United States v. Quimby

51 F.2d 167, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 2880
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·Decided July 7, 1931·No. No. 436·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

MANTON, Circuit Judge.

The appellant was convicted on eleven counts of an indictment, containing twelve counts, charging use of the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. The tenth count was dismissed at the trial, and his co-defendant Cutler was acquitted on all counts.

Clarke Bros., a private banking institution, carried on business for 88 years, but closed its doors June 29, 1929, when bankruptcy followed. The fraudulent scheme charged was that the appellant and one Cutler, together with James R. Clarke, William H. Clarke, and Philip Clarke, unlawfully and fraudulently devised and intended to devise a scheme to defraud certain named depositors and others unnamed, “as depositors and lenders.” The scheme is charged to have existed from April, 1927, to June 29, 1929. Clarke Bros, were private bankers and lawfully held themselves out as such. They accepted deposits of moneys offering interest at 5% per cent, on special accounts, and 3 per cent, on ordinary accounts. The appellant and his codefendant are charged with taking sums of money placed on deposit, as loans without sufficient security. The theory of the indictment is that such lending of money was part of the scheme to defraud and was made with the knowledge of Clarke Bros., and used not only to enrich the appellant, but also one of the Clarkes. In this way it is said that. money was fraudulently obtained from depositors.

Appellant was not an officer of the bank nor in its employ. It is further claimed that accounts were solicited and deposits obtained so that money might be borrowed by the appellant, and that representations were made that Clarke Bros, were conducting a sound conservative business, under the supervision of the New York state banking department, and that Clarke Bros, were solvent. It is claimed that the representations were false and untrue; that Clarke Bros, were not doing a legitimate business, and were not financially sound, nor was it a staple and reliable banking house, and that it did not conduct its business in accordance with the principles of sound banking and disregarded the banking laws of the state of New York. Private banks of this kind are not under the supervision of the hanking department under the law of New York.

The first count, after charging the alleged scheme to defraud, says that Clarke Bros. placed in the post office on June 29, 1929, a printed circular and calendar addressed to one McGovern, soliciting deposits from the addressee; count 2, a letter of May 29, 1928; count 3, on June 25, 1928; count 4, September 28, 1928; count 5, January 13', 1927; count 6, June 30, 1927; count 7, May 29, 1928; count 8, November 26, 1928; count 9, March 16, 1929'; count 11, December 31, 1928; count 12, June 28, 1929. These letters inclosed a blotter or calendar used for advertising purposes and suggested the service of Clarke Bros, as bankers, or offered their services to persons wishing to travel by way of selling travelers’ checks.

There was no direct proof of an agreement or scheme to defraud; the jury were asked to infer it from the circumstances. Appellant was shown to have been a depositor and a borrower of money from the bank. He frequented the bank often in the years preceding its failure, as often as once or twice a week. He was seen sometimes lunching with members of the firm. The loans made to the appellant were at various times during the two years preceding the failure, and on the closing of the bank amounted to $185,000. He gave his note each time to •James R. Clarke. The notes were not entered on the books of the bank until September 18, 1928, when James R. Clarke instructed the note teller to make entries in the discount ledger under appellant’s name. As collateral for these notes, appellant gave a claim for commissions against the New York Edison Company for $750,000, and from that time on moneys were loaned against the security. Of the $185,000, $55,000 was represented by notes made by the appellant to James R. Clarke, which he gave Clarke for his personal accommodation so he could discount them at some other bank. About $40,000 of this sum was used by Clarke to build a home for his daughter. Appellant was never asked to pay this $55,000, and he assumed Clarke would take care of these obligations. The validity of the claim given as collateral security was severely questioned at the trial. Three eminent members of the bar testified to its legality, and it might well have been reasonable for Clarke Bros, to accept it as collateral. From time to time subsequent to the assignment to the bank appellant made several assignments of interest therein to others, amounting in all to about one-third of the amount of the claim.

The appellee was permitted to prove some judgments recovered against the appellant by third parties.

[169] Years before tbe failure of tbe bank, James R. Clarke advanced $150,000 to the P.ort Terminal Corporation, a corporation which appellant had promoted, and held its note for that amount. This company had an enterprise in New Jersey, but it was a failure. It was shown to have been carried on the books of the bank at $840,000. Appellant disclaimed any knowledge of the book entries of the bank. The appellant was interrogated in a preliminary examination before a commissioner, and he was asked by the United States attorney to explain why Clarke Bros, carried this loan at $840,000, to which he replied that he knew nothing of the book entries and knew no reason therefor. But in this fraud charge it is argued that this amounted to proof of some improper entry made in the Clarke Bros, books and therefore was fraudulent. An interest in a McCarter Syndicate was carried on the books of the bank at $700,000, and the appellant was interrogated before the commissioner as to whether he knew that fact. He disclaimed knowledge thereof. No proof was offered at the trial below to show such an entry was made on the books of the bank or that appellant knew thereof. But the argument proceeded that this was another transaction to defraud the creditors. Indeed, no proof was offered that the books of the bank carried either of these items, and. the United States attorney argued as if they had been proven. The deposition before the commissioner was received in evidence.

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United States v. Quimby, 51 F.2d 167, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 2880 (2d Cir. 1931).

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