USCA4 Appeal: 24-4330 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4330
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PIERRE DE ROMEO SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Elizabeth W. Hanes, District Judge. (2:22-cr-00122-EWH-DEM-1)
Submitted: February 27, 2025 Decided: April 24, 2025
Before WILKINSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: S. Mario Lorello, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Jacqueline R. Bechara, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, E. Rebecca Gantt, Assistant United States Attorney, Megan M. Montoya, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4330 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Pierre De Romeo Smith appeals his convictions following a jury trial and the district
court’s order denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for a new trial. A jury convicted
Smith of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1),
(b)(1) (Count 1); sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2)
(Count 2); production of a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (Count 3); possession with intent to distribute cocaine
(Count 4), fentanyl (Count 5), and methamphetamine (Count 6), all in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 7). On appeal, Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his convictions on all seven counts. He also argues that the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct. We
affirm.
We review de novo the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of
acquittal. United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 401 (4th Cir. 2022). “We will uphold
the jury’s verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The jury, not the reviewing court, weighs credibility and resolves conflicts in the
evidence; and if the evidence supports different, reasonable interpretations, the jury decides
which interpretation to believe.” United States v. Wysinger, 64 F.4th 207, 211 (4th Cir.)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 175 (2023). “[A] defendant
who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy burden.” United States v.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4330 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292, 308 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Reversal
for insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Smith first argues that the Government did not prove that he used force, threats of
force, or coercion to cause the sex trafficking victim (“Jane Doe”) to engage in commercial
sex acts, as alleged in Count 1. But the trial testimony belies his claim. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2); Wysinger, 64 F.4th at 211, 213 (discussing elements of statute). And,
in any event, the jury decides how to interpret and resolve conflicts in the evidence. See
Wysinger, 64 F.4th at 211.
Smith next argues that there was insufficient evidence to show he was aware of Jane
Doe’s age. Because Smith did not raise this specific ground in his Rule 29 motion in the
district court, we review this claim to determine whether “a manifest miscarriage of justice
has occurred.” United States v. Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Rao, 123 F.4th 270, 276 (5th Cir. 2024)
(defining manifest miscarriage of justice). To sustain Smith’s conviction on Count 2, the
Government “need not prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact,
that the [victim]” was under 18 years old. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c). Instead, the Government
needs to prove only that “the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the
person.” Id.; see United States v. Williams, 127 F.4th 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2025) (“[I]f a
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the underage victim, the defendant’s
knowledge of the victim’s age is irrelevant.”). Because Smith knew Jane Doe for a month
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and interacted with her on numerous occasions, he had a reasonable opportunity to observe
her. Thus, no manifest miscarriage of justice occurred.
Regarding Count 3, Smith argues that the evidence presented was “consistent with
a reasonable hypothesis of innocence that it was Jane Doe’s idea and decision to create the
photographs, free from any coercion or inducement or purposeful acts on [his] part.”
(Appellant’s Br. (ECF No. 18) at 20). But it is the jury’s province to decide which version
of the facts to believe. Wysinger, 64 F.4th at 211; see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); United States v.
McCauley, 983 F.3d 690, 695 n.3 (4th Cir. 2020) (stating elements of offense). Smith’s
challenge therefore fails.
Smith asserts that the Government failed to prove he constructively possessed the
controlled substances and firearm in Counts 4 through 7. “Constructive possession requires
ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband or the premises or vehicle in which
the contraband was concealed and knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” United
States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
United States v. Robertson, 68 F.4th 855, 862 (4th Cir.) (stating elements of § 922(g)
offense), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 301 (2023); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-4330 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4330
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PIERRE DE ROMEO SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Elizabeth W. Hanes, District Judge. (2:22-cr-00122-EWH-DEM-1)
Submitted: February 27, 2025 Decided: April 24, 2025
Before WILKINSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: S. Mario Lorello, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Jacqueline R. Bechara, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, E. Rebecca Gantt, Assistant United States Attorney, Megan M. Montoya, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4330 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Pierre De Romeo Smith appeals his convictions following a jury trial and the district
court’s order denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for a new trial. A jury convicted
Smith of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1),
(b)(1) (Count 1); sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2)
(Count 2); production of a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (Count 3); possession with intent to distribute cocaine
(Count 4), fentanyl (Count 5), and methamphetamine (Count 6), all in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 7). On appeal, Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his convictions on all seven counts. He also argues that the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct. We
affirm.
