United States v. Rafael Villagomez-Troche

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 19, 2022
Docket17-10540
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Rafael Villagomez-Troche (United States v. Rafael Villagomez-Troche) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Rafael Villagomez-Troche, (9th Cir. 2022).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 19 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-10540

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00836-SPL-1 v. District of Arizona, Phoenix RAFAEL VILLAGOMEZ-TROCHE, AKA Robert Villagomez Troche, AKA Rafael MEMORANDUM* Villagomez-Troche, Jr.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven P. Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 9, 2022** Pasadena, California

Before: WATFORD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO,*** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Page 2 of 4

Rafael Villagomez-Troche, a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals from the

district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss his indictment under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(d). We affirm.

1. To prevail on his motion to dismiss the indictment, Villagomez-Troche

was required to prove that entry of the underlying removal order was

“fundamentally unfair.” United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 141 S. Ct. 1615,

1620–21 (2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)). A removal order is fundamentally

unfair if the non-citizen’s due process rights were violated by defects in the

removal proceeding and he suffered prejudice as a result. United States v.

Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2014). Villagomez-Troche argues that

he was not removable as charged because the government could not prove by clear

and convincing evidence that he had been convicted of “a violation of . . . any law

. . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21).” 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

Clear and convincing evidence establishes that Villagomez-Troche was in

fact convicted of a violation of Illinois state law related to cannabis, a qualifying

controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 802. Although there is some variation

among different state-court documents as to the precise crime to which

Villagomez-Troche ultimately pleaded guilty, nothing indicates that the substance

he admitted possessing was anything other than cannabis. Villagomez-Troche Page 3 of 4

emphasizes the prosecutor’s statement during his first change of plea hearing that

if, after lab testing, the substance “turns out not to be cannabis we would . . . vacate

the plea.” Although that first plea was indeed vacated, a second guilty plea was

immediately entered in its place without any comment to indicate that the

substance was found not to be cannabis. Indeed, the state court docket entry

indicates he pleaded guilty to “UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF CANNABIS.”

Moreover, Villagomez-Troche—with the assistance of counsel—admitted all the

factual allegations in the Notice to Appear, which specifically alleged that he was

convicted of unlawful possession with the intent to deliver cannabis. On this

record, the government carried its burden of proving by clear and convincing

evidence that Villagomez-Troche was convicted of unlawful possession of

cannabis.

Because Villagomez-Troche’s underlying removal order was not

fundamentally unfair, we need not address whether he exhausted his administrative

remedies or was improperly deprived of the opportunity for judicial review. See

Palomar-Santiago, 141 S. Ct. at 1620–21.

2. On appeal, Villagomez-Troche preserved the argument that his Notice to

Appear did not confer jurisdiction on the immigration court because it did not

specify the date and time of his removal hearing. As an en banc panel of this court

recently held, however, such defects do not deprive the immigration court of Page 4 of 4

jurisdiction. United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, No. 19-30006, slip op. at 5 (9th

Cir. July 11, 2022).

AFFIRMED.

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Related

United States v. Palomar-Santiago
593 U.S. 321 (Supreme Court, 2021)
United States v. Aguilera-Rios
769 F.3d 626 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)

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