United States v. Quaintance

471 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94439, 2006 WL 3891417
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedDecember 22, 2006
DocketCR NO. 06-538 JCH
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 471 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (United States v. Quaintance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Quaintance, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94439, 2006 WL 3891417 (D.N.M. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HERRERA, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Danuel Dean Quaintance’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment and Incorporated Memorandum, filed April 7, 2006, [Doc. No. 34] (“Motion to Dismiss”). Defendants Mary Helen Quaintance and Joseph Allen Butts join in the Motion to Dismiss. On August 21, 2006, the Court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. Defendant Danuel Dean Quaintance was present at the hearing and was represented by Marc H. Robert, Esq. Defendant Mary Helen Quaintance was present and represented by Mario A. Es-parza, Esq. Defendant Joseph Allen Butts was present and represented by Bernadette Sedillo, Esq. The United States was present and represented by Assistant United States Attorney Luis Martinez and Special Assistant United States Attorney Amanda Gould. After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, along with the arguments of counsel, written briefs, and applicable law, the Court concludes that the Motion to Dismiss is not well taken and should be denied.

BACKGROUND

Defendants Danuel Quaintance, Mary Quaintance, and Joseph Butts are charged with possession of more than 50 kilograms of marijuana with the intent to distribute in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 841, and with conspiracy to possess more than 100 kilograms with the intent to distribute in violation of the CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 846. 1

*1155 Defendant Danuel Quaintance is the founder of the Church of Cognizance, and Defendants Mary Quaintance and Joseph Butts are members of the Church of Cognizance. Defendants maintain that marijuana is a sacrament and deity and that the consumption of marijuana is a means of worship. Defendants argue that the application of the CSA to members of the Church of Cognizance constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., as well as the Establishment Clause and First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

DISCUSSION

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was passed in 1993 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). In that case, the Supreme Court abolished the compelling interest test for judicial claims involving the free exercise of religion. RFRA re-established the strict scrutiny test for judicial claims involving the free exercise of religion. RFRA states in relevant part:

Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception.
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
al is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) and (b). Defendants maintain that the application of the CSA to the Church of Cognizance constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by members of the Church of Cognizance. Although Defendants also argue that the application of the CSA to members of the church is not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and that it is not the least restrictive means of furthering that interest, the parties seek only a ruling on whether the CSA substantially burdens their religious beliefs.

A person claiming that the government has placed a substantial burden on his or her practice of religion must establish that the governmental action (1) substantially burdens (2) a religious belief, not just a philosophy or way of life, (3) which belief is sincerely held. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1482 (10th Cir.1996) (citing Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir.1996)). That showing must be made by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

The Government concedes that application of the CSA substantially burdens the Defendants’ beliefs. Accordingly, the only questions before the Court are (1) whether Defendants’ beliefs are religious, and not simply a philosophy or way of life, and (2) whether those beliefs are sincerely held.

I. Religious Belief.

In United States v. Meyers, the Tenth Circuit set forth the following five factors a district court should consider in determining whether a belief is “religious” *1156 for purposes of RFRA: (1) ultimate ideas, (2) metaphysical beliefs, (3) moral or ethical system, (4) comprehensiveness of beliefs, and (5) accoutrements of religion. Id. at 1483. In United States v. Meyers, the United States charged the defendant with two offenses stemming from marijuana possession and trafficking. 906 F.Supp. 1494, 1495 (D.Wyo.1995). Meyers asserted that the United States could not prosecute him for these crimes because, as a “Reverend” of the “Church of Marijuana,” his possession and distribution of marijuana was legally protected religious conduct. Id. The question before the Meyers court was whether the “Church of Marijuana” was a bona fide religion that triggered the protections of RFRA. Id. The district court concluded that Meyers’s beliefs were secular and not religious, id. at 1508, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit explained that Meyers’s beliefs “more accurately espouse a philosophy and/or way of life rather than a ‘religion.’” 95 F.3d at 1484.

In applying the Meyers factors, the Tenth Circuit explained that a district court “ ‘cannot rely solely on established or recognized religions to guide it in determining whether a new and unique set of beliefs warrants inclusion.’ ” Id. (quoting Meyers, 906 F.Supp. at 1503). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit indicated that “ ‘no one of these factors is dispositive,’ ” and that “the factors should be seen as criteria that, if minimally satisfied, counsel the inclusion of beliefs within the term ‘religion.’ ” Id. (quoting Meyers, 906 F.Supp. at 1503).

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Bluebook (online)
471 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94439, 2006 WL 3891417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-quaintance-nmd-2006.