KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge.
Peter Seeger appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a trial before Thomas F. Murphy, District Judge, and a jury, on an indictment charging him with a refusal to answer ten questions asked by a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, in violation of 2 U.S.C.A. § 192. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for the maximum term of one year on each of the ten counts in the indictment, to be served concurrently, and to pay the costs of his prosecution.1
Seeger, a musician and folk singer, appeared as a witness before the subcommittee on August 18, 1955 during hearings which were being conducted on the subject of communist infiltration in the field of entertainment in New York.2 Although he answered a number of questions asked by members of the subcommittee and the subcommittee’s counsel, Seeger refused to discuss allegations that he was connected with communist activities or had participated in functions allegedly sponsored by the Communist Party. The refusal was not based on a claim of constitutional privilege under the Fifth Amendment,3 but generally on Seeger’s expressed belief that the questions were either “improper” or “immoral.”4
[481]*481Nearly one year later, on July 25, 1956, appellant’s refusal to answer those questions was reported to the House of Representatives; and the House thereupon voted to certify the report to the United States Attorney for prosecution. On March 26, 1957 the ten count indictment, predicated on appellant’s refusal to answer ten stated questions, was filed.5 Seeger pleaded not guilty, and subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment. In support ’of this motion it was argued, inter alia, that the indictment was defective because it failed “to state the authority of the sub-committee to conduct the inquiry before which the defendant was summoned as a witness.” The motion was denied in an oral opinion delivered from the bench.6
On appeal, Seeger contends that his conviction should be reversed on several grounds. Among them he challenges the authority of the subcommittee, the manner in which the hearings were conducted, the Grand Jury proceedings, and the adequacy of the indictment; moreover, he urges us to consider several errors allegedly committed by the court below during trial. Some of these contentions pertain to claimed violations of appellant’s rights under the First7 and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. However, we find it unnecessary to consider the merits of any of these arguments, except one: that the indictment was defective because it failed to properly allege the authority of the subcommittee to conduct the hearings in issue, and to set forth the basis of that authority accurately.
The “Contempt of Congress” statute under which this prosecution was brought, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192, states in part:
“Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony * * * upon any matter under inquiry before * * * any committee * * * willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor * * * ” (italics added).
A conviction for a violation of Section 192 cannot be sustained unless it appears [482]*482(1) that Congress had the constitutional power to investigate the matter in issue or to make the particular inquiry, Watkins v. U. S., 354 U.S. 178, 187, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957); Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U.S. 263, 292, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-174, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880); (2) that the committee or subcommittee8 was duly empowered to conduct the investigation, and that the inquiry was within the scope of the grant of authority, U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42-43 (1953) 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770; U. S. v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312, 315 (2d Cir. 1956), affirming 18 F.R.D. 27, 33 (S.D.N.Y.1955); U. S. v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1953); U. S. v. Kamin, 136 F.Supp. 791, 793 (D.Mass.1956); (3) that the question was pertinent to the authorized inquiry, Barenblatt v. U. S., 360 U.S. 109, 123, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 (1959); Sacher v. U. S., 356 U.S. 576, 577, 78 S.Ct. 842, 2 L.Ed.2d 987 (1958); and (4) that the refusal to answer was deliberate and intentional, Quinn v. U. S., 349 U.S. 155, 165, 75 S.Ct. 668, 99 L.Ed. 964 (1955).
In order to determine whether an indictment which charges a violation of 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 is valid, the Court must examine it in light of the requirement of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” made against him. Procedurally, this means that an indictment must set forth an offense “with clearness, and all necessary certainty, to apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands charged,” U. S. v. Mills, 7 Pet. 138, 142, 8 L.Ed. 636 (1833). Thus, it has been long recognized that “every ingredient of which the offence is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged in the indictment * * * ” U. S. v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168, 174, 21 L.Ed. 538 (1872).9
“The object of the indictment is, first, to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defence, and avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and, second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.” U. S. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875).
U. S. v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377, 378, 74 S.Ct. 113, 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953); Hagner v. U. S., 285 U.S. 427, 431, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932); Wong Tai v. U. S., 273 U.S. 77, 80-81, 47 S.Ct. 300, 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927); Evans v. U. S., 153 U.S. 584, 587, 14 S.Ct. 934, 38 L.Ed. 830 (1894); U. S. v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487, 8 S.Ct. 571, 31 L.Ed. 516 (1888); U. S. v. Achtner, 144 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1944).
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KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge.
