United States v. Railway Employes' Department

286 F. 228, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1779
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJanuary 5, 1923
DocketNo. 2943
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 286 F. 228 (United States v. Railway Employes' Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Railway Employes' Department, 286 F. 228, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1779 (N.D. Ill. 1923).

Opinion

WILKERSON, District Judge.

The defendants filed their joint and several answers on October 6, 1922. Thereupon they presented their motion for a dissolution of the temporary injunction granted September 23, 1922, 283 Fed. 479, and for a dismissal of the bill. This motion was argued at length, and briefs have been filed on both sides. The answer contains 56 printed pages, and so far as this motion is concerned may be treated as denying the substantial averments of the bill relative to the alleged unlawful conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce and the carriage of the mails. The answer also sets up new matter relating to the controversies between the railroad companies and the members of the Federated Shop Crafts the attempts to adjust these controversies prior to the filing of the bill, and the settlements with certain railway companies made subsequent to the filing of the bill.

The principal affirmative contentions in the answer are that the strike was justified by oppressive and unlawful conduct on the part of the managers of the railway companies; that it was prolonged by the refusal of the railway managers to comply with proposals for settlement made by the President and the United States Railroad Labor Board; that the bill in this case, while filed in the name of the United States, was really brought in the interest of an unlawful combination of railway managers; and that the bill cannot be maintained any longer, and cannot proceed to a decree because of settlements between the Federated Shop Crafts and a large number of the railway companies involved, and the abandonment by the defendants of the conspiracy charged in the bill, if one ever existed.

By equity rule 29 (198 Fed. xxvi, 115 C. C. A. xxvi) demurrers and pleas are abolished. Defense must be either by motion to dismiss or by answer. While it is within the discretion of the court to entertain a motion to dismiss for want of equity, apparent upon the face -of the bill, at any time before the hearing, the rule contemplates that it be made before the answer is filed. The rule provides:

“If the defendant move to dismiss the bill'or any part thereof, the motion may he set down for hearing by either party upon five days’ notice, and, if it be denied, answer shall he filed within five days thereafter or decree pro eonfesso be entered.”

The defendant may not, by filing his answer, move to dismiss upon denials of the allegations of the bill or by new matter set up in his answer. The motion must be heard and decided upon the allegations of the bill as upon demurrer. The rule which prevails in courts of equity, in disposing of motions to dismiss because the bill does not set up facts sufficient to constitute a'cause of action, is to overrule the motion and let the case go to hearing, unless it is founded upon an absolutely clear proposition that, taking the allegations to be trae, the bill must be dismissed at the hearing. A case in equity involving important matters should go to issue and proofs, where a doubtful question is raised by the pleadings. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 144, 22 Sup. Ct. 552, 46 L. Ed. 838; Krouse v. Brevard Tannin Cor et al., 249 Fed. 538, 548, 161 C. C. A. 464.

Defendants assert that the bill should be dismissed because there is a prayer for relief which, under the provisions .of the Clayton Act [231]*231(38 Stat. 730), the court is without power to grant. It is well established that the bill will not be dismissed if it presents a case for any relief. In Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. at page 145, 22 Sup. Ct. at page 559 (46 L. Ed. 838), it was said:

“Doubtless tbe specific prayers of this bill are in many respects open to objection, but there is a prayer for general relief, and in that such appropriate decree as tbe facts might be found to justify could be entered, if- consistent ■with the case made by the bill, and not inconsistent with the specific prayers in whole or in part, if that were also essential. Tayloe v. Merchants’ Insurance Co., 9 How. 390, 406; Daniell, Ch. Pr. (4th Am. Ed.) 380.”

Apart from those portions of the prayer for relief, which it claimed contravene sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act (Comp. St. §§■ 8835f, 1243d), the bill certainly charges a combination and conspiracy to do acts which are unlawful in themselves, and which by reason of their inherent nature prejudice the public interests by unduly obstructing the course of trade. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376, 33 Sup. Ct. 780, 57 L. Ed. 1232; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468, 470, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 R. Ed. 349, 16 A. L. R. 196.

The argument of the defendants that the bill, if its scope is thus narrowed, becomes merely a bill to enjoin the commission of crimes, overlooks the provisions of the Sherman Raw (Comp. St. §§ 8820-8823, 8827-8830) and Clayton Raw (38 Stat. 730), which invest the District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of those laws. In United States v. Trans-Missouri' Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 342, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 559 (41 L. Ed. 1007) the court said:

“The civil remedy by injunction and the liability to punishment under the criminal provisions of the [Sherman] Act are entirely distinct. * - ' Con-
gress, haying the control of interstate commerce, has also the duty of protecting if, and it is entirely competent for that body to give the remedy by injunction as more efficient than any other civil remedy. The subject is fully and ably discussed in the case of In re Debs, 158 II. S. 564.”

Defendants claim that the bill should be dismissed, because the alleged basis for relief no longer exists. It is asserted in the answer and affidavits that the strike has been settled on many of the railroads involved, and that the conspiracy charged in the bill has disappeared. It is argued, therefore, that, inasmuch as decrees in equity are based upon circumstances and rights existing at the time of the entry of the decree, there is no reason why this suit should proceed further. Here, again, defendants overlook the fact that this objection does not arise on the allegations of the bill, and therefore furnishes no ground for its dismissal. Dixon v. Anderson, 252 Fed. 694, 696, 164 C. C. A. 534; Krouse v. Brevard Tannin Co., 249 Fed. 538, 548, 161 C. C. A. 464.

However, this objection to proceeding with the cause, even if it were properly raised, is without merit. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007, it was urged that there should not be á hearing of the appeal because the association against which complaint was made in the bill had been dissolved. The Supreme Court had no difficulty in denjdng this cont'ention. The court said:

[232]*232“The mere dissolution of the association is not the most important object of this litigation.

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Bluebook (online)
286 F. 228, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1779, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-railway-employes-department-ilnd-1923.