United States v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.

34 C.C.P.A. 71, 1946 CCPA LEXIS 526
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedNovember 4, 1946
DocketNo. 4544
StatusPublished

This text of 34 C.C.P.A. 71 (United States v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 34 C.C.P.A. 71, 1946 CCPA LEXIS 526 (ccpa 1946).

Opinion

Garrett, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Government has here appealed from the judgment of the United States Customs Court, First Division (C. D. 981), sustaining importer’s protest and awarding it recovery of duties assessed and collected upon merchandise invoiced and entered at the port of New York as citronella oil.

It was imported from Ceylon, of which country it was a product, and was contained in 32 drums, 16 of which were designated as lot 137 and 16 as lot 138, the drums being numbered 1 to 16 in each lot. A sample from each of the 32 drums was analyzed by the Government’s chemist who reported that an amount of petroleum distillate (kerosene) was contained in the oil in each drum. The lowest quantity of such petroleum distillate in any one drum was 6 per centum; the highest 13.6 per centum. The average percentage in the shipment considered as a whole was 8.78 per centum.

The collector (after correspondence with and under the instructions of the Commissioner of Customs) classified the merchandise under paragraph 60 of the Tariff Act of 1930, assessing duty at 30 per centum ad valorem and 40 cents per pound, that being the rate fixed in the trade agreement with the Republic of France, T. D. 48316 (69 Treas. Dec. 853, 863), this being a modification of the rate of 50 per centum ad valorem plus 40 cents per pound, provided in the paragraph as originally enacted by Congress for those “Perfume materials” consisting of “all mixtures or combinations containing essential or distilled oils, or natural or synthetic odoriferous or aromatic substances * * * and not containing more than 10 per centum of alcohol.” Specifically, the claim of the Government is that the merchandise falls within the provision for “mixtures or combinations containing essential or distilled oils.” Importer’s protest, as originally filed, read in part as follows:

We claim that the goods in question are properly nondutiable under the Act of June 17, 1930.
Under Par. 1673, 1731, or 1733, or under Par. 1731 and 1733 considered together. We further claim that if not free of duty then shch merchandise is dutiable at 25% ad valorem under Par. 58.
[73]*73The foregoing claims are made directly, or by virtue of paragraph 1559. It is further claimed that the goods are dutiable under paragraph 1558 at 10 percent ad valorem, or if not, at 20 percent ad valorem.

Subsequently, an amendment was granted adding to tbe protest an alternative claim under paragraph 57 of the act.

Notwithstanding the several paragraphs under which claim was made, the trial court only passed upon that under paragraph 1731, which we quote in full:

Par. 1731. Oils, distilled or essential: Anise, bergamot, bitter almond, camphor, caraway, cassia, cinnamon, citronella, geranium, lavender, lemon-grass, lime, lignaloe or bois de rose, neroli or orange flower, origanum, palmarosa, pettigrain, rose or otto of roses, rosemary, spike lavender, thyme, and ylang ylang or cananga: Provided, That no article mixed or compounded with or containing alcohol shall be exempted from duty under this paragraph.

The brief for appellee states, in substance, that its claim under the quoted paragraph is its principal claim, but also presents arguments as to other claims which the trial court did not find it necessary to pass upon. However, neither paragraph 57 nor paragraph 58 is discussed and we assume the claims under them to have been abandoned. ■

With respect to paragraph 1731, supra, it is, and has been throughout, the position of counsel for the Government, as expressed in their brief before us, that the paragraph—

provided for the essential or distilled oils which it named in their natural state: that the merchandise in controversy, admittedly a mixture of citronella oil and petroleum distillate, was not described by the language of paragraph 1731 and that no commercial designation different from the common meaning justified an interpretation of paragraph 1731 which would include such merchandise.

Also, it was and is the position of Government counsel—

that the merchandise was a mixture containing a distilled oil and was therefore described and provided for in paragraph 60.

So, the Government brief asserts:

Thus the question at issue is whether the provision in paragraph 1731 for “citronella oil” can be construed either according to a common or commercial understanding to include the imported merchandise.

The contention on behalf of appellee is stated in its brief as follows:

Various claims are made in the protest, the principal claim being for free entry under the eo nomine unqualified provision for Citronella Oil in Par. 1731. In other words plaintiff’s main claim is that in spite of the fact that the Citronella Oil concededly contains a percentage of petroleum distillate, as the government chemist reports, nevertheless the article is still commercial Citronella Oil, although adulterated, and therefore free of duty as such under the long established rule that the designation of an article eo nomine includes that article in all its forms; that therefore even if the article fall within the provisions of Par. 60 under which it was assessed, it is more specifically provided for under this eo nomine provision.

[74]*74In the succeeding paragraph counsel for appellee makes the further claim that the merchandise “can in no way be lawfully assessed” under paragraph 60, and that if not classifiable under paragraph 1731, it falls within paragraph 1558.

Upon the record presented it is logical that we first consider and rule upon the holding of the trial court that the merchandise is classifiable under paragraph 1731, supra, from the reading of which it is observable that citronella oil is therein provided for eo nomine.

That a pure, unadulterated citronella oil is classifiable under the paragraph is not questioned, but it is the contention of counsel for the Government, in effect, that the addition of 6 per centum to 13.6 per centum of petroleum distillate, which admittedly was injected in Ceylon and became mixed with the citronella oil (thus creating what is shown to be a physical mixture), so changed the properties or character of the substance that as imported it was, for customs purposes, a substance not falling within the common meaning of the term “citronella oil.”

Also, it is claimed that “Mixtures of citronella oil and petroleum distillate, the latter varying in amounts from 6% to 13.6%, were not, on or prior to June 1930, commercially designated as ‘citronella oil’,” and that appellee failed to establish any commercial designation of citronella oil which would include the imported product.

The contentions of counsel for appellee on this phase of the controversy are epitomized in his brief in four “Points” as follows:

Point I
The Record establishes without dispute that Congress had in mind adulterated Citronella Oil as well as the pure product when it provided for the free entry of Citronella Oil. ■
Point II

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34 C.C.P.A. 71, 1946 CCPA LEXIS 526, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-procter-gamble-mfg-co-ccpa-1946.