Peter Seeger appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a trial before Thomas F. Murphy, District Judge, and a jury, on an indictment charging him with a refusal to answer ten questions asked by a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, in violation of 2 U.S.C.A. § 192. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for the maximum term of one year on each of the ten counts in the indictment, to be served concurrently, and to pay the costs of his prosecution.1
Seeger, a musician and folk singer, appeared as a witness before the subcommittee on August 18, 1955 during hearings which were being conducted on the subject of communist infiltration in the field of entertainment in New York.2 Although he answered a number of questions asked by members of the subcommittee and the subcommittee’s counsel, Seeger refused to discuss allegations that he was connected with communist activities or had participated in functions allegedly sponsored by the Communist Party. The refusal was not based on a claim of constitutional privilege under the Fifth Amendment,3 but generally on Seeger’s expressed belief that the questions were either “improper” or “immoral.”4
[481]*481Nearly one year later, on July 25, 1956, appellant’s refusal to answer those questions was reported to the House of Representatives; and the House thereupon voted to certify the report to the United States Attorney for prosecution. On March 26, 1957 the ten count indictment, predicated on appellant’s refusal to answer ten stated questions, was filed.5 Seeger pleaded not guilty, and subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment. In support ’of this motion it was argued, inter alia, that the indictment was defective because it failed “to state the authority of the sub-committee to conduct the inquiry before which the defendant was summoned as a witness.” The motion was denied in an oral opinion delivered from the bench.6
On appeal, Seeger contends that his conviction should be reversed on several grounds. Among them he challenges the authority of the subcommittee, the manner in which the hearings were conducted, the Grand Jury proceedings, and the adequacy of the indictment; moreover, he urges us to consider several errors allegedly committed by the court below during trial. Some of these contentions pertain to claimed violations of appellant’s rights under the First7 and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. However, we find it unnecessary to consider the merits of any of these arguments, except one: that the indictment was defective because it failed to properly allege the authority of the subcommittee to conduct the hearings in issue, and to set forth the basis of that authority accurately.
The “Contempt of Congress” statute under which this prosecution was brought, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192, states in part:
“Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony * * * upon any matter under inquiry before * * * any committee * * * willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor * * * ” (italics added).
A conviction for a violation of Section 192 cannot be sustained unless it appears [482]*482(1) that Congress had the constitutional power to investigate the matter in issue or to make the particular inquiry, Watkins v. U. S., 354 U.S. 178, 187, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957); Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U.S. 263, 292, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-174, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880); (2) that the committee or subcommittee8 was duly empowered to conduct the investigation, and that the inquiry was within the scope of the grant of authority, U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42-43 (1953) 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770; U. S. v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312, 315 (2d Cir. 1956), affirming 18 F.R.D. 27, 33 (S.D.N.Y.1955); U. S. v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1953); U. S. v. Kamin, 136 F.Supp. 791, 793 (D.Mass.1956); (3) that the question was pertinent to the authorized inquiry, Barenblatt v. U. S., 360 U.S. 109, 123, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 (1959); Sacher v. U. S., 356 U.S. 576, 577, 78 S.Ct. 842, 2 L.Ed.2d 987 (1958); and (4) that the refusal to answer was deliberate and intentional, Quinn v. U. S., 349 U.S. 155, 165, 75 S.Ct. 668, 99 L.Ed. 964 (1955).
In order to determine whether an indictment which charges a violation of 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 is valid, the Court must examine it in light of the requirement of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” made against him. Procedurally, this means that an indictment must set forth an offense “with clearness, and all necessary certainty, to apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands charged,” U. S. v. Mills, 7 Pet. 138, 142, 8 L.Ed. 636 (1833). Thus, it has been long recognized that “every ingredient of which the offence is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged in the indictment * * * ” U. S. v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168, 174, 21 L.Ed. 538 (1872).9
“The object of the indictment is, first, to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defence, and avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and, second, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.” U. S. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875).
U. S. v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377, 378, 74 S.Ct. 113, 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953); Hagner v. U. S., 285 U.S. 427, 431, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932); Wong Tai v. U. S., 273 U.S. 77, 80-81, 47 S.Ct. 300, 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927); Evans v. U. S., 153 U.S. 584, 587, 14 S.Ct. 934, 38 L.Ed. 830 (1894); U. S. v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487, 8 S.Ct. 571, 31 L.Ed. 516 (1888); U. S. v. Achtner, 144 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1944).
In view of this constitutional mandate, and the undisputed fact that the Government must establish that a committee or subcommittee was duly authorized and that its investigation was within the scope of the delegated authority, an indictment under Section 192 is defective if the authority is not pleaded, U. S. v. Lamont, supra.
