United States v. Petro Snegirev

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Petro Snegirev

393 F. App'x 448

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 25, 2010

Docket08-35336

StatusUnpublished

This text of 393 F. App'x 448 (United States v. Petro Snegirev) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Petro Snegirev, 393 F. App'x 448 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Petro Snegirev appeals the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence for the sale and possession of methamphetamine. Snegirev claims he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) evidence of drug purity and raise certain defenses. We review a motion to vacate under § 2255 de novo. See United States v. Guess, 203 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2000).

Snegirev cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his lawyer’s failure to challenge DEA evidence of drug purity at trial because drug purity was not at issue during the guilt phase. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Rather, the issue at trial was whether he sold and possessed methamphetamine at all. Sne-girev has never suggested he sold and possessed something other than methamphetamine.

Snegirev also cannot demonstrate that counsel’s failure to raise certain defenses prejudiced him. See id. An entrapment defense would have failed because Snegi-rev was predisposed to sell drugs. See United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 648-50 (9th Cir.2006). A defense that Snegirev did not intend to sell the drugs found in his possession would have not succeeded because he possessed an amount of methamphetamine well in excess of what is consistent with personal use. See United States v. Johnson, 357 F.3d 980, 984 & n. 11 (9th Cir.2004). His brief provides no argument in support of the assertion that his lawyer should have sought to dismiss the indictment on the basis of outrageous government conduct. See Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 1988).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM *

Petro Snegirev appeals the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence for the sale and possession of methamphetamine. Snegirev claims he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) evidence of drug purity and raise certain defenses. We review a motion to vacate under § 2255 de novo. See United States v. Guess, 203 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2000).

Snegirev cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his lawyer’s failure to challenge DEA evidence of drug purity at trial because drug purity was not at issue during the guilt phase. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Rather, the issue at trial was whether he sold and possessed methamphetamine at all. Sne-girev has never suggested he sold and possessed something other than methamphetamine.

Snegirev also cannot demonstrate that counsel’s failure to raise certain defenses prejudiced him. See id. An entrapment defense would have failed because Snegi-rev was predisposed to sell drugs. See United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 648-50 (9th Cir.2006). A defense that Snegirev did not intend to sell the drugs found in his possession would have not succeeded because he possessed an amount of methamphetamine well in excess of what is consistent with personal use. See United States v. Johnson, 357 F.3d 980, 984 & n. 11 (9th Cir.2004). His brief provides no argument in support of the assertion that his lawyer should have sought to dismiss the indictment on the basis of outrageous government conduct. See Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 1988).

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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393 F. App'x 448, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-petro-snegirev-ca9-2010.

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