United States v. Philip Lampe

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Philip Lampe

712 F. App'x 590

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 26, 2018

Docket17-2621

StatusUnpublished

This text of 712 F. App'x 590 (United States v. Philip Lampe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Philip Lampe, 712 F. App'x 590 (8th Cir. 2018).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Philip Lampe directly appeals the sentence the district court 1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), suggesting that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. In a pro se brief, Lampe also appears to challenge the reasonableness of the sentence; he further contests the district court’s drug-quantity calculation and states that he was tricked into pleading guilty.

After careful review, we conclude that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Salazar-Aleman, 741 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir. 2013) (discussing appellate review of sentencing decisions). We also conclude that Lampe’s drug-quantity challenge is foreclosed because he stipulated to the drug quantity and resulting base offense level that the district court used to determine the applicable Guidelines range. See United States v. Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995) (defendant who explicit ly and voluntarily exposes himself to specific sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal). To the extent Lampe asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was involuntary, we decline to consider these arguments on direct appeal. See United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010) (if defendant did not move to withdraw plea in district court, he may not challenge voluntariness of plea for first time on direct appeal); United States v. McAdory, 501 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2007) (this court ordinarily defers ineffective-assistance claims to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings).

Having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues'for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.

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PER CURIAM.

Philip Lampe directly appeals the sentence the district court 1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), suggesting that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. In a pro se brief, Lampe also appears to challenge the reasonableness of the sentence; he further contests the district court’s drug-quantity calculation and states that he was tricked into pleading guilty.

After careful review, we conclude that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Salazar-Aleman, 741 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir. 2013) (discussing appellate review of sentencing decisions). We also conclude that Lampe’s drug-quantity challenge is foreclosed because he stipulated to the drug quantity and resulting base offense level that the district court used to determine the applicable Guidelines range. See United States v. Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995) (defendant who explicit ly and voluntarily exposes himself to specific sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal). To the extent Lampe asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was involuntary, we decline to consider these arguments on direct appeal. See United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010) (if defendant did not move to withdraw plea in district court, he may not challenge voluntariness of plea for first time on direct appeal); United States v. McAdory, 501 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2007) (this court ordinarily defers ineffective-assistance claims to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings).

Having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues'for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.

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712 F. App'x 590, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-philip-lampe-ca8-2018.

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