United States v. Quintin

7 Ct. Int'l Trade 153
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedApril 3, 1984
DocketCourt No. 81-9-01320
StatusPublished

This text of 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 153 (United States v. Quintin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Quintin, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 153 (cit 1984).

Opinion

Ford, Judge:

The United States instituted this action to enforce the provisions of Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by Pub. L. 95-410, the Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978 (19 U.S.C. § 1592], and collect the civil penalty provided therein. Exclusive jurisdiction in said action was granted to this Court by the Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-417.

The pertinent portion of the provisions involved, as set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1592, provides:

§ 1592. Penalty against goods
(a) Prohibition.
(1) General rule. Without regard to whether the United States is or may be deprived of all or a portion of any lawful duty thereby, no person, by fraud, gross negligence, or negligence—
(A) may enter, introduce, or attempt to enter or introduce any merchandise into the commerce of the United States by means of—
(i) any document, written or oral statement, or act which is material and false, or
(ii) any omission which is material, or
(B) may aid or abet any other person to violate subpara-graph (A)
*******
(c) Maximum Penalties. (1) Fraud. A fraudulent violation of subsection (a) is punishable by a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the domestic value of the merchandise.
(2) Gross Negligence. A grossly negligent violation of subsection (a) is punishable by a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed—
(A) the lesser of—
(i) the domestic value of the merchandise, or
(ii) four times the lawful duties of which the United States is or may be deprived, or
(B) if the violation did not affect the assessment of duties, 40 percent of the dutiable value of the merchandise.
[155]*155(3) Negligence. A negligent violation of subsection (a) is punishable by a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed—
(A) the lesser of—
(i) the domestic value of the merchandise, or
(ii) two times the lawful duties of which the United States is or may be deprived, or
(B) if the violation did not affect the assessment of duties, 20 percent of the dutiable value of the merchandise.
(4) Prior disclosure. If the person concerned discloses the circumstances of a violation of subsection (a) before, or without knowledge of, the commencement of a formal investigation of such violation, with respect to such violation, merchandise shall not be seized and any monetary penalty to be assessed under subsection (c) shall not exceed—
(A) if the violation resulted from fraud—
(i) an amount equal to 100 percent of the lawful duties of which the United States is or may be deprived, so long as such person tenders the unpaid amount of the lawful duties at the time of disclosure or within thirty days, or such longer period as appropriate customs officer may provide, after notice by the appropriate customs officer of his calculation of such unpaid amount, or
(ii) if such violation did not affect the assessment of duties, 10 percent of the dutiable value; or
(B) if such violation resulted from negligence or gross negligence, the interest (computed from the date of liquidation at the prevailing rate of interest applied under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § 6621]) on the amount of lawful duties of which the United States is or may be deprived so long as such person tenders the unpaid amount of the lawful duties at the time of disclosure or within 30 days, or such longer period as the appropriate customs officer may provide, after notice by the appropriate customs officer of his calculation of such unpaid amount.
* * * ^ * * *
(D) Deprivation of lawful duties. Notwithstanding section 514 of this Act [19 USCS § 1514], if the United States has been deprived of lawful duties as a result of a violation of subsection (a), the appropriate customs officer shall require that such lawful duties be restored, whether or not a monetary penalty is assessed.
(e) Court of International Trade Proceedings. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any proceeding commenced by the United States in the Court of International Trade for the recovery of any monetary penalty claimed under this section—
(1) all issues, including the amount of the penalty, shall be tried de novo;
(2) if the monetary penalty is based on fraud, the United States shall have the burden of proof to establish the alleged violation by clear and convincing evidence;
[156]*156(3) if the monetary penalty is based on gross negligence, the United States shall have the burden of proof to establish all the elements of the alleged violation; and
(4) if the monetary penalty is based on negligence, the United States shall have the burden of proof to establish the act or omission constituting the violation, and the alleged violator shall have the burden of proof that the act or omission did not occur as a result of the negligence.

As a result of the 1978 Amendment, supra, the actions under this section were changed from in rem to in personam proceedings. The merchandise may, however, under the conditions set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(5), be seized. In addition the liability imposed is based upon the degree of culpability of the person entering or attempting to enter merchandise into the trade and commerce of the United States. The statute as indicated supra provides for three degrees of culpability, to wit, fraud, gross negligence and negligence. The trial of all issues, including the amount of penalty, is de novo.

At the trial of this matter in Burlington, Vermont, plaintiff introduced the testimony of Howard Campbell Rhodes, a U.S. Customs Inspector; Robert Plouffe, a Customs Inspector with Canadian Customs; George Robert Klinefetter, a senior Special Agent with U.S. Customs and John Manahan, Assistant director for Classification and Value in the Vermont District. Defendant, appearing pro se, took the stand on his own behalf.1

This action is the result of defendant having entered at the port of West Berkshire, Vermont, on December 12, 1979, certain ceramic tile, glue and grout, purchased in Montreal, Canada. At the time of entry, defendant declared he had been out of the country since “Saturday” (more than 48 hours, as December 12 was a Wednesday).2

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
7 Ct. Int'l Trade 153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-quintin-cit-1984.