to other admissible

evidence,” and, in view of the evidence as a whole, we can say with fair assurance that they

did not substantially sway the jury’s verdict. United States v. Wood, 741 F.3d 417, 426

(4th Cir. 2013); see Nsahlai, 121 F.4th at 1060.

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We turn now to the exhibits that Mhana contends were not properly admitted into

evidence as summaries of voluminous materials. Two rules of evidence are relevant to this

issue.

Rule 1006 authorizes a district court to “admit as evidence a summary, chart, or

calculation offered to prove the content of voluminous admissible writings, recordings, or

photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court, whether or not they have been

introduced into evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006(a). Documents admitted under this rule

“serve ‘as a surrogate for underlying voluminous records that would otherwise be

admissible into evidence.’” United States v. Oloyede, 933 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2019)

(quoting United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 272 (4th Cir. 2004)). Rule 1006 evidence

“must be an objectively accurate summarization of the underlying documents, not a skewed

selection of some of the documents to further the proponent’s theory of the case.” Id. at

311.

Rule 611(a), by contrast, permits a district court to allow a jury to view

“pedagogical” charts and summaries “to aid the jury in its understanding of the evidence

that has already been admitted.” 4 Janati, 374 F.3d at 273. These illustrative aids are not

evidence themselves but “facilitate the presentation and comprehension of evidence

already in the record.” Id. Illustrative aids “may include witnesses’ conclusions or

After the trial in this case, the Supreme Court adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 4

107, which now governs illustrative aids like these. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4533 Doc: 62 Filed: 05/12/2026 Pg: 16 of 25

opinions, or they may reveal inferences drawn in a way that would assist the jury,” subject

to the district court’s supervision and other rules of evidence. Id.

Mhana contends that the district court abused its discretion in admitting exhibits

900, 901A, 905–908, and 920 pursuant to Rule 1006. 5 We will first describe each exhibit,

but because Mhana advances particularized arguments about only exhibits 900 and 905–

908, we too will focus on those.

Exhibit 900, titled “IMEIs Sold by Protocol and Wireless City,” is a 189-page

summary of 61 other exhibits the district court admitted during trial. Sixty of those exhibits

are sales invoices from Protocol and Wireless City Fashion (exhibits 101–160), and the

other is a DHL spreadsheet identifying the devices found when a Protocol shipment

ruptured (exhibit 650). Exhibit 900 lists 8,470 IMEIs and, for each one, identifies whether

the sales invoice was from Protocol or Wireless City Fashion, the date of the invoice, and

the admitted exhibit where that invoice can be found.

Exhibit 901A summarizes one data point from the wireless carrier spreadsheets

admitted as exhibits 14A, 27A, 27B, 27C, and 28. For each wireless carrier, exhibit 901A

calculates how many of the approximately 10,020 IMEIs for devices bought or sold by

Protocol and Wireless City Fashion that carrier was able to confirm that it originally sold.

5 Mhana also includes exhibits 916–918 in this list, but the district court ultimately did not admit those exhibits into evidence under Rule 1006. The district court initially admitted those exhibits under Rule 1006, but after Mhana renewed his objection, the court ruled that it would not send the exhibits back with the jury and, after the Government withdrew the exhibits, the court allowed the Government to use them as Rule 611(a) illustrative aids instead. Mhana does not argue that the district court’s initial ruling prejudiced him or that these exhibits were improper under Rule 611(a). 16 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4533 Doc: 62 Filed: 05/12/2026 Pg: 17 of 25

Using those figures, exhibit 901A also calculates the percentage of IMEIs that were

identified by their original sellers.

Exhibits 905–908 each summarize information about the devices found in one of

four specific shipments from Protocol to a company overseas, corresponding with the four

counts for transportation of stolen goods. While other admitted exhibits listed the devices

in each shipment, exhibits 905–908 each present a table showing four data points about

those devices, taken from the wireless carrier spreadsheets already admitted into evidence:

IMEI, carrier, carrier determination (for example, “fraud,” “nonpayment,” “lost/stolen,”

and so forth), and loss amount. Each exhibit also calculates a total loss for the shipment.

Exhibit 920 summarizes cash withdrawals from Mhana’s business bank accounts.

The district court admitted into evidence more than 90 monthly bank statements and cash

withdrawal slips related to those accounts. This exhibit lists each withdrawal, providing

the account, date, and amount of cash withdrawn for each. It also calculates the total

amount of cash withdrawn.

Mhana primarily argues that the challenged exhibits “were skewed and unduly

‘selectiv[e]’ because they ‘did not fully represent the [materials] that they were purportedly

summarizing.’” Opening Br. 43 (quoting Oloyede, 933 F.3d at 310). His argument is two-

fold.

Initially, Mhana asserts that the Government’s selection and presentation of some

data points from the underlying documents, to the exclusion of other data points in those

documents, makes the summary exhibits inaccurate and inadmissible under Rule 1006.

