United States v. Pilisuk

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 13, 2026
• Docket: 24-6239
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6239

Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:22-cr-00001-TL-1 v. MEMORANDUM* SHABNAM DAWN PILISUK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Tana Lin, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 22, 2026 Seattle, Washington

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Shabnam Dawn Pilisuk appeals her jury trial convictions, mandatory

minimum prison sentence, and a condition of her supervised release. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm Pilisuk’s convictions and

custodial sentence, and we construe Special Condition 3 of her supervised release

to conform with United States v. Gnirke, 775 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2015).

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Pilisuk’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for Counts 3 and 4

fail. We review for plain error. United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1217 (9th

Cir. 2014).1 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier

of fact could have found that the evidence presented demonstrated that a

“dominant, significant, or motivating purpose” of Pilisuk’s trips to Las Vegas and

Colorado with Minor Victim 1 (“MV1”) was to engage in criminal sexual activity.2

Flucas v. United States, 22 F.4th 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2022). Specifically, a jury

could find that Pilisuk’s motivations in taking the trips included continuing to

abuse MV1 while her husband was away in Death Valley, taking explicit photos of

MV1 in a generic setting such as the Las Vegas hotel room, or grooming MV1 by

taking him to a topless event and nudist resort in Colorado. Although the Las

Vegas and Colorado trips may have had other purposes, it is not the case “that an

innocent travel purpose precludes [Pilisuk] from also having an illicit” motive, and

“Ninth Circuit precedent clearly establishes that a defendant can have mixed

motives for traveling.” United States v. Pepe, 81 F.4th 961, 977 (9th Cir. 2023)

1 On either de novo or plain error review, the result is the same. See Gadson, 763 F.3d at 1217 (“[P]lain error review of a sufficiency claim is only ‘theoretically more stringent than the standard for a preserved claim.’” (quoting United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 2011))). 2 Because Pilisuk’s challenge to Count 3 fails, we deny as moot her motion to file a supplemental brief regarding her Count 1 conviction (Dkt. No. 54) and her motion for leave to file a reply (Dkt. No. 57).

2 24-6239 (citing Flucas, 22 F.4th at 1155).

Pilisuk’s vouching argument falls short on plain error review. See United

States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because [the defendant] did

not object to the government’s closing argument, we review his claim of improper

vouching for plain error.”). The prosecutor’s comment was ambiguous, but even

assuming the prosecutor’s comment was improper vouching, these unobjected-to

comments did not affect Pilisuk’s substantial rights. Pilisuk cannot demonstrate “a

reasonable probability that, but for” the district court’s tolerance of the

prosecutor’s now-challenged statement, “the outcome of the proceeding would

have been different” and “a jury would have acquitted” her. Greer v. United

States, 593 U.S. 503, 507–08, 510 (2021) (citation omitted).

We review de novo whether Pilisuk’s thirty-year mandatory minimum

custodial sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), violates the Eighth Amendment. See

United States v. Meiners, 485 F.3d 1211, 1212 (9th Cir. 2007). It does not, as the

gravity of Pilisuk’s offense is not grossly disproportionate to the sentence imposed.

See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59–61 (2010).

Finally, consistent with Gnirke, we construe Special Condition 3 narrowly as

applying “(1) to any materials with depictions of ‘sexually explicit conduct’

involving children, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2), and (2) to any materials

with depictions of ‘sexually explicit conduct’ involving adults, defined as explicit

3 24-6239 sexually stimulating depictions of adult sexual conduct that are deemed

inappropriate by [Pilisuk]’s probation officer.” 775 F.3d at 1166. This limiting

construction aligns with the parties’ positions, respects Pilisuk’s First Amendment

rights, and honors the district court’s intention to limit Pilisuk’s access to both

child and adult pornography.

AFFIRMED.

4 24-6239