[483]*483“The cornerstone of the Government’s case in any prosecution under § 192 must be a lawfully constituted committee engaged in an inquiry within the scope of its authority when the refusal to answer occurred. This is the hard core of its case against the defendant and he is entitled to have it pleaded in the indictment.”10
Furthermore, as Judge Weinfeld pointed out in the lower court opinion in the Lamont case,
“There is an added reason why this element should be pleaded. With pertinency also an essential element, it is important for the defendant in preparing his defense to know the claimed source of authority since ‘The initial step in determining the pertinency of the question is to ascertain the subject matter of the inquiry then being conducted by the subcommittee.’ [Bowers v. United States, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 202 F.2d 447, 448.] Or, as stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Rumely case, the resolution under which the committee purports to act is the ‘controlling charter’ of its powers and governs ‘its right to exact testimony.’ [United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44, 73 S.Ct. 543, 545, 97 L.Ed. 770.] Since pertinency must be and has been pleaded, there is no logical reason why the authority of the com,mittee should not likewise be pleaded.” Id., 18 F.R.D. pp. 33-34 (italics added).11
The Government does not appear to contest this.12 Instead, it seeks to have us disregard and overrule the pertinent and correlative holding of U. S. v. Lamont, supra, that it is not enough to allege the subcommittee was “duly authorized,” but that “the source of its claimed authority, whether it be a resolution of the [House of Representatives] or the parent committee [Cf. United States v. DiCarlo, D.C.N.D.Ohio, 102 F.Supp. 597] should be alleged in the indictment.”13
This we cannot do. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure unmistakably require the Government to plead “the essential facts constituting the offense charged,” Rule 7(c), Fed.R.Crim.P., 18 U.S.C.A. (italics added), and not mere legal conclusions. As we have already noted, the basic function of an indictment is to inform the defendant so that he may defend himself. See, Scott, A Fair Trial for the Accused, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 509, 518 (1957).14 “For this, facts are to be stated, not conclusions of law alone,” U. S. v. Cruikshank, supra. Anxious as we are to avoid over-elaboration and formalism, we cannot condone “a formalism of generality.”15
Moreover, unless we disregard as mere surplusage certain allegations in the indictment before us, a course not urged by the Government, it is perfectly clear that the prosecutor recognized that it was necessary to allege facts indicating the [484]*484subcommittee’s authority. The first paragraph of the indictment purports to relate the substance of a resolution passed by the Committee on Un-American Activities on June 8, 1955 directing the subcommittee to conduct the investigation.16 The second paragraph then states that “pursuant to said direction” the subcommittee conducted the hearings at which Seeger appeared as a witness. But the resolution of June 8, 1955 (Government Exh. 9, p. 2260) was not such an authorization to the subcommittee. It was merely a direction to the parent Committee’s clerk to proceed with an investigation. See U. S. v. Yarus, supra, 198 F.Supp. at p. 427. The resolution of July 27, 1955 (Government Exh. 8), which actually purports to authorize the subcommittee to proceed with the hearings was nowhere mentioned. In other words, instead of a “clear,” “accurate” and “unambiguous” allegation of the essential facts indicating the subcommittee’s authority, the indictment contained a wholly misleading and incorrect statement of the basis of that authority.17 This not only runs afoul of accepted notions of fair notice, but goes “to the very substance of whether or not any crime has been shown.” U. S. v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 316.
The possibility that a defendant might obtain this essential information by means of a bill of particulars does not affect our conclusion. A bill of particulars cannot repair a fatal defect in an indictment, U. S. v. Lamont, supra, at p. 315, because the defendant has a constitutional right to a fair and accurate accusation by indictment; and there is no unconditional right to a bill of particulars, U. S. v. Bentvena, D.C., 193 F.Supp. 485, 498 (1960). Furthermore, in the instant case, although the trial court did order the Government to specify the basis of the subcommittee’s authority in a bill of particulars, the vital resolution of July 27, 1955 (Government Exh. 8) was not produced in compliance with that order.18
There can be no doubt that it is the duty of every citizen to help Congress obtain information which it needs to legislate intelligently and effectively. It should be expected that persons summoned before a Congressional committee will respect its dignity; and a witness has an “unremitting obligation * * * to testify fully with respect to matters within the province of proper investigation.” Watkins v. U. S., supra, 354 U.S at pp. 187, 188.
When Congress believes that its authority has been flouted by improper behavior of a witness who has refused to give testimony before one of its subcommittees, and has voted that the witness be prosecuted for contempt, it is incumbent upon the courts to apply the [485]*485sanctions provided by law for that offense. “But when Congress seeks to enforce its investigating authority through the criminal process administered by the federal judiciary, the safeguards of criminal justice become operative,” U. S. v. Sacher, 356 U.S. 577, 78 S.Ct. 843. The issue then is not only whether Congress, or the prosecutor, or even a judge might believe that the defendant is guilty of contempt; it is whether he has been accused and tried in full compliance with the transcending principles of fairness embodied in our Constitution and protected by our law.
“When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps. No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures. The methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the quality of our civilization may be judged.” Coppedge v. U. S., 82 S.Ct. 917.
In this instance we have concluded that the prosecutor cannot put a gloss on the essential and basic teachings of the Lamont case, fortified by constitutional holdings of the Supreme Court. A defendant, faced with possible loss of liberty, should not, at the commencement of the prosecution, be made to guess whether the inquiring body had power to exact his testimony. The burden placed upon the prosecutor by a requirement that he adequately and accurately allege facts indicating the existence of this element of the crime is minor; and the Government is in no way prejudiced in its attempt to vindicate the authority of Congress. On the other hand, the benefit derived from that requirement by the accused is substantial; and the benefit is wholly consistent with, and we believe dictated by principles of fundamental fairness.
The Government would dispose of appellant’s argument as a “hypertechnical” challenge to a conviction warranted by the evidence. But an assertion that a prosecution must begin with a fair and accurate accusation involves more than mere technicality or form. It goes to substance. We are not inclined to dismiss lightly claims of constitutional stature because they are asserted by one who may appear unworthy of sympathy. “Once we embark upon shortcuts by creating a category of the ‘obviously guilty’ whose rights are denied, we run the risk that the circle of the unprotected will grow.” U. S. v. Tribote, 297 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1961).
Reversed and indictment dismissed.