Although Rule 1006 forbids “a skewed selection” of only “some of the documents”

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purportedly summarized, it does not require a summary to include every data point within

a set of voluminous records. Oloyede, 933 F.3d at 311. In Oloyede, we held that charts

“purportedly summarizing” bank accounts failed to comport with Rule 1006 because the

charts included only “selected deposits that had been made into the bank accounts

consistent with the government’s theory of which deposits were tied to illegal activity.”

Id. at 310. Specifically, the charts “included wire transfers only to the extent that the bank

statement identified the name of the sender and that name was on a list [of suspected

victims]” and similarly “included check deposits only to the extent that the check was

written by an individual on the list.” Id. Thus, the charts “did not fully represent the

accounts that they were purportedly summarizing” because they included some, but not all,

wire transfers and check deposits. Id.

Oloyede required that if some deposits appeared in the summary then every deposit

should appear in the summary, not that every detail from the underlying documents be

included. Here, for example, exhibit 900 purports to summarize the IMEIs sold by

Mhana’s business as reflected in 61 underlying documents. If exhibit 900 omitted some of

those sales from its summary, it would fail to comport with Rule 1006. But admitting

exhibit 900 did not exceed the district court’s discretion merely because the exhibit

includes four data points for each sale—IMEI, business, date, and exhibit number—

without including other data points for those sales that also are reflected in the underlying

documents, like the device color and storage capacity.

Next, Mhana argues that some exhibits were improperly admitted under Rule 1006

because, just like Oloyede, they selectively summarized certain transactions within the

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underlying documents and omitted others to help the jury understand how various related

records supported the Government’s case. In this regard, Mhana highlights exhibits 905–

908, which marry device lists from four shipments with information about those devices

lifted from larger documents describing many more devices. 6 At oral argument, he also

represented that exhibit 900 does not include all of the sales reflected in exhibit 102, which

is one of the sixty sets of invoices underlying exhibit 900. The Government responded that

exhibit 900 focuses on overseas sales because those were most likely to involve criminal

activity. The parties have not provided us with exhibit 102.

Even assuming the district court erred in admitting exhibits 900 and 905–908 under

Rule 1006, we find the error harmless for three reasons. First, all of the underlying

documents for these summary exhibits were already in evidence. The jury therefore had

access to all of the information provided in the summary exhibits, which organized, but did

not add to, the corpus of evidence at trial.

Second, each of these disputed exhibits could have been shown to the jury as

illustrative aids pursuant to Rule 611(a). See Oloyede, 933 F.3d at 311 (“[W]e are confident

that the error did not affect the defendants’ substantial rights, particularly as the same

information in the same form could have been shown to the jury under Rule 611(a).”). And

6 Mhana also contends that exhibits 905–908 impermissibly contained trial testimony because the Government highlighted accounts that were opened in the name of victims who testified at trial. At Mhana’s request, however, the district court ordered the Government to remove the highlighting and victim identifications from the exhibits before they were sent back with the jury. Although the jury saw the highlighting and identifications in court before they were removed, the Government could have shown the jury the same editorial markup of those exhibits during closing argument. 19 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4533 Doc: 62 Filed: 05/12/2026 Pg: 20 of 25

Mhana was “free to cross-examine the government’s witnesses” about these exhibits, “just

as if the charts had been shown to the jury under Rule 611(a).” Id. Mhana notes that the

district court did not instruct the jury that they were prohibited from considering these

exhibits as substantive evidence. See Janati, 374 F.3d at 273 (“Whenever pedagogical

charts are employed . . . the court should make clear to the jury that the charts are not

evidence themselves, but are displayed to assist the jury’s understanding of the evidence.”).

But that does not preclude a finding of harmlessness here, just as it did not in Oloyede. See

933 F.3d at 311. Particularly in a case, like this one, where the underlying records were

admitted into evidence and available to the jury, the absence of a limiting instruction does

not undermine the conclusion that the jury’s verdict was not substantially swayed by

admission of the summary exhibits.

Third, the jury heard overwhelming evidence of Mhana’s guilt, including testimony

from coconspirators, victims, investigators, and wireless company representatives. See

United States v. Caldwell, 7 F.4th 191, 204 (4th Cir. 2021) (calling “the closeness of the

case” and “the centrality of the issue affected by the error” “decisive factors” in harmless

error review (internal quotation marks omitted)). After reviewing the evidence, we find it

“highly probable” that the admission of exhibits 900 and 905–908 “did not affect the

[jury’s] judgment” that Mhana, with guilty knowledge, committed these crimes. Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

D.

In a final attempt at reversal, Mhana reminds us that “[t]he cumulative effect of two

or more individually harmless errors has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same

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extent as a single reversible error.” United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 330 (4th Cir.