We review de novo the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of
acquittal. United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 401 (4th Cir. 2022). “We will uphold
the jury’s verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The jury, not the reviewing court, weighs credibility and resolves conflicts in the
evidence; and if the evidence supports different, reasonable interpretations, the jury decides
which interpretation to believe.” United States v. Wysinger, 64 F.4th 207, 211 (4th Cir.)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 175 (2023). “[A] defendant
who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy burden.” United States v.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4330 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292, 308 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Reversal
for insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Smith first argues that the Government did not prove that he used force, threats of
force, or coercion to cause the sex trafficking victim (“Jane Doe”) to engage in commercial
sex acts, as alleged in Count 1. But the trial testimony belies his claim. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2); Wysinger, 64 F.4th at 211, 213 (discussing elements of statute). And,
in any event, the jury decides how to interpret and resolve conflicts in the evidence. See
Wysinger, 64 F.4th at 211.
Smith next argues that there was insufficient evidence to show he was aware of Jane
Doe’s age. Because Smith did not raise this specific ground in his Rule 29 motion in the
district court, we review this claim to determine whether “a manifest miscarriage of justice
has occurred.” United States v. Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Rao, 123 F.4th 270, 276 (5th Cir. 2024)
(defining manifest miscarriage of justice). To sustain Smith’s conviction on Count 2, the
Government “need not prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact,
that the [victim]” was under 18 years old. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c). Instead, the Government
needs to prove only that “the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the
person.” Id.; see United States v. Williams, 127 F.4th 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2025) (“[I]f a
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the underage victim, the defendant’s
knowledge of the victim’s age is irrelevant.”). Because Smith knew Jane Doe for a month
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4330 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2025 Pg: 4 of 5
and interacted with her on numerous occasions, he had a reasonable opportunity to observe
her. Thus, no manifest miscarriage of justice occurred.
Regarding Count 3, Smith argues that the evidence presented was “consistent with
a reasonable hypothesis of innocence that it was Jane Doe’s idea and decision to create the
photographs, free from any coercion or inducement or purposeful acts on [his] part.”
(Appellant’s Br. (ECF No. 18) at 20). But it is the jury’s province to decide which version
of the facts to believe. Wysinger, 64 F.4th at 211; see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); United States v.
McCauley, 983 F.3d 690, 695 n.3 (4th Cir. 2020) (stating elements of offense). Smith’s
challenge therefore fails.
Smith asserts that the Government failed to prove he constructively possessed the
controlled substances and firearm in Counts 4 through 7. “Constructive possession requires
ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband or the premises or vehicle in which
the contraband was concealed and knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” United
States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
United States v. Robertson, 68 F.4th 855, 862 (4th Cir.) (stating elements of § 922(g)
offense), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 301 (2023); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 873
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (stating elements of § 841(a) offense). We have concluded that,
when a defendant “was the driver and sole occupant at the time the drugs [and firearm]
were found” and the contraband was “within his reach,” that evidence is “indicative of a
high degree of dominion and control over the [contraband].” United States v. Herder, 594
F.3d 352, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2010); see Moody, 2 F.4th at 191 (“There is an inference that
the driver of the vehicle has knowledge of the contraband within it . . . .” (internal quotation
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4330 Doc: 34 Filed: 04/24/2025 Pg: 5 of 5
marks omitted)). Here, Smith was the sole occupant and driver of the vehicle in which the
contraband was found. We therefore conclude that Smith’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence fails. See Freitekh, 114 F.4th at 308.
Turning to Smith’s claim that the district court should have granted him a new trial
under Rule 33, our review is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kuehner, 126 F.4th
319, 330 (4th Cir. 2025). The district court “should exercise its discretion to award a new
trial sparingly, and a jury verdict is not to be overturned except in the rare circumstance
when the evidence weighs heavily against it.” United States v. Burfoot, 899 F.3d 326, 340
(4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]o obtain a new trial . . . , a party
must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir
dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556
(1984). Although the parties do not dispute that the juror gave untruthful answers during
voir dire, our review of the record confirms that there was no reason to dismiss the
challenged juror for cause and that the juror had no actual biases or motives that affected
the fairness of Smith’s trial. See id. at 555-56. Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. See Kuehner, 126 F.4th at 330.
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED