22-1653 (L) United States v. Purvis-Mitchell
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s local rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the federal appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of February, two thousand twenty-four.
PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, GERARD E. LYNCH, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 22-1653 (L), 22-1654 (Con)
TYLER PURVIS-MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________________________
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: STEPHEN N. PREZIOSI, New York, NY. FOR APPELLEE: STEVEN D. CLYMER, Assistant United States Attorney (Emmet O’Hanlon, Paul D. Silver, on the brief), for Carla B. Freedman, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY.
Appeal from the July 26, 2022, judgment of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment entered on July 26, 2022, is AFFIRMED in part and
the case REMANDED for further proceedings.
Defendant-Appellant Tyler Purvis-Mitchell (“Purvis-Mitchell”) appeals from the
district court’s July 26, 2022, judgment, rendered following a jury trial, convicting him of
possessing with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(B). The district court sentenced Purvis-Mitchell
principally to 150 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Purvis-Mitchell argues that the
district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized from his
rental car, home, and cellphone, and abused its discretion in denying his motion for a
new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. He additionally argues, for the
first time on appeal, that the government’s post-trial disclosure of potential impeachment
evidence violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We reject Purvis-
Mitchell’s arguments as to the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and motion
for a new trial. We decline to consider his post-trial Brady claim on the present record 2 and remand the case to the district court with a limited mandate to consider the claim in
the first instance on a renewed motion under Rule 33. We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, to which we
refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Suppress
Purvis-Mitchell first argues that the district court erred in denying his pro se
motion to suppress because the search warrants issued for his rental car, home, and
cellphone lacked probable cause and were insufficiently particular and overbroad, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. He further argues that the affidavits submitted in
support of the warrant applications contained false information and material omissions
regarding surveillance video footage of an April 12, 2020, shooting and that, as a result,
the district court erred in concluding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applied. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in applying the good
faith exception, we need not address Purvis-Mitchell’s challenges to the existence of
probable cause or the particularity and breadth of the warrants. See United States v. Jones,
43 F.4th 94, 110 (2d Cir. 2022).
On appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress, “we review the [district] court’s
factual findings for clear error . . . [and its] legal determinations, including the existence
of probable cause and the good faith of officers relying on a search warrant, de novo.”
3 United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Raymonda,
780 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2015)). “[T]he ‘good-faith exception’ to the exclusionary rule
applies when the [officers] executing a search warrant ‘act with an objectively reasonable
good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful.’” Jones, 43 F.4th at 111 (quoting Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011)). The Supreme Court has recognized that police
reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable if, inter alia, the warrant application is
“so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable.”
United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 923 (1984)).
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court rejected the arguments Purvis-
Mitchell now raises on appeal, concluding that “there were no false statements in the
search warrant applications, let alone intentional or recklessly false statements, . . . nor
was any relevant information omitted that would have influenced the probable cause
calculus.” App’x at 164. Specifically, the district court found that the surveillance video,
as described in the affidavits, shows a man “consistent with [Purvis-Mitchell’s] height
and weight[,] as listed in his criminal history report[,]” id. at 160–61, exiting a gray
Chrysler sedan and taking what “appears to [be] a shooting position,” id. at 158. It further
noted that “the individual in question appears to be holding a firearm.” Id. at 159. We
discern no error, let alone clear error, in the district court’s conclusions. See United States
v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2015) (“When reviewing for clear error, we may
4 reverse only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed, and [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
We also reject Purvis-Mitchell’s claim that the affidavits were “so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon,
468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, in addition to describing the
surveillance video, each affidavit noted that (1) rental car records established that Purvis-
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22-1653 (L) United States v. Purvis-Mitchell
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s local rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the federal appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of February, two thousand twenty-four.
PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, GERARD E. LYNCH, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 22-1653 (L), 22-1654 (Con)
TYLER PURVIS-MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________________________
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: STEPHEN N. PREZIOSI, New York, NY. FOR APPELLEE: STEVEN D. CLYMER, Assistant United States Attorney (Emmet O’Hanlon, Paul D. Silver, on the brief), for Carla B. Freedman, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY.
Appeal from the July 26, 2022, judgment of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment entered on July 26, 2022, is AFFIRMED in part and
the case REMANDED for further proceedings.
Defendant-Appellant Tyler Purvis-Mitchell (“Purvis-Mitchell”) appeals from the
district court’s July 26, 2022, judgment, rendered following a jury trial, convicting him of
possessing with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(B). The district court sentenced Purvis-Mitchell
principally to 150 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Purvis-Mitchell argues that the
district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized from his
rental car, home, and cellphone, and abused its discretion in denying his motion for a
new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. He additionally argues, for the
first time on appeal, that the government’s post-trial disclosure of potential impeachment
evidence violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We reject Purvis-
Mitchell’s arguments as to the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and motion
for a new trial. We decline to consider his post-trial Brady claim on the present record 2 and remand the case to the district court with a limited mandate to consider the claim in
the first instance on a renewed motion under Rule 33. We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, to which we
refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Suppress
Purvis-Mitchell first argues that the district court erred in denying his pro se
motion to suppress because the search warrants issued for his rental car, home, and
cellphone lacked probable cause and were insufficiently particular and overbroad, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. He further argues that the affidavits submitted in
support of the warrant applications contained false information and material omissions
regarding surveillance video footage of an April 12, 2020, shooting and that, as a result,
the district court erred in concluding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applied. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in applying the good
faith exception, we need not address Purvis-Mitchell’s challenges to the existence of
probable cause or the particularity and breadth of the warrants. See United States v. Jones,
43 F.4th 94, 110 (2d Cir. 2022).
On appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress, “we review the [district] court’s
factual findings for clear error . . . [and its] legal determinations, including the existence
of probable cause and the good faith of officers relying on a search warrant, de novo.”
3 United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Raymonda,
780 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2015)). “[T]he ‘good-faith exception’ to the exclusionary rule
applies when the [officers] executing a search warrant ‘act with an objectively reasonable
good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful.’” Jones, 43 F.4th at 111 (quoting Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011)). The Supreme Court has recognized that police
reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable if, inter alia, the warrant application is
“so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable.”
United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 923 (1984)).
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court rejected the arguments Purvis-
Mitchell now raises on appeal, concluding that “there were no false statements in the
search warrant applications, let alone intentional or recklessly false statements, . . . nor
was any relevant information omitted that would have influenced the probable cause
calculus.” App’x at 164. Specifically, the district court found that the surveillance video,
as described in the affidavits, shows a man “consistent with [Purvis-Mitchell’s] height
and weight[,] as listed in his criminal history report[,]” id. at 160–61, exiting a gray
Chrysler sedan and taking what “appears to [be] a shooting position,” id. at 158. It further
noted that “the individual in question appears to be holding a firearm.” Id. at 159. We
discern no error, let alone clear error, in the district court’s conclusions. See United States
v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2015) (“When reviewing for clear error, we may
4 reverse only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed, and [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
We also reject Purvis-Mitchell’s claim that the affidavits were “so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon,
468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, in addition to describing the
surveillance video, each affidavit noted that (1) rental car records established that Purvis-
Mitchell had rented the Gray Chrysler sedan identified in the video, (2) staff of the rental
car company had confirmed that the vehicle was returned by Purvis-Mitchell after the
shooting, and (3) Purvis-Mitchell had rented a second vehicle and was still in possession
of it. Additionally, the affidavit underlying the warrant for Purvis-Mitchell’s cellphone,
which was obtained after his arrest, noted that the cellphone was discovered in close
proximity to “where [he] was taken into custody” and that he “identified [the phone] as
his [] during an interview” with the arresting officer. App’x at 109. These facts provided
Albany police with “at least arguable probable cause” to believe that evidence of a crime
would be found in Purvis-Mitchell’s rental car, home, and cellphone. Jones, 43 F.4th at
111; see also id. at 112 (noting that the good faith exception does not apply where the
“‘affidavits are bare bones’—that is, when they are ‘totally devoid of factual
5 circumstances to support conclusory allegations’” (quoting United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d
89, 103 (2d Cir. 2011))). We therefore conclude that the good faith exception applied.
II. Rule 33 Motion for a New Trial
Purvis-Mitchell next argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for a new trial, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, based on his claim that the
government violated its obligations under Brady by disclosing certain Albany Police
“chain of custody” reports ten days before his trial began. The district court rejected this
claim, concluding that the reports were neither suppressed by the government nor
“material” under Brady.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33
for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hunter, 32 F.4th 22, 30 (2d Cir. 2022). “A Brady
violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence materially favorable to
the accused.” United States v. Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 544 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869 (2006) (per curiam)). Undisclosed
“[e]vidence is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017) (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556
U.S. 449, 469–70 (2009)). “While the trial judge’s factual conclusions as to the effect of
nondisclosure are entitled to great weight, we examine the record de novo to determine
6 whether the evidence in question is material as a matter of law.” Hunter, 32 F.4th at 31
(quoting United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2005)).
The chain of custody evidence was not “material” for purposes of Brady because
Purvis-Mitchell was not prejudiced by the delayed disclosure. Here, the government
presented substantial evidence that Purvis-Mitchell possessed the methamphetamine in
question with the intent to distribute it. See id. at 32 (“Where the evidence against the
defendant is ample or overwhelming, the withheld Brady material is less likely to be
material.” (quoting United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2002))). This evidence
included (1) the testimony of Albany Police detectives who recovered methamphetamine-
laced pills from Purvis-Mitchell’s rental car and home; (2) Purvis-Mitchell’s post-arrest
admission that the pills recovered from the rental car were his, and (3) text messages
between Purvis-Mitchell and a potential customer discussing the sale of
methamphetamine-laced pills. The potential impact of the delayed disclosure was also
limited given that defects in the chain of custody go to weight, not admissibility, see
United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 57 (2d Cir. 1998), and Purvis-Mitchell’s defense was
not that the pills did not belong to him, but that the government could not prove that he
had intended to distribute them, see Gov’t App’x at 202. In sum, because the belatedly
disclosed evidence was not material under Brady, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Purvis-Mitchell’s Rule 33 motion.
7 III. Brady Claim Based on Post-Trial Disclosure
Finally, Purvis-Mitchell argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the
government violated its obligations under Brady by disclosing impeachment evidence
concerning a government witness ten months after the end of his trial. The government,
in response, concedes that the information is “favorable to Purvis-Mitchell,” but “denies
that it suppressed [the] information” in question. Gov’t Brief at 71. Because the district
court has not considered this issue, we lack a sufficient record to determine “whether any
[undisclosed] evidence favorable to the [d]efendant[] was material, suppressed, or both.”
United States v. Stillwell, 986 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2021). Accordingly, we remand the case
to the district court, in accordance with the procedures set forth in United States v. Jacobson,
15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994), to consider Purvis-Mitchell’s claim in the first instance.
* * *
We have considered Purvis-Mitchell’s remaining arguments and conclude that
they are without merit. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court
entered on July 26, 2022, is AFFIRMED in part and the case REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this order.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court