2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To satisfy this requirement, such errors must

so fatally infect the trial that they violated the trial’s fundamental fairness.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Generally, however, if a court determine[s] . . . that none of [a

defendant’s] claims warrant reversal individually, it will decline to employ the unusual

remedy of reversing for cumulative error.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although we have assumed the existence of “a few harmless errors, they were not

widespread or prejudicial enough to have fatally infected [Mhana’s] trial.” United States

v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 371 (4th Cir. 2010). Indeed, as explained above, we doubt whether

any of the evidentiary errors we have assumed had any effect at all. See Basham, 561 F.3d

at 330 (“When none of the individual rulings work any cognizable harm, it necessarily

follows that the cumulative error doctrine finds no foothold.” Id. (internal quotation marks,

brackets, and ellipsis omitted)). We easily conclude, therefore, that any evidentiary errors,

even considered cumulatively, did not play a role in the outcome of Mhana’s trial, which

“adhered to fundamental fairness.” Lighty, 616 F.3d at 371. And “[i]t is well-settled that

a criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial not a perfect one.” United States v. Runyon,

707 F.3d 475, 520 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III.

We turn now to the Government’s cross-appeal of the district court’s ruling denying

a forfeiture judgment. We review the district court’s interpretation of federal forfeiture

laws de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Morgan, 224 F.3d

339, 342 (4th Cir. 2000).

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“If a person is charged in a criminal case with a violation of an Act of Congress for

which the civil or criminal forfeiture of property is authorized, the Government may

include notice of the forfeiture in the indictment or information pursuant to the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure.” 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). “If the defendant is convicted of the

offense giving rise to the forfeiture, the court shall order the forfeiture of the property as

part of the sentence in the criminal case.” Id. (emphasis added). “The word ‘shall’ does

not convey discretion.” United States v. Blackman, 746 F.3d 137, 143 (4th Cir. 2014)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “Congress could not have chosen stronger

words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where [Section 2461]

applied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The plain text of the statute thus

indicates that forfeiture is not a discretionary element of sentencing” but rather

“[Section] 2461 mandates that forfeiture be imposed when the relevant prerequisites are

satisfied.” Id.

Those prerequisites are satisfied here. First, forfeiture was authorized because

Mhana was charged with transportation of stolen goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.

“Any property . . . which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to . . . any

offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this

title)” is “subject to forfeiture to the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Section

1956(c)(7) defines “specified unlawful activity” to include, with exceptions not relevant

here, “any act . . . constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) of this title.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956(c)(7). And Section 1961(1) lists “any act which is indictable under . . . title 18,

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United States Code, . . . section[] 2314 . . . (relating to interstate transportation of stolen

property).” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

Second, the Government “include[d] notice of the forfeiture in the indictment.” 28

U.S.C. § 2461(c); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) (“A court must not enter a judgment of

forfeiture in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or information contains notice to

the defendant that the government will seek the forfeiture of property as part of any

sentence in accordance with the applicable statute.”). The Government was not required

to identify in the indictment “the property subject to forfeiture or specify the amount of any

forfeiture money judgment” sought. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a).

Third, Mhana was convicted of transportation of stolen goods in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2314, the “offense giving rise to the forfeiture.” 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). Moreover,

the jury returned a special verdict form finding a nexus between specific property and

Mhana’s offense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(5)(B). And the district court entered a

preliminary order of forfeiture for that specific property, for certain substitute property, and

for a $3,649,033 money judgment determined by the court. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b)(1)(A) (“If the government seeks a personal money judgment, the court must

determine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay.”); see also United

States v. Jameel, 626 Fed. App. 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding “without merit” a

defendant’s claim that he “was entitled to a jury trial to determine the amount of the money

judgment”).

The district court declined to order forfeiture at sentencing out of concern about

“double payment” of restitution and forfeiture. J.A. 1911; see also J.A. 1909 (district court

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noting that “there’s only so much blood in the turnip”). But we have made clear that

“[f]orfeiture is mandatory even when restitution is also imposed.” Blackman, 746 F.3d at

143. And “[t]he fact that a defendant . . . lacks adequate assets to satisfy a judgment does

not operate to frustrate entry of a forfeiture order.” Id. at 143–144. “Insofar as the district

court believed that it could withhold forfeiture on the basis of equitable considerations,”

therefore, “its reasoning was in error.” Id. at 143.

Mhana calls to our attention one sentence from the sentencing hearing in which he

asserted that the money judgment in the preliminary order of forfeiture was “an excessive

fine that would violate the Eighth Amendment” and “a fine in excess of the statutory

maximum.” J.A. 1909. The district court did not base its ruling on either of those grounds.

On appeal, Mhana presents no substantive argument that entry of a forfeiture order would

have violated the Eighth Amendment or exceeded the statutory maximum penalties for his

offenses; he relies entirely on the incorrect implication that the district court adopted his

one-line assertion at sentencing. In any event, Congress has placed “no statutory . . .

maximum limit on forfeitures.” United States v. Alamoudi, 452 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir.

2006). And having failed to engage, either below or on appeal, with any of the factors that

guide this Court’s “determination of whether a forfeiture is ‘grossly disproportional’” in

violation of the Eighth Amendment, Mhana certainly has not “carr[ied his] burden of

demonstrating gross disproportionality.” United States v. Sanders, 107 F.4th 223, 232 (4th

Cir. 2024).

The district court erred in declining to enter a forfeiture judgment, and that error

warrants reversal.

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IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mhana’s convictions, reverse the district

court’s forfeiture ruling, and remand with directions for the court to enter a forfeiture

judgment.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED