Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 10, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-3103 (D.C. No. 2:22-CR-20040-HLT-3) RONALD QUINN, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Defendant-Appellant Ronald Quinn pleaded guilty to possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and was
sentenced to 108 months in prison, followed by four years of supervised release. He
timely filed a notice of appeal. His counsel submitted an Anders brief stating this appeal
presents no non-frivolous grounds for reversal. After careful review of the record, we
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 2
agree. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Quinn was charged with: (1) possession of methamphetamine with the intent
to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (2) conspiracy to distribute and possess
methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and (3) use of
a firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). On March
22, 2024, Mr. Quinn entered into a written plea agreement, in which he did not waive his
right to bring subsequent claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of
counsel but waived all other potential challenges to his conviction and sentence. He
pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841, a Class B Felony. The district court accepted the plea agreement.
The presentence report (PSR) filed with the district court determined Mr. Quinn’s
offense level is 31 and his criminal history category is I. See United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) § 2D1.1. The PSR calculated Mr. Quinn’s
Guidelines range to be 108 to 135 months in prison, with four to five years of supervised
release following imprisonment, and a fine of $30,000 to $5,000,000. The district court
sentenced him to 108 months in prison, to be followed by four years of supervised
release.
Mr. Quinn timely filed a notice of appeal on July 25, 2024. His appellate counsel
filed a brief and motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967), which allows defense counsel to “request permission to withdraw” when
2 Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 3
counsel conscientiously examines a case and determines that an appeal would be
“wholly frivolous.” While both Mr. Quinn and the Government had an opportunity to
respond to counsel’s Anders brief, neither did so.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When counsel submits an Anders brief, we review the record de novo. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kurtz, 819 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2016). This court must “conduct a
full examination of the record to determine whether defendant’s claims are wholly
frivolous.” United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005). “If the court
concludes after such an examination that the appeal is frivolous, it may grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw and may dismiss the appeal.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Here, the Anders brief addresses whether Mr. Quinn has any non-frivolous
arguments to claim (1) ineffective assistance of counsel or (2) prosecutorial misconduct.
It concludes neither has merit, and we agree. Based on our de novo review, we conclude
that none of the issues addressed in the Anders brief has merit, and we have not detected
any other viable issues.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Anders brief addresses whether the record supports an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim and finds no meritorious arguments. Neither do we.
“In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, [the defendant] must
establish that his counsel’s performance: (1) fell below an objective standard of
3 Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 4
reasonableness and (2) that he was prejudiced by this performance.” Beavers v. Saffle,
216 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2000). While there is no evidence in the record to support
either prong of this test, we generally do not review ineffective assistance claims on
direct appeal. See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
Mr. Quinn did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel until his
sentencing hearing. At his change of plea hearing, the district court asked: “Mr. Quinn,
are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation, and advice given to you in this
case by [your counsel]?” ROA Vol. III at 28. To which Mr. Quinn answered, “Yes.” Id.
At his sentencing hearing, however, Mr. Quinn complained about his three trial
attorneys’ performance in general terms, stating he had “some of the – some horrible,
horrible counsel from day one,” id. at 64; that “it’s going to be a one-side[d] affair
because [the Government] presented a better case,” id. at 66; and that he “didn’t even get
a chance to object to [his] PS[R] at all,” 1 id. at 67. Mr. Quinn did not present any specific
examples of deficient performance by any of his attorneys at either hearing.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 10, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-3103 (D.C. No. 2:22-CR-20040-HLT-3) RONALD QUINN, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Defendant-Appellant Ronald Quinn pleaded guilty to possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and was
sentenced to 108 months in prison, followed by four years of supervised release. He
timely filed a notice of appeal. His counsel submitted an Anders brief stating this appeal
presents no non-frivolous grounds for reversal. After careful review of the record, we
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 2
agree. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Quinn was charged with: (1) possession of methamphetamine with the intent
to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; (2) conspiracy to distribute and possess
methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and (3) use of
a firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). On March
22, 2024, Mr. Quinn entered into a written plea agreement, in which he did not waive his
right to bring subsequent claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of
counsel but waived all other potential challenges to his conviction and sentence. He
pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841, a Class B Felony. The district court accepted the plea agreement.
The presentence report (PSR) filed with the district court determined Mr. Quinn’s
offense level is 31 and his criminal history category is I. See United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) § 2D1.1. The PSR calculated Mr. Quinn’s
Guidelines range to be 108 to 135 months in prison, with four to five years of supervised
release following imprisonment, and a fine of $30,000 to $5,000,000. The district court
sentenced him to 108 months in prison, to be followed by four years of supervised
release.
Mr. Quinn timely filed a notice of appeal on July 25, 2024. His appellate counsel
filed a brief and motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967), which allows defense counsel to “request permission to withdraw” when
2 Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 3
counsel conscientiously examines a case and determines that an appeal would be
“wholly frivolous.” While both Mr. Quinn and the Government had an opportunity to
respond to counsel’s Anders brief, neither did so.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When counsel submits an Anders brief, we review the record de novo. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kurtz, 819 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2016). This court must “conduct a
full examination of the record to determine whether defendant’s claims are wholly
frivolous.” United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005). “If the court
concludes after such an examination that the appeal is frivolous, it may grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw and may dismiss the appeal.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Here, the Anders brief addresses whether Mr. Quinn has any non-frivolous
arguments to claim (1) ineffective assistance of counsel or (2) prosecutorial misconduct.
It concludes neither has merit, and we agree. Based on our de novo review, we conclude
that none of the issues addressed in the Anders brief has merit, and we have not detected
any other viable issues.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Anders brief addresses whether the record supports an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim and finds no meritorious arguments. Neither do we.
“In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, [the defendant] must
establish that his counsel’s performance: (1) fell below an objective standard of
3 Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 4
reasonableness and (2) that he was prejudiced by this performance.” Beavers v. Saffle,
216 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2000). While there is no evidence in the record to support
either prong of this test, we generally do not review ineffective assistance claims on
direct appeal. See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
Mr. Quinn did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel until his
sentencing hearing. At his change of plea hearing, the district court asked: “Mr. Quinn,
are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation, and advice given to you in this
case by [your counsel]?” ROA Vol. III at 28. To which Mr. Quinn answered, “Yes.” Id.
At his sentencing hearing, however, Mr. Quinn complained about his three trial
attorneys’ performance in general terms, stating he had “some of the – some horrible,
horrible counsel from day one,” id. at 64; that “it’s going to be a one-side[d] affair
because [the Government] presented a better case,” id. at 66; and that he “didn’t even get
a chance to object to [his] PS[R] at all,” 1 id. at 67. Mr. Quinn did not present any specific
examples of deficient performance by any of his attorneys at either hearing.
We generally do not review an ineffective assistance of counsel argument on
direct appeal. See Galloway, 56 F.3d at 1240 (“Such claims brought on direct appeal are
presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed.”). We will consider an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal “where such claims were
This is not the case. Prior to this colloquy with the district court, Mr. Quinn 1
agreed he had read and discussed the PSR with his attorney, and that he had enough time to review it with his attorney and have all his questions answered. Through his attorney, he also told the court he had no objections to the PSR. 4 Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 5
adequately developed by the district court prior to appeal.” United States v. Gallegos, 108
F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir. 1997). That record has not been developed here. Thus, this is
not one of those “rare instances” where “an ineffectiveness of counsel claim may need no
further development prior to review on direct appeal.” Galloway, 56 F.3d at 1240. The
district court did not address the issue, and Mr. Quinn failed to point to any factual
evidence of deficient performance of counsel or prejudice. We thus see no reason to
depart from our general practice of not reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims
on direct appeal here.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The Anders brief considers whether the record supports a prosecutorial misconduct
claim and concludes it does not. We agree.
Prosecutorial misconduct is the overstepping of “the bounds of that propriety and
fairness which should characterize the conduct of [the United States Attorney] in the
prosecution of a criminal offense.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935). “We
use a two-step process when evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, we
examine whether the conduct was, in fact, improper. If we answer that question in the
affirmative, we must then determine whether it warrants reversal.” United States v.
Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1421 (10th Cir.1998).
Mr. Quinn did not raise any issue of prosecutorial misconduct until his sentencing
hearing. There, he stated that the “[G]overnment’s been ridiculous in this case . . . for
them to be able to get away with getting people to cooperate, exposing them to danger,
putting them in the safeguards, not safeguarding them at all, it’s completely ridiculous.”
5 Appellate Case: 24-3103 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 03/10/2025 Page: 6
ROA Vol. III at 62. He also alleged there was “apparent misconduct” without identifying
any specific instance of prosecutorial misconduct, instead asserting the Government
“[got] a max [] [G]uideline[s] sentence out of the deal”—which it did not. Id. at 63.
Finally, he stated that “from the start . . . the [G]overnment’s got their way. Nobody’s
[been] listening to me from day one . . . . This has just been [] a nightmare experience.”
Id. at 64. None of these frustrations challenge the propriety of the Government’s specific
conduct.
Further, our independent review of the record has not identified any non-frivolous
arguments Mr. Quinn could make to support his claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Accordingly, we agree with defense counsel that the claim is without merit.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our independent review of the record reveals no non-frivolous grounds for
reversal. Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the
appeal.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge