United States v. Polzin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 25-1856
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-1856 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-00586-ODW-1 v. MEMORANDUM * 0F

JACQUES POLZIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 15, 2026 ** 1F

Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, BUMATAY, and TUNG, Circuit Judges.

Jacques Polzin appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) and

§ 216(a)(2). We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Polzin argues that based on the evidence presented at trial, no reasonable

jury could have rejected his affirmative defense of entrapment by estoppel. We

disagree.

Where, as here, Polzin did not preserve his motion for a judgement of

acquittal, this Court reviews sufficiency of the evidence claims for plain error.

United States v. Pelisamen, 641 F.3d 399, 409 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011). 1 Polzin must 2F

show that “no rational factfinder, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, would reject [Polzin’s] defense.” United States v.

Bibbins, 637 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). If evidence

conflicts, this Court “must presume––even if it does not affirmatively appear in the

record––that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the

prosecution[] and must defer to that resolution.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d

1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation modified).

At trial, Polzin raised the affirmative defense of entrapment by estoppel. In

support of this defense, Polzin testified that his supervisor knew that Polzin’s wife

owned JNJ Auto Repair and had approved of Polzin sending vehicles to JNJ.

1 The distinction between de novo review and plain error review in this context “is largely academic, given that, whether review is de novo or for plain error, we must give great deference to the jury verdict and ‘must affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found the evidence sufficient.’” Pelisamen, 641 F.3d at 409 n.6 (quoting United States v. Vizcarra–Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995)).

2 25-1856 Polzin also testified that his supervisor instructed Polzin to prepare a conflict

memo recognizing and approving of the conflict of interest. This memo was

received into evidence. The government, however, presented evidence that

conflicted with Polzin’s testimony and defense theory. For instance, the

government presented evidence that Polzin’s supervisor was unaware that Polzin’s

wife owned JNJ Auto and thus did not approve of Polzin sending vehicles there.

Indeed, Polzin’s supervisor testified that he did not have any conversations with

Polzin about the conflict of interest and only saw the conflict memo after Polzin

had been charged. The government also presented evidence from a former JNJ

Auto employee who testified that Polzin was the “owner and CEO of JNJ” and that

Polzin would hide when ICE agents brought their vehicles there. If Polzin

believed that he had his supervisor’s approval, then he would have little reason to

hide from the ICE agents.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government while

presuming the jury resolved conflicting evidence in favor of the government,

Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164, we hold that a reasonable jury could have rejected

Polzin’s affirmative defense. Therefore, we do not disturb the jury’s verdict or

Polzin’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.

3 25-1856