United States v. Raekwon Undral Jackson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: January 6, 2026
• Docket: 25-1208
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0010n.06

No. 25-1208

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Jan 06, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN RAEKWON UNDRAL JACKSON, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )

Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Raekwon Undral Jackson pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a firearm. The district

court sentenced him to 51 months of imprisonment, at the bottom of his Guidelines range. Jackson

argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court placed

unreasonable weight on the need to deter further criminal conduct. We disagree and affirm.

I.

Duane Malory, a known gang member, streamed a video on Facebook Live that showed

him driving around Kalamazoo, Michigan with a handgun on his lap. Law enforcement officers

saw the video and went to investigate. They found Malory in his vehicle at a gas station, with

Jackson as his passenger. The officers attempted to make contact with them, but Malory suddenly

reversed the vehicle and crashed into the gas station store. He then pulled forward, struck several

police vehicles, and fled. The officers pursued. No. 25-1208, United States v. Jackson

Eventually, Malory slowed down, and Jackson jumped out. Jackson dropped something,

picked it back up, and ran. An officer gave chase. While running, Jackson reached into his

waistband, pulled out a firearm, and tossed it into a nearby garbage can. Officers eventually

apprehended him, and a search of his person revealed 65.89 grams of marijuana and a digital scale.

Officers also recovered the firearm Jackson threw. It matched the firearm in Malory’s Facebook

video. The firearm had an extended magazine and a Glock switch, which, with some modification,

allowed it to fire fully automatic.

A grand jury indicted Jackson for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(o). Jackson pleaded guilty to violating § 922(g)(1). The district court, after assessing

enhancements for possessing marijuana and obstructing justice, determined Jackson had a criminal

history category of II and a total offense level of 23. The Guidelines range was 51 to 63 months

of imprisonment.

At sentencing, Jackson moved for a downward variance. Jackson emphasized that he had

taken steps to better himself, which included getting a job, removing himself from negative

influences, and participating in therapy. The district court commended Jackson for his behavior

but denied the motion. The district court noted, however, that Jackson’s history, prior conviction

for illegal firearm possession, previous probation violation, and the facts surrounding the present

offense would typically warrant a sentence at the middle or top end of the Guidelines range. But

having “taken into consideration everything [his] attorney and [he had] talked about and [the]

positive steps that [he had] taken,” the district court noted it would sentence Jackson to the “bottom

of the [G]uidelines.” The district court then sentenced Jackson to a term of 51 months of

imprisonment. Jackson timely appealed.

-2- No. 25-1208, United States v. Jackson

II.

Jackson argues only that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. We

review a district court’s sentence for substantive reasonableness using the deferential abuse-of-

discretion standard. United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 661 (6th Cir. 2012). A district court

abuses its discretion if it “arbitrarily selected the sentence, based the sentence on impermissible

factors, failed to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, or gave an unreasonable amount of weight

to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Robinson, 892 F.3d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting

United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 733 (6th Cir. 2012)). A within-Guidelines sentence

is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2008)

(en banc).

A.

Jackson argues that the district court placed too much weight on the need to deter him from

future conduct associated with firearms when sentencing him. Although the instant offense

involved a firearm, as did his previous felony conviction, Jackson disputes that he regularly

possessed firearms. In support, Jackson asserts that he possessed the firearm in this case for only

a short moment and that the firearm was Malory’s, not his. Jackson also contends that the district

court did not adequately consider his positive behavior while on bond.1

The district court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Jackson. It first weighed

the nature and circumstances of the offense. Although Jackson possessed the firearm for only a

1 Jackson also suggests that the district court erred in not addressing that Malory received a 30-month state sentence. We have explained, however, that § 3553(a)(6) requires a district court to look only to federal “national disparities . . . not disparities between codefendants” or disparities between federal and state sentences. United States v. Bass, 17 F.4th 629, 636–37 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). Jackson identifies no authority that would have required the district court to address Malory’s state sentence. -3- No. 25-1208, United States v. Jackson

moment, the offense was serious. The firearm was loaded and equipped with an extended

magazine and switch. And Jackson possessed both marijuana and a scale at the same time, which

is suggestive of drug dealing.2 Further, he fled the scene with the firearm, before discarding it into

a garbage can in a residential area. Although his possession was brief, the district court recognized

that Jackson’s conduct exacerbated the dangerousness of the situation. Deterring Jackson from

future conduct associated with firearms was thus an appropriate consideration for the district court.

Even so, Jackson argues that the district court considered deterrence too much while

ignoring other relevant sentencing factors. But the district court specifically noted that Jackson’s

positive behavior while on bond was the overriding factor for a lower sentence at the bottom of

the Guidelines. And rather than ignoring any mitigating factors, the district court spoke

extensively about them. Specifically, the district court commended Jackson on having completed

high school, having letters of support, articulating goals and plans for the future, and “for starting

down this path of getting a job, and when that job went away originally, getting another.” It also

commended Jackson for seizing the opportunity to participate in the halfway house and bettering

himself with that support. Further, the district court observed that a poor environment and negative

associations contributed to Jackson’s mistakes.

The record reflects that the district court thoughtfully considered the § 3553(a) factors,

including the need for deterrence and the positive steps Jackson had already taken, before

sentencing him at the bottom of the Guidelines range. Jackson’s argument “ultimately boils down

to an assertion that the district court should have balanced the § 3553(a) factors differently,” but

this is “simply beyond the scope of our appellate review.” United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326,

2 The district court recognized that Jackson possessed a legal amount of marijuana under Michigan law. But it emphasized that marijuana remains illegal under federal law, and it is the combination of a firearm with Jackson’s apparent drug dealing that aggravated the offense. -4- No. 25-1208, United States v. Jackson

332 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2006)). We therefore

conclude that Jackson’s within-Guidelines sentence is not substantively unreasonable.

* * *

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

-5-