United States v. Quajohn Crews

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: May 23, 2024
• Docket: 23-4581
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4581

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

QUAJOHN ANTHONY CREWS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (7:23-cr-00009-FL-1)

Submitted: May 21, 2024 Decided: May 23, 2024

Before WYNN and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Jennifer C. Leisten, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Quajohn Anthony Crews appeals his conviction and the 96-month sentence imposed

after he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). Counsel has filed a brief in

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), indicating that he has found

no meritorious issues for appeal, but suggesting that the district court plainly erred when it

imposed a warrantless search condition to Crews’ three-year supervised release term.

Crews has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, despite receiving notice of his right to do

so. The Government moves to dismiss the appeal based on the appellate waiver in Crews’

plea agreement. As explained below, we dismiss in part and affirm in part.

We first conclude that Crews has waived his right to appeal his conviction and

sentence. A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the right to appeal under 18

U.S.C. § 3742. See United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This court

reviews the validity of an appellate waiver de novo and will enforce the waiver if it is valid

and the issue appealed is within the scope thereof. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162,

168 (4th Cir. 2005).

An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to the

waiver. Id. at 169. “To determine whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed

to waive his appellate rights, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the

defendant’s experience, conduct, educational background and knowledge of his plea

agreement and its terms.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023).

“Generally, . . . if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate

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rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant

understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Based on the totality of circumstances in this case, we conclude that Crews

knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and understood the waiver.

We further conclude that Crews’ challenge to the warrantless search condition of

his supervised release falls within the scope of the waiver. According to the plea

agreement, Crews waived his right to appeal his “conviction and whatever sentence is

imposed on any ground, including any appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742,” save for

exceptions inapplicable here. United States v. Crews, No. 7:23-cr-00009-FL-1 (E.D.N.C.,

PACER No. 34 at 1). As we have explained, “custodial and supervised release terms [are]

components of one unified sentence.” United States v. Venable, 943 F.3d 187, 193-94 (4th

Cir. 2019); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of

imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as part of the sentence a

requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after

imprisonment.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the waiver bars appellate review of the

reasonableness of the term of supervised release, as well as the special conditions imposed.

See United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2012) (enforcing appellate

waiver because it “explicitly covers appeals based on ‘any ground set forth in . . . § 3742,’”

which includes “appeals challenging a sentence as ‘imposed in violation of law’”).

We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss, in part, and dismiss the

appeal as to all issues falling within the scope of the broad appeal waiver in Crews’ plea

agreement. In accordance with our obligations under Anders, we have reviewed the entire

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record for any potentially meritorious issues that do not fall within the scope of the

appellate waiver and have found none. Accordingly, we deny the Government’s motion,

in part, as to any issues falling within the scope of the appeal waiver and affirm the criminal

judgment in part.

This court requires that counsel inform Crews, in writing, of his right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Crews requests that a petition be

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a

copy thereof was served on Crews. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

would not aid in the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART