United States v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co.

188 F. 484, 1911 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 24, 1911
DocketNo. 17
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 188 F. 484 (United States v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 188 F. 484, 1911 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254 (E.D. Pa. 1911).

Opinion

J. B. McPHERSON, District Judge

(charging jury). The parties to this criminal proceeding have entered into a stipulation concerning the facts, and are agreed that a controlling question of law is presented thereby. They submit it for the court to decide, but 1 may say a few words to you in explanation of the decision. I shall not read the stipulation, as it is long, and the details might be difficult to follow; but the legal question may be stated thus: Does the Elkins act concerning interstate commerce apply to the continuous transportation of goods from a foreign country to a foreign country, if such goods are merely carried in bond across two or more states of the Union? In the case now on trial a cargo of sugar was shipped from Hamburg, Germany, destined, as the bill of lading states, “to Philadelphia for transportation in bond to Raymond, Alberta,” Canada, and it was taken to its destination by continuous and uninterrupted transportation at the hands of successive carriers. A steamship company carried it across the Atlantic Ocean to Philadelphia. Here, it was loaded in bond upon railway cars and was transported over the connecting lines of successive carriers until it reached Alberta, the point of ultimate destination. The Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company carried it over part of the route at a less rate than would have been lawful if the shipment had originated at Philadelphia, and it is the charging of this rate that is alleged to be a criminal offense. In my opinion the offense has not been proved. This was an unbroken series of continuous acts of transportation, beginning at Hamburg and ending at Alberta, by which the sugar was merely moved across the United States in its transit between two foreign countries, and the Elkins act as I read it does not attempt to regulate such a transaction at all. Under the facts before the court, therefore, the defendant cannot be convicted of an offense under this indictment for taking part in the carriage. As I understand the stipulation, nothing in the facts agreed upon casts any doubt upon the entire good faith of the transaction — and especially there is nothing to justify the conclusion that when the sugar reached Philadelphia it had reached a point of destination in the proper sense of that word. Philadelphia was merely a way-station on the journey, where it became necessary to substitute inland carriage for carriage across the ocean, and the transportation was only halted long enough to enable the sugar to be loaded upon the cars and the requirements of the revenue laws to be complied with. As it seems to me, the truth and reality of this somewhat complicated [486]*486transaciton is not in doubt. All the parties from the beginning to the end intended to assist in a continuous transportation from one foreign country to another, and this intention was carried out in good faith and without interruption. As I have already said, the Elkins act does not regulate such shipments at all, and, as the indictment is preferred under that statute, a verdict in favor of the defendant must be rendered.

I may add a few words about a decision relied upon by the government. In my opinion, that case (Gulf, etc., Railway Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 27 Sup. Ct. 360, 51 L. Ed. 540) rests upon a different state of facts. The corn there in question did not belong to the shipper, the Hardin Company, at all until it was delivered at Texarkana in the state of Texas. The previous owner of the corn had shipped it from South Dakota to Texarkana in order to deliver it there to the Hardin Company, and when the delivery was made the interstate shipment came to an end, and for the first time the Hardin Company became the owner'of the corn. The corn was then in Texas, and the Hardin Company was not concerned with the previous transportation. Its right under the contract with the former owner was to have certain corn delivered to it at Texarkana, and it had no interest in the previous carriage. But, having received the corn in Texas, it thereupon assumed dominion over the property and proceeded to make a new contract concerning further shipment. The previous owner had only agreed to bring the corn to Texarkana, and, having fulfilled that obligation, stepped out of the transaction altogether. The new owner of the property — which was then upon the soil of Texas —the Hardin Company, and the railway company also, were each bound by the law of Texas thereafter, so far as further carriage inside the state was concerned. But here there are no such controlling facts. The sugar started in Germany, and was then and always thereafter destined, not for Philadelphia, but for Canada. The title never changed; the sugar was never delivered, but only passed along; indeed, the place of delivery was not within the United States at all, but in Canada; and whatever happened along the route was merely the carrying out by successive steps of the original contract made in Hamburg. The precise date when the Reading Railway Company came into the transaction does not seem to be vital. Whenever it came in, its purpose (like the purpose of all the other carriers) was to aid in carrying out a contract of through shipment from Germany to Canada, and in my opinion. there was no violation of the Elkins act in so doing. So far as appears, such a transaction is not within the mischief which the act was intended to remedy, and it certainly does not seem to be within the language of the statute.

You will render a verdict for the defendant.

Tile indictment set out a departure from the legal rate of charge, a failure to observe the tariff filed with the commission, a giving and granting of a concession from the lawful rate, and a charging of less comi>ensation than such rate. The stipulation was as follows:
“(1) That at all times mentioned in the said bill of indictment, as well before as afterwards, the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company was and still is a common carrier by railroad from Philadelphia to Newberry Junction, in the state of Pennsylvania; the New York Central & Hudson [487]*487River Railroad Company was and still is a common carrier by railroad from Newberry Junction to Corning, in tlie state of New York; the Erie Railroad Company was and still is a common carrier by railroad from Corning to Buffalo, in the state of New York; the Mutual Transit Company was and still is a common carrier by water from Buffalo to Superior, in the state of 'Wisconsin, and in connection with the aforesaid common carriers by railroad was and still is a common carrier partly by railroad and partly by water under a common management, arrangement, or control from Philadelphia to Superior; the Great Northern Railway Company was and still is a common carrier by railroad from Superior to Sweet Grass, in the state of Montana; and the Alberta Railway & Irrigation Company was and still is a common carrier by railroad from Sweet Grass to Raymond, in the Province of Alberta, Canada, and the route of the said respective carriers formed a connecting continuous through route from Philadelphia to Raymond, Alberta.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Wilson
160 F.2d 745 (Seventh Circuit, 1947)
Woodbury v. Galveston, H. S.A. Ry. Co.
209 S.W. 432 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1919)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
188 F. 484, 1911 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-philadelphia-r-ry-co-paed